203. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 14, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- Sir Percy Spender
- The Secretary
- Mr. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Merchant
Ambassador Spender, who had called at his request, opened the discussion by saying that he had just received a message from Prime Minister Menzies reporting that the Australian Cabinet considers that a joint declaration regarding the defense of Formosa, accompanied by an evacuation of the off-shore islands, is worth exploring. The message went on to say that the UK had been consulted and had raised certain points. Sir Percy, however, was not informed as to what these points were. The Ambassador then asked whether or not the Secretary wanted to encourage the pursuit by Australia of this matter with the UK and the rest of the Commonwealth.
The Secretary replied that he could not give an immediate answer. The key would be the attitude of the Republic of China. In fact, