Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

214. Message From the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)¹

Washington, April 22, 1955—6:29 p.m.

[Message No. 3.] In regard to a message going to you and Robertson from State concerning the maritime zone of defense, I have brought the following practical factors to the attention of SecDef, SecState, and the President. I have been directed to convey them to you so that you will have them in mind in connection with your impending conversations.

A. The purpose and scope of the objectives. (As related to measure of controls to be applied to restriction of sea and air traffic and nature and extent of measures to be invoked for its enforcement).

B. Operational factors. (Normal coastal junk traffic moves close to shore in shoal water. Its volume and traffic pattern make it impossible to control by visit and search. Interdiction involves surface penetration and continued operations in waters close to coast. Interdiction ocean shipping feasible but there is very little such in this area. Reaction to interdiction could include minor surface operations, submarine operations and air attack. Air threat most significant. Continuation of operations in face of such threats requires appropriate destruction of enemy air capability. Maintenance of cap by carrier air over interdicting forces for extended periods neither desirable nor practicable. Possible expansion enemy air operations should be viewed in light present unsatisfactory state air defense Formosa).

C. Results to be gained by proposed local interdiction. (Seaborne cargoes could enter China at ports other than those abreast Formosa for distribution by overland means).

D. Problem of sustaining blockade. (DDs and supporting ships could be provided on continuing basis. Air cover by carriers could be sustained only if operated in unsuitable areas and maintained continuously on station. This is unsound. Maintenance of adequate air cover would require USAF augmentation in area).

E. Eventuality of evacuation off shore islands. (Two conditions to be considered: first unopposed evacuation which presents no insurmountable problem and second opposed evacuation. Latter could develop if imposition interdiction measures results in ChiCom military reaction. Evacuation under these conditions not within capability of NGRC. Augmentation by U.S. in lift and supporting forces required. Success of operation would require attainment of air superiority throughout the operations. Not believed this can be achieved solely by local aerial combat and use of conventional weapons).

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4–2155. Top Secret; Exclusive; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Carney; transmitted in telegram 222329Z from CNO to Chief MAAG Formosa. An April 23 memorandum from Hoover to Secretary Dulles states that Carney read the draft message to the President at a meeting at the White House, apparently the meeting recorded in the memorandum, supra. (Ibid.)