228. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, April 27, 1955, 6 p.m.1
I met at my house with Senators Knowland, Hickenlooper2 and Alex Smith.3 I gave them the background of the position I had taken with reference to the Chou En-lai statement on negotiating with the United States, namely, that:
The buildup of airfields was going ahead and unless interfered with would create a situation where the Chinese would have air dominance over Quemoy and Matsu in the absence of an all-out United States atomic attack.
The President was very reluctant to authorize the Chinese Nationalists to hit the airfields in their development stage with United States planes based upon Formosa. This would seem in the nature of “preventive war” and make us seem responsible for the hostilities which would doubtless ensue.
The President was also reluctant to see a wholesale use of atomic weapons against the densely populated mainland where land bursts would be required which would have a fall-out which might involve [Page 527] heavy casualties. This might alienate Asian opinion and ruin Chiang Kai-shek’s hopes of ultimate welcome back to the mainland.
Therefore, it seemed that diplomacy and not merely force might be required to avoid a misfortune of considerable proportions in relation to the coastal positions which might either be lost or only held at a prohibitive cost.
I went on to speak about the Bandung Conference, of the feeling which I had had that the Conference would either give the Chinese Communists the “green light” to go ahead with force to seize the coastal positions and perhaps Formosa, or that the Conference might set up restraints upon the Chinese Communists. I said that we had worked very hard to produce the latter result and that our friends had pitched in and done a job which had led Chou to follow a pacific rather than belligerent course. They felt pleased with the result and a complete turn-down by the United States would alienate our Asian non-Communist friends and allies.
The combination of these considerations led me to feel that we should be prepared to talk with the Chinese Communists merely to the extent of ascertaining whether they would make a “cease fire”.
I pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists in return for getting the Security Treaty had in effect authorized us to bring about a cease fire in that they for their side had agreed not to attack unless they were attacked or unless we agreed to their attack on the mainland. Therefore, all that remained was to find out whether the Chinese Communists would do the same. As far as the substance of the rights of the Chinese Nationalists was concerned, we made it perfectly clear that we would not deal with those rights behind the backs of the Nationalists.
Senator Knowland indicated the feeling that Senator George was being excessively deferred to and that the Republicans in the Senate were being too much ignored. He also felt that we could not trust a cease-fire agreement and that the Armistices in Korea and Indochina were already being broken.
While I did not feel that my presentation had convinced the Senators, except perhaps Senator Smith, the meeting was cordial and in good spirits.
April 28, 1955.
I met again in my office this morning with Senator Alexander Smith. We reviewed somewhat what I had said the evening before. Senator Smith asked whether what we had in mind would tie our hands in the event there was a resumption of fighting in Korea or Indochina. I said I thought that any “cease fire” for the Formosa area should be contingent upon non-aggression by the Chinese Communists [Page 528] elsewhere. Senator Smith said he thought it was an important point that we should keep open a threat to the center in order to protect the two flanks.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 28.↩
- Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
- Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Dulles invited the three Senators to meet with him after Senators Knowland and Hickenlooper expressed concern in telephone conversations earlier in the day concerning Dulles’ statements at his press conference the day before. (Notes by Phyllis Bernau of telephone conversations with Senators Knowland and Hickenlooper and Vice President Nixon, April 27; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)↩