Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 14, 1955, 3:10 p.m.¹

Washington, June 14, 1955, 3:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Menon’s Trip to Peking

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Krishna Menon
• Ambassador Mehta of India
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Mr. Menon and Ambassador Mehta spent an hour and a half with the Secretary this afternoon. As Mr. Menon did not seem disposed to begin talking himself, the Secretary opened by going over the views of the United States in general terms. He said that the American Government and people have no desire for war with Communist China. This Administration was the one that stopped the war in Korea by concluding the armistice despite some criticism. It had been difficult for the United States to keep those hostilities limited to Korea since there was much pressure in the United States for widening them. If the armistice had not come about when it did, the war probably would have spread. Mr. Menon nodded agreement. The Secretary then pointed out that, with regard to China, it would be even more difficult than in Korea to limit hostilities for China is an extremely large country and it is difficult to see just where military operations would stop. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Russians would not be involved. Such hostilities would mean the use of atomic weapons which would lead to the total devastation of Chinese communications and other facilities, leaving 600,000,000 Chinese destitute, and in ruins. Since the United States would then have to sustain the very existence of all the Chinese, there would not be any constructive purpose to such a war.

A few months ago the Secretary feared that hostilities with China were inevitable. An ugly situation seemed to be developing which would lead to war. However, there now appeared to have been a change for the better in recent months. While Mr. Menon might disagree, the Secretary felt that the Bandung Conference had had a beneficial effect in that regard. Whatever intentions Chou En-lai might have had when he came to Bandung, at least it could be said that the opinions expressed by the delegates there must have had a moderating influence. The perceptible improvements in the general situation had been due to the various factors in addition to Bandung. The United States itself had taken several steps to contribute to this atmosphere. The Secretary mentioned the following:

1. We helped the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate the Tachen Islands.

2. Our Treaty with the Republic of China covered only Taiwan and the Pescadores although the Chinese Government had pressed to have the treaty cover the offshore islands.

3. We have restrained the Chinese Nationalists from attacking airfields on the mainland opposite Taiwan despite the fact that the Chinese Communists have been constructing a large airfield complex there which for jet aircraft constitute a real threat to Taiwan. This Chinese Communist air buildup is an extremely serious matter of great concern to the Chinese Nationalists. Nevertheless, we had decided in the larger interests of the situation to restrain the Chinese Nationalists in this regard. So far we have been able to do this. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists are still continuing to rush completion of additional jet airfields in this area. The Chinese Communists are mounting a large military buildup across from Formosa which had the very opposite effect of lessening tension in this area.

4. The Secretary mentioned that the United States Government was looking into the possibility that U.S. aircraft might be operating too close to or, perhaps, even by mistake, over Chinese Communist areas, but that the military orders in this regard now had some revision in order to eliminate this possible provocation.

5. Finally, the U.S. Government had taken steps to facilitate the return of the Chinese students in America who wish to return to mainland China.

The Secretary told Mr. Menon that he was outlining this information for Mr. Menon in order to show him the extent to which the United States, itself, had gone in this whole matter. The Secretary then asked Mr. Menon what he thought might be done, particularly by the Chinese Communists, in the light of his discussions in Peiping.

Mr. Menon said that India’s interest was precisely the same as that outlined by the Secretary, namely, to avoid war and to reduce tensions. The question is not which side would win a war but how it could be prevented from occurring. He agreed that it would be difficult to keep the war from spreading and that it undoubtedly would involve atomic weapons with all the obvious consequences not only for China but for the rest of the world, even India. He said that Russia, at least, would supply Communist China with war materials and, perhaps, do even more. As he put it, “we cannot stop the wind and the rain”. So the problem is to see if this dangerous situation can be avoided.

Mr. Menon said that he had been greatly encouraged by his talks with the Secretary on his previous visit to Washington. The Secretary’s views had been of great help to him in his discussions with the Chinese because he knew the attitude of the President and the Secretary. He then said that in his discussions with the Chinese and Americans there were the following things to ascertain:

1. Is there a possible basis for agreement on entering into direct negotiations;

2. What conditions should be established precedent to such negotiations;

3. What should be the form of such negotiations.

Menon several times made it clear that he did not wish to get into any discussion of the status and disposition of Formosa, although he had his own personal ideas about that. He also felt that this question should not be made part of the initial process of getting direct negotiations started.

