Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

310. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 18, 1955—10 p.m.

Secto 39. Hammarskjold today handed to President and Secretary² texts (1) Swedish Ambassador’s talk with Chou En-lai on July 8 and (2) Hammarskjold’s reply.³

First text follows:

“At the request of Mr. Hammarskjold, the Swedish Ambassador to Peking saw Mr. Chou En-lai on 8 July 1955 and transmitted to him orally a message from Mr. Hammarskjold of 2 July.⁴ In summary Mr. Chou En-lai replied as follows:

The Chinese Government had thoroughly examined Mr. Hammarskjold’s previous message of 2 June⁵ and had found that the development had not corresponded to the views expressed therein by the Secretary-General. The Chinese Government had reached the conclusion that the U.S. Government feared that China after release of the prisoners would continue to take other steps in order to lessen the tension. Such a development would not be welcomed by the United States. In support of this opinion Mr. Chou En-lai made the following points:

1. Through the conference at Bandoeng it had become clear that an increasing number of states wished to restore the rights of China in the United Nations. This had worried Mr. Dulles who in San Francisco had concentrated his attacks against China.

2. Mr. Lodge had made complaints about steps taken by China in the Straits of Formosa and had without any foundation feared China.

3. Members of the Secretariat of the United Nations had expressed themselves in favor of pressure against China. The American intentions obviously aimed at stirring up Chinese public opinion and counter-acting those efforts towards a relaxation of the tension, which had been made by persons with good intentions. Specifically, the Americans aimed at preventing China from releasing the prisoners. In the event that they were released, propaganda would be made to the effect that China had given in to pressure.

Mr. Hammarskjold’s message of 2 July had presented a new example of pressure. To make a report on the prisoners issue to the United Nations, which had illegally deprived China of its seat, would not have this effect on China. If a contribution to the relaxation of tension was intended, it would not be right to exert pressure through the United Nations. China would certainly not yield to any pressure. The Chinese authorities would follow its own rules and be led by its own judgment as to what would best serve the purpose of lessening the tension. The pressure policy of the United States was borne out by the American military provocations and manoeuvres in the Formosa Straits which aimed at intimidation.

Mr. Hammarskjold had been in Peking and it ought to be clear to him that China conducted a peaceful policy. The Chinese Government had announced its wish to negotiate with the United States, which country had demonstrated the greatest antagonism against China. It had not been China that had taken an ambiguous position. It was now for the United States to show a spirit of conciliation, which would not be rejected. However, the attitude taken by the United States at present could not lead to a relaxation of the tension.

In conclusion, Mr. Chou En-lai expressed his great appreciation for having had an opportunity to make his views clear to Mr. Hammarskjold and stated that he would be willing to continue the discussions on the basis of the friendly attitude, which had inspired the conversations in Peking.”

Second text follows:

“I received on 9 July 1955 from the Swedish Ambassador in Peking an account of your recent talk with him. Your willingness to continue our discussions on the basis of the friendly attitude, which inspired our talks in Peking as well as our subsequuent contacts in the course of the spring, is fully shared by me.

The central point of my letter of 2 June was my question what—if anything—I could do in order to facilitate a solution of the prisoner problem. In that letter and in my most recent message I tried to give you, with great frankness, my personal reasons for feeling with growing urgency my responsibility under the Charter to contribute to a relaxation of tensions by doing what I can along the line indicated by my question.

The basis on which I approach this problem remains in all respects the same as it was in Peking. Although I act in my own right in my contacts with you and although I recognize that you reject the General Assembly resolution on the prisoners, this resolution—as noted also in the course of the Peking talks—necessarily has binding force on me as concerns the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. In this context that relationship constitutes the only basis for an element of pressure which is a pressure on me as an officer of the organization, explained by the fact that I have a formal duty towards the General Assembly to account for my activities.

I have given serious consideration to your comments on the present situation. My interpretation of the attitude of the United States authorities differs from yours. This difference of opinion between us, however, should be considered rather as a reason to continue our discussions than as an obstacle to further contacts which in my view represent a bridge to which there is no equivalent.

As I shall remain in Geneva, where I arrived yesterday, until the end of next week and I intend to be back here at the beginning of August, the Consulate General of the Peoples Republic of China in Geneva may, during that time, present the simplest line of communication between us.”

End verbatim text.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–1855. Secret.

2. The President’s appointment book indicates that he met with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Secretary Dulles at 12:30 p.m. on July 18. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments.) A memorandum of conversation by Dulles, dated July 26, which apparently refers to this conversation, reads as follows:

   “At Geneva, on a date I have now forgotten (probably July 18) I spoke to Mr. Hammarskjold and asked him whether or not he thought it would be helpful or the reverse if we should through direct contacts with the Chinese Communists seek to reinforce his efforts to get back the eleven US prisoners of war. He said he thought that it would be helpful.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

   No other record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library. A memorandum of July 18 by Goodpaster of a subsequent luncheon conversation between the President and the Secretary-General, at which China was a subject of discussion but the question of the fliers was not directly discussed, is scheduled for publication in the Summit Conference compilation in a forthcoming volume.

3. The two documents, both dated July 11 and bearing notations that they were handed to the President and the Secretary at the Palais des Nations on July 18, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.
4. See footnote 2, Document 281.
5. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 264.