Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

300. Letter From Burmese Prime Minister U Nu to the Secretary of State¹

San Francisco, July 14, 1955.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I have recently received through our Ambassador in Peking a delayed message from Premier Chou En-lai which is causing me considerable concern.

The message began with Premier Chou En-lai’s charge that the United States–Cambodian Military Assistance Agreement constituted a violation of the Geneva Agreement.² You will recall that we discussed this during my visit to Washington. The message then refers to the fact that consultations had not yet begun with a view to making preparations for the General Elections to be held in Vietnam in July 1956, although the Geneva Agreement required that such consultations and preparations should begin in July 1955. It adds that the release of the four American pilots did not seem to have contributed to relaxation of tensions; rather it was Premier Chou En-lai’s impression that China’s action in releasing these pilots had been interpreted as a sign of weakness. Indeed, his message carried the insinuation that the hope which I had expressed at Bandung to the effect that the release of the air-men would bring about a reduction of tensions had not been fulfilled. Premier Chou En-lai further complained that Kuomintang harassment of the Chinese coast had been on the increase recently.

As I said in opening this letter, China’s attitude in general as reflected in this message is causing me considerable concern. It seems to me that we just cannot let the situation drift, and that we need to do something to check the threatened deterioration in the situation in the Far East.

I am particularly concerned with the situation in Cambodia and Laos, for reasons which are well known to you. The recent reports in the newspapers of the renewal of fighting in Northern Laos have done nothing to allay my concern. I am anxious that something be done immediately to prevent a worsening of the situation in these countries. I have given the matter much anxious thought, and have been forced to fall back on my former conclusion, which is that the only way to arrest the drift is for discussions to take place, at the highest possible level, between the United States and China as soon as possible. I do hope that you will use all your influence to bring about such discussions. I personally do not believe that there is any danger that Asia, and for that matter the whole world, would regard United States agreement to enter into discussions with China as evidence of weakness since no man in his senses today could possibly regard America as weak. On the contrary, I sincerely believe that it would be regarded as a magnanimous act.

It may be that it would be advantageous to bring some other countries into the discussions. In that event, Cambodia, Laos, France and India would seem to be appropriate—the first two for obvious reasons, France because of her continuing interest in Cambodia and Laos, and India because of her role under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. But of course the question of which, if any, of these countries should be invited is something which must be left entirely to the United States and China to decide.

I should be glad to know your reaction to this suggestion. In view of the urgency and importance of this matter, I am trying to ensure that this letter reaches you before you leave for Geneva. As you know, we are strictly “peace brokers” in this matter. We want peace because we abhor war with all its sacrifice in blood and treasure, and because peace is a pre-requisite to the amelieration of the conditions in which live so large a proportion of the world’s population. It is this, and this alone, which prompts me to address this letter to you.³

With kind regards to you and Mrs. Dulles

Sincerely yours,

Maung Nu⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7–1455. Top Secret. Text was transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Tedul 12 to Geneva, July 16. (Ibid., 611.93/7–1655) This letter was apparently classified by the Department of State.
2. The text of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, signed on July 21, 1954, and the Cambodian Armistice Agreement, signed at Geneva on July 20, 1954, are in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xvi, pp. 1540 and 1531. The United States was not a signatory of either agreement, but see Secto 711 from Geneva, July 21, 1954, which transmitted the statement by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made at Geneva in the Eighth Plenary Session of the Conference, on July 21, 1954, Ibid., p. 1500.

3. A message from Robertson to U Nu, transmitted in telegram 50 to Rangoon, July 18, states that his message had been relayed to Secretary Dulles, who had “requested me to tell you that he has already taken certain steps along the lines you have recommended” and that “the U.S. shares your concern regarding the tenor of Chou En-lai’s message to you because the analysis of the situation expressed in that message seems totally incorrect and represents a dangerous approach.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7–1855) A letter of August 1 from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Nu noted that direct talks with the Chinese were beginning that day at Geneva and added, “I do not expect any major results, at least not quickly, but the fact of talking about our differences may help prevent their developing for the worse.”

   A letter of August 19 from U Nu to Dulles thanked him for his letter, with its message on the Geneva talks, and said he had sent a quotation of it to Premier Chou En-lai, since he thought Chou would be interested in it and that it would be useful to communicate it to him. (Both Ibid., 033.90B11/8–2955)

4. The use of the subordinate prefix “Maung” rather than the honorific “U” was a courtesy.