With respect to the first point, direct negotiations, Menon felt that the first important element was to determine quickly whether or not they are possible. He felt they are. He reiterated throughout the afternoon’s conversation the hope that the United States Government would now agree to the idea as well as to some of the other points. On the basis of his talks in Peiping and Washington, he had found a common desire to reduce tensions and to find some way of achieving this objective. Therefore, direct negotiations could be agreed to on the basis of “reducing tensions” but not on the future status of Formosa. The Chinese Communists are really firm, he believes, in wanting peace and in not desiring war. They will refrain from hostilities as long as talks are going on and until negotiations fail. Menon emphasized that, in any event, the Chinese Communists will get the offshore islands and that we should make no mistake about that. They now have the force to take the islands if they desire. And if there are negotiations, Menon implied that the assumption of Communist control over the offshore islands would be one of the matters to be worked out peacefully. Because of that, the Chinese Communists would be willing to forego use of force to take these islands as long as the talks go on. If the talks fail, then that would mean war. However, he believed it would be better to try negotiations since we would all be no worse off than we are now. At least we would buy time.

The Secretary commented that it often happens that some issues should not be forced prematurely into negotiations in an effort to seek a solution, for such negotiations only lead to a break-off and undesirable results. If matters have not ripened to a point where some settlement can be envisaged, it is better to wait for time to work things out. The Secretary noted that the Chinese traditionally have had the faculty of letting time work things out and have been known for their patience in not pressing for premature solutions. He hoped the Chinese Communists would realize this now. Menon agreed. The question of Formosa is one of these issues. The Secretary said he could conceive of no solution at this time, since neither side would disavow their claims. Perhaps Mr. Menon had a solution but, in any event, the Secretary felt this whole question might take a long time, perhaps several years to work out. He thought it would be helpful for everybody concerned to realize this. Since the Chinese have lived without Formosa for some sixty years, they can get along without it for some more. Their authority over it was always very tenuous for centuries anyway. Moreover, the United States virtually alone had wrested Formosa away from Japan and we were not now going to return it to a regime proclaiming its hostility toward us. However, while there were advantages in buying time in this kind of situation, that did not mean we were willing to wait indefinitely for the release of Americans unjustly and illegally held by the Chinese Communists.

As to creating the conditions precedent to such negotiations, Menon believed that there were certain things that the United States could do and that they were primarily of a negative character. These were:

(a) To let relatives enter China to visit the American prisoners. Menon expressed his personal opinion several times that this would soon result in the release of all the prisoners, although he specifically said this unofficially and not for the record. He suggested that India, if it were desirable, would seek safe passage or other guarantees that the relatives would be able to leave China and that they would not be mistreated.

The Secretary explained that such a proposal would be extremely difficult for us to accept. The American public opinion would not see why the prisoners should not be let out in the first place and why more Americans would have to be involved in China. The Chinese Communists are illegally and unjustly holding American prisoners. When Mr. Menon demurred, the Secretary said that he thought the question of the prisoners had been settled in the Korean Armistice negotiations. The American people could not be expected to trust the Communists with another promise after they had broken a previous one. It would be like sending another child to the kidnappers of one’s baby. In short, the Secretary said he did not believe the United States could consider this proposal but at least he would think it over. Menon, however, urged this proposal on the Secretary several times.

(b) To permit American reporters or columnists to go into China to see for themselves and write their impressions. The Indian Government would also try to arrange safe passage or other guarantees for them.

The Secretary cited the difficulty of changing recently established passport regulations which prohibit American nationals from entering Communist China.² He said it would be difficult for Americans to understand why we had reversed this ruling with Americans still in jail in China. How could we be sure, he asked, that they might not also get into trouble? Menon tried to explain that such a step on our part would help the position of the Chinese Communists internally and create a better atmosphere for developing direct negotiations. He believed that the Chinese Communists also have a problem with respect to the release of the prisoners and the creation of suitable conditions for trying to negotiate the reduction of tensions.

(c) To persuade the Chinese Nationalists to abandon the “scorched-earth” policy in the off-shore islands.

While this reference was not altogether clear, Menon said that the Chinese Nationalists must not destroy the means for civilian existence on the off-shore islands, if they evacuate them, as they had the Tachens. If they indicate they will insist on such a policy it will make negotiations extremely difficult.

(d) The United States should not set prerequisites to negotiations such as the prior release of American prisoners, although Menon again said he was sure that all prisoners would be released if his general courses of action were initiated.

As to the form of negotiations, Menon strongly advised against seeking any formal diplomatic arrangements with delegations, agenda, etc. Instead, he suggested we use the pattern established in Geneva between the American and Chinese Consuls. There are questions of a consular nature which could be used as an initial basis for commencing direct exchanges. The question of how many Chinese students there are in the United States actually desiring return to China would be a basis for discussion from the Chinese viewpoint. While the question of the treatment of American prisoners, the arrangements for Red Cross contacts or even getting the relatives into China, would be a basis for discussion from the American viewpoint. He suggested that the United States and the Chinese Communist Ambassadors in New Delhi, London, and Moscow might begin to have contacts with each other to discuss such questions. Since he could speak only with respect to New Delhi, he felt he could say that New Delhi would be a useful place to begin such contacts since they could be facilitated by people friendly to both sides. As such diplomatic exchanges proceeded, they might move on to wider matters.

