Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

262. Memorandum of the Substance of a Conversation, Peking, May 26, 1955¹

Peking, May 26, 1955

On May 26 Chou En-lai gave Mr. Trevelyan his reply to Sir A. Eden’s message.² Chou En-lai said that the passage in his speech of May 13 to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress³ gave the relative position of the Chinese Government on the basis of which he had made his statement at Bandoeng. He would like to give Mr. Trevelyan the result of his discussions with Krishna Menon on the following four points:

(a) In order to bring about negotiations between the Chinese and United States Governments, both sides should take some action directly or indirectly connected with the Formosan situation which would release tension. This would not be a pre-condition of the negotiations but rather an expression of sincerity by each side. The Chinese Government had already made a statement at Bandoeng and a number of statements since, and might soon be able to take other steps which would make clear that China wished to release tension. They hoped that Her Majesty’s Government could induce the United States Government to take steps on their side which would release tension and commence negotiations.

(b) After consultations with Krishna Menon, the Chinese were in favour of diplomatic contact prior to negotiations such as had already gone on through the Governments of the Soviet Union, India and the United Kingdom. At the same time, diplomatic representatives of China and the United States in Moscow, New Delhi and London should make contact with each other through the introduction of the three Governments. These views had been explained to the Indian and Soviet Governments. He asked Mr. Trevelyan to convey them to Her Majesty’s Government. The Chinese Government would like to know Her Majesty’s Government’s views on this.

(c) The Chinese Government considered that the main topic in the negotiations between the United States and the Chinese Governments should be the easing and removal of tension in the Formosa area. They had not come to a final view on the form of negotiations but would see how things develop. They had agreed to the Soviet proposal for a 10-Power conference, but the number of countries taking part could be smaller or larger or there might be direct negotiations between the United States and Chinese Governments, with other countries assisting “on the side”. The form would have to be determined by events.

(d) The “Chiang Kai-shek clique” could at no time and in no circumstances take part in any international conference. But the Chinese Government did not refuse and in fact suggested direct contact with them. As the Chinese Government had made clear many times, the liberation of Formosa was an internal question. The Chinese people were willing to strive for its liberation by peaceful means as early as possible and this meant negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek. They were, however, two types of negotiations entirely different by nature, internationally and internally. The Chinese would strive for both. They could be held in parallel or in succession. They could not be mixed up although they might have some relation to each other.

Chou En-lai stressed that these four points were confidential and not for publication and said that they should be helpful to Her Majesty’s Government in their efforts to promote the easing of tension in the Formosa area. Mr. Trevelyan said he would transmit to Mr. Macmillan Chou En-lai’s message.

Subsequent discussion on the four points was as follows:

(a) When asked whether he wished to elaborate at this stage his idea of possible action by the United States Government which would relax tension, Chou En-lai said that they would have to wait and see the reactions of the United States Government. He had discussed this with Menon who would pass through London and would no doubt have talks with the new United Kingdom Government on his journey to Washington.

(b) Chou En-lai said in amplification that the first method of proceeding was that the three Governments should use their good offices in the matter. For instance, Menon had come to Peking and was now going to Washington. Her Majesty’s Government had asked for a clarification of the Chinese Government’s attitude and would no doubt pass appropriate information to the United States Government. They could then inform the Chinese Government of the United States Government’s attitude. Molotov had mentioned the question to Mr. Dulles in Vienna. The second method was that there should be contact between the United States and Chinese Missions in the three capitals through the introduction of the three governments. But without the first form of contact between Governments, the second would have no significance and would perhaps even be impossible. Chou En-lai agreed that the Chinese Government would not mind whether discussions took place in one, two or three capitals. Mr. Trevelyan asked for a clarification of the expression “diplomatic contact”. Chou En-lai said that he meant the kind of contacts which we were now having as opposed to a conference.

(c) Mr. Trevelyan asked whether he was correct in assuming that the Chinese Goverrment did not wish at this stage to elaborate any further the scope of negotiation. Chou En-lai said that discussion at an international conference should include questions which all parties wished to bring up. It would not be easy to find a definition of subjects to be discussed more appropriate than that which he had used.

(d) Mr. Trevelyan said that he understood the Chinese Government’s position that there would be two sets of negotiations, one international and one which they regarded as internal. Would timing of these negotiations be a matter for consideration in the preliminary discussions which the Prime Minister contemplated in his point (b)? Chou En-lai replied that when he spoke of “diplomatic contact” he was thinking mainly of international negotiations. Contact required for internal questions could be made at any time internally within China. But question of how Formosa could be peacefully “liberated” could be touched on during preliminary diplomatic contact.

RM

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2955. Secret. The source text bears the heading “Formosa: Substance of a conversation between Chou En-lai and Mr. Trevelyan in Peking on May 26”. It was given to Hoover in Washington by Makins on the evening of May 29, according to a memorandum of May 30 from Hoover to Dulles. (Ibid., 793.00/5–3055)
2. Reference is apparently to the request conveyed by Trevelyan on May 9 that Chou should elaborate his offer of negotiations for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East; see Document 248.
3. See footnote 2, Document 251.