249. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vienna, May 14, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- Secretary Dulles, Molotov, Troyanovsky (interpreter), Merchant, Robertson.
In an aside conversation with the Secretary and Robertson, Molotov facetiously brought up the question of Formosa. Merchant joined the group and Troyanovsky acted as interpreter. The Secretary said he wanted to talk about that matter seriously. He asked whether Mr. Molotov remembered the conversation the two of them had had alone at Berlin2 when the Secretary had said that he saw danger signs and that events of the Far East might develop grave results which none of us wanted. Molotov said he did remember. The Secretary said we were very close to that danger point now. Molotov said it would take time to work out. The Secretary replied that it would also take patience and restraint.
The Secretary asked Molotov what suggestions he had for settling the Formosa question on a peaceful basis. Molotov replied that he had already suggested that the question be discussed in a five-power conference. The Secretary answered that it could be better discussed in a six-power conference. Molotov replied that the Chinese Communists would not agree. (Apparently referring to being unwilling to sit down with Chiang Kai-shek.) The Secretary countered by saying in no event would we discuss the interests of the Chinese Nationalists without their participation. Just as the Soviets might feel it necessary to be loyal to the GDR, we would be completely loyal to the Government of the Republic of China. Molotov nodded his head. He then said “if a conference of five is too small, we could have one of ten.” (Presumably he was referring to a ten-power conference which had at one time been suggested in other quarters.)3
Molotov said “we want peace” and asked along what lines did we expect his suggestions to be made. The Secretary replied that in Korea, Germany, Viet Nam we believed in achieving unification by peaceful means and not by violence. So too in Formosa, without [Page 564] prejudice to conflicting claims, the parties should renounce force and attempt a peaceful solution.
The Secretary continued that in so far as Formosa was concerned, there need be no great hurry. It has been 60 years since China had held Formosa and the fact that Formosa was not still Japanese was wholly due to the fact that the US had had the power to take Formosa away from Japan. Indeed the control of China over Formosa before the Treaty of 18954 had been tenuous for centuries. Surely the situation could continue another decade or longer if the alternative was the risk of war within a year.
Molotov then said “But Quemoy and Matsu don’t belong to Formosa.” The Secretary said that they were now in the possession of what we recognized as the lawful government of China.
Mr. Robertson said that they had been held indefinitely by the Republic of China except for the brief wartime occupation by Japan. The Communists had made one effort several years ago to take Quemoy and had been bloodily repulsed. Apart from that their lawful possession by the Government of China had never been challenged.
The Secretary said that what he was talking about was Formosa and not Quemoy and Matsu. He reminded Molotov that our Treaty with the ROC only covered Formosa and the Pescadores and that our interest in the islands arose from their relation to the defense of the Treaty area. Molotov nodded his head. The Chinese Communists had themselves refused to make any distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands. In all their statements they declare that their purpose is to liberate Formosa and that the capture of the offshore islands will facilitate this object.
The Secretary then referred to the Communist build-up of airfields on the Mainland opposite Formosa. Ostensibly they were for attack on Formosa. The US had used its influence with the Chinese Nationalists to restrain them from attacking these positions. It was difficult to keep this situation from breaking out into war. The Secretary went on to say that the Chinese Communists were dependent upon Russia for various strategic supplies and planes and could not develop their plans without Russian support. The Secretary said that we had obtained from the Chinese Nationalists arrangements which we thought would enable us to influence the situation for peace from our side and he suggested that the Soviet Union could do the same with the Chinese Communists.
Molotov replied that the build-up of airfields was an internal affair with which he had nothing to do. The Secretary said that he [Page 565] hoped the Soviets would exercise restraint on the Communists. At this point dinner was announced. Before the subject was abandoned, the Secretary asked Molotov to give further consideration to the problem and let us know what he thought could be done towards a peaceful solution. The Secretary said that if Mr. Molotov had any further ideas he could communicate them privately either through Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow or the Soviet Ambassador in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–1755. Top Secret. The source text, dated May 17, bears the following note: “Originally drafted by Secretary with later additions by Merchant. This final draft has been approved by the Secretary, Merchant, and Robertson.” The conversation took place in Vienna, at a dinner at the American Ambassador’s residence for the British, French, and Soviet Foreign Ministers; Dulles and the other Foreign Ministers were in Vienna for the signature of the Austrian State Treaty the following day. Dulles sent a brief report to the President of this conversation and other discussions at the dinner in Dulte 46 from Vienna, May 15, scheduled for publication in documentation on U.S. relations with Austria in a forthcoming volume.↩
- On February 13, 1954, at the Berlin Conference.↩
- Reference is apparently to the Soviet proposal for a 10-power conference, made to the British on February 4; see footnote 2, Document 86.↩
- Text of the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, is in Foreign Relations, 1895, vol. I, p. 199.↩