In a general exposition of the point of view of Prime Minister Nehru and himself, Menon quite intently explained that India wanted to help increase and promote the prestige of the United States throughout Asia and that India was not opposed to the United States. They hold a different point of view on Formosa than the Americans and they also maintain friendly relation with the Chinese Communists, but the latter fully realize India has a policy of non-alignment and also friendship with the West. India is a much more stable country now than when he was there two years ago. While the Communists in India may win some votes, here and there, Menon felt sure that they could no longer take over India, as might have been the case some time past. The leaders of India understand the people and the people support the Government. India will not go the way of Chiang Kai-shek because of ignorance of the people and corruption. Thus, India is following its own way of freedom and can help the United States in Asia. India desires peace and not war.

In trying to promote a base for negotiations between China and America, he and the Prime Minister are not trying to establish the rights or wrongs of either party. They are only trying to get the parties together if possible. In approaching this whole matter the United States must also realize that while the Chinese are Communists, they do have strong support of the population throughout China. It will be dangerous to assume otherwise. For all these reasons Menon hoped that the Secretary would give full consideration to the suggestions outlined today. Menon said that he came from Peiping with some hope that it would be possible to work something out.

The Secretary responded that he hoped Menon’s hope was justified.

Menon replied intensely that his statement of hope was said in utter seriousness and that he wished the Secretary would share the same feelings.

During the course of the conversation the subject of American prisoners in China came up at numerous times.

The Secretary pointed out that this is a fundamental problem for the American Government and people. It seemed to the Secretary that it was very nervy of the Chinese Communists to make these suggestions while Americans languish illegally and unjustly in Chinese jails. This has now become a common pattern of Communist behavior. They use prisoners as hostages to bargain for political advantages. The Russians started doing it in the 1945 surrender terms with the Japanese and Germans. Ten years later the Russians are holding up the return of prisoners to wangle concessions out of the Japanese and German Governments. The Chinese Communists are doing the same thing. The United States cannot tolerate such behavior. Formerly the United States could use force to protect American Nationals mistreated by foreign powers. There is great pressure in America today for getting the American prisoners out. However, the use of force in the modern world is a different story than it used to be. Menon acknowledged the importance of releasing these prisoners but said that India is not going into the rights and wrongs of either party, his talks in Peiping had been much more broadly based than the release of prisoners, which indeed had been the narrow and unsuccessful base for the UN Secretary General’s unfortunate efforts, the United States should not insist on the release as a precondition to everything else, and, finally, the question of prisoners would have to be solved in the larger context that he had been talking about. He told the Secretary that the Chinese Communist decision to release the prisoners had been taken on May 19. Menon asked Chou En-lai to hold up the release and its publicity until May 30 to enable him to return to New Delhi and relay the information to Washington and to arrange the desired publicity. This had all worked to create better conditions. Therefore, Menon hoped the United States would do the same thing again to capitalize on any additional steps to reduce tensions in order to improve the general atmosphere. He referred to the visits of relatives in China and to the release of all Chinese students in this country wanting to return to China. The Secretary said that there was one Chinese student deliberately held back because he had highly classified material and because he had also improperly used it. However, the United States might consider waiving this objection under certain circumstances if it would help.

With respect to the effect of the Bandung Conference on the Chinese Communists, Menon went to some length to explain that Chou En-lai had not come to Bandung to get support for issues vital to the Chinese Communists. Whether this was a matter of policy or not, Menon said it was a fact that Chou En-lai had refrained from asking support or asking the Conference to endorse his stand. The issues were deliberately avoided. Menon apparently considered this significant.

In conclusion Menon asked the Secretary to study his suggestions and said that he would have to have several more discussions with the Secretary and, if possible, with the President. Menon said he would like to see the Secretary again in San Francisco and that perhaps they might meet in New York.³ The Secretary thanked Menon for the efforts which he and the Prime Minister had made, and indicated they might talk again perhaps in San Francisco.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6–1455. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. The Department of State announced on May 1, 1952, that all new passports would be stamped not valid for travel to China, the Soviet Union, or the Eastern European Soviet bloc countries unless specifically endorsed as valid for such travel. The text of the announcement is in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. II, p. 2084.
3. Dulles was in New York June 15–17 for meetings with the British Foreign Secretary and French Foreign Minister. He met with Menon on June 15; see Document 272.