Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

264. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, June 2, 1955—3:14 p.m.

709. For Lodge from Hoover. Re fliers.

1. I have taken up Hammarskjold’s proposed message to Chou-En-lai re the 11 imprisoned airmen (urtel 843, June 1)² with our own staff and the Dept of Defense. Subsequently, and without reference to opinions expressed by the above groups, I had an opportunity to present it to the President.

2. Everyone concerned is most appreciative of the efforts which the Secretary General has already made in this matter, as well as his desire to continue to be helpful. Nevertheless the President, as well as State and Defense, feel that the original decision not to enter into any deal with the Communists for the families of the prisoners to go to China was a proper one and was based upon fundamental principles. The conditions which govern this situation are the same today as when the decision was first made.

3. We have done everything possible to cooperate in making the Secretary General’s job as easy as possible. We arranged, for instance, to have the fliers families write supplicant letters to Chou, asking him for the release of the men, and have kept controversial statements and press comments to a minimum, on the assurance that such measures would facilitate the men’s release.

4. While we do not feel we should comment on Hammarskjold’s letter in any detail, you should inform him of our position as indicated above. We will always be glad to receive any suggestions from him and hope of course to be kept fully informed of his activities.

5. We do not believe your own suggestion with regard to an approach by Trevelyan to Chou En-Lai would be very likely to be productive, and it might possibly complicate efforts being made by the Secretary General. Trevelyan himself has paid his farewell calls at Peiping and presumably has already left the city. We would therefore prefer to hold this idea in abeyance.

6. I will be discussing the matter with you shortly by telephone.³

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/6–155. Secret; Niact.

2. The telegram under reference transmitted the text of the Secretary-General’s proposed message, which expressed gratification at the release of the 4 airmen, urged the release of the 11 airmen, and discussed the possibility of visits to the latter by their families, a subject which Chou had again raised in a May 30 letter informing Hammarskjöld of the release of the 4 fliers. The proposed message argued that release of the 11 airmen would contribute most effectively to the relaxation of world tension if it were arranged before the French, British, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers met in San Francisco on June 20. It concludes as follows:

   • “5) Hoping that you agree with my analysis I trust that under these circumstances you will see your way to favorable solution of the question of the eleven before 20 June. On this assumption it is obvious that visits by families at this late stage would no longer serve a useful purpose.
   • “6) If you agree with my conclusions I believe that, if desired, Washingtons consent in principle to visits by the families which I presume could now be obtained, could be made a matter of public record.”

   Telegram 843 continued with Lodge’s recommendations. He recommended that the United States should “raise no objection to any part of this message including paragraph six because the message clearly shows that our ‘consent in principle’ is in return for agreement of Chou to liberate the prisoners, and does not involve the actual physical presence of a single relative at any time. In other words, under the Secretary General’s note we get the prisoners and they do not get the family visits.” He also recommended that after Hammarskjöld’s message had reached Peking, Trevelyan should be requested to call on Chou and ask what the British should say when they were asked at San Francisco why the Chinese had not released the prisoners. (Ibid.) A copy of Premier Chou’s May 30 message to Hammarskjöld is attached to a memorandum by Cook of a June 1 conversation between Lodge and Hammarskjöld. (Ibid.)

3. Telegram 848 from New York, June 2, reads in part as follows:

   • “4. I saw Hammarskjold at 3:00 this afternoon . . . ., and he told me as I was leaving that he regarded paragraph 6 of his proposed message to Chou En-lai so important that he would be perfectly satisfied if I were to tell him: ‘The US cannot sanction what you propose and whatever you do is on your own responsibility’. That therefore is all that he expects from us.
   • “5. In accordance with your OK in our telephone conversations of 3:30 and 4:30, I have therefore told him this, making it also clear, as you suggest in paragraph 4 of your niact 709, that our position on prisoners families is still what it always was; that the American people cannot understand why release of the fliers should depend in any way on family visits; that to go along with the family idea plays into Menon’s hands; and will complicate release of future prisoners.
   • “He replied: ‘I must take the responsibility’.” (Ibid., 611.95A241/6–255)