Office of the Historian

257. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, May 24, 1955—7:32 p.m.

1865. Your 1830.2 Following may be helpful as background your conversations with Menon and Nehru.

There have been no new developments U.S. policy regarding negotiations since Deptel 1756 repeated Taipei 671.3 President confirmed this his Press Conference last week. We remain willing explore possibilities cease-fire Taiwan area but unabated Chinese Communist propaganda for liberation Taiwan not promising augury. Moreover Chou En-lai’s report on Bandung to CPR People’s Congress indicated no flexibility or apparent desire achieve reasonable solution to problem beyond his statement intent use peaceful means so far as possible. See London’s 5070 repeated New Delhi 1194 for British reaction. This recalcitrance and continued Communist failure release American airmen despite nearly year direct talks at Geneva and UNSYG’s efforts not encouraging. U.S. continues prepared examine prospects sincerely however.

We have no information on Chinese position, including Menon-Chou talks, other than Chou’s Bandung report5 and brief conversation [Page 573] between Chou and UK Chargé Trevelyan in which Chou indicated unwillingness discuss cease-fire and insistence on vague formula “relaxation of tensions”.6 We have had no further reports from London.

As Secretary indicated his April 26 Press Conference we intend obtain maximum possible information regarding Communist intentions before deciding our exact course. We are therefore interested fullest possible reports regarding Menon visit but not prepared accept any specific intermediary at present (Embtel [Deptel] 1756).

In probable event Nehru or Menon suggest latter proceed Washington believe we should not encourage such visit. You can point out that Secretary and Menon will be at San Francisco and can exchange views there. You may also assure him and Nehru his reports and GOI attitude will be communicated highest level Washington.

FYI Department’s view is that specific proposals currently undesirable. Chances for tacit cease-fire better if situation kept quiet and evolves gradually. Doubtful if any concrete formula could be helpful. On contrary any formula such as Menon likely propose probably would lead impasse and might afford Communists pretext for terminating de facto cease-fire.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–2355. Secret. Repeated for information to Jakarta, Karachi, London, and Taipei. Drafted in CA, cleared with the Secretary and in substance with Robertson, and approved in NEA.↩
  2. Telegram 1830 from New Delhi, May 23, reported that Krishna Menon was en route from Peking to New Delhi and requested background information for the talks which Cooper anticipated with Menon and Nehru. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Document 244.↩
  4. Telegram 5070 from London, May 18, reported that Foreign Office spokesmen in replying to press inquiries were taking the position that Chou’s statement was a step backward and was unnecessarily insulting to the countries which were trying to promote the relaxation of tensions but that it was largely meant for domestic consumption. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–1855)↩
  5. Premier Chou’s May 13 report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; see Document 251.↩
  6. On May 9; see Document 248.↩