252. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 19, Secretary Dulles reported on his meetings in Vienna; his description of his May 14 conversation with Foreign Minister Molotov is recorded as follows:
“Perhaps the single most interesting event at Vienna had been a dinner which Secretary Dulles had attended with the three other Foreign Ministers. The occasion had provided a private conversation with Molotov on the situation in China. Secretary Dulles had indicated to Molotov the United States view and line on China—namely, that China was a divided country, that there were several other divided countries in Asia such as Korea and Vietnam, and finally, that such divisions should not be the occasion for solutions reached by force. Secretary Dulles had then appealed to Molotov to induce the Soviet Government to use its influence with Communist China to prevent Communist China from resorting to force. In the course of this he had pointed out the build-up of war potential in the areas of Communist China opposite Formosa.
“Molotov, continued Secretary Dulles, was interested but reserved in response to these comments. He used the familiar argument that the actions of the Chinese Communists were an internal matter in which the Soviet Government could not interfere. Secretary Dulles had responded to this by pointing out that, after all, the Russians were supplying the Chinese Communists with the stuff by which they were carrying on their military build-up.
“At a later point in the conversation, Molotov suggested a Five-Power conference (to include Communist China) which could deal with Far Eastern problems. Secretary Dulles replied that he would much prefer a Six-Power conference (including the Chinese Nationalists). All in all, this had been quite a talk, although it probably produced no result other than Secretary Dulles’ own statement as to the gravity of the situation in the area of the Formosa Strait. Molotov at least said that he would think about the points Secretary Dulles had raised, a statement which the latter said he had welcomed.”
Later in the meeting, during a discussion related to the forthcoming four-power heads-of-government meeting, Dillon Anderson asked whether the NSC Planning Board should study the problem of [Page 568] China and Far Eastern security in connection with the preparations for the conference. The President replied “that he did not believe that Far Eastern problems should be studied as a matter of urgency at this time. He said he was determined not to take part in any Five-Power conference at present.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, May 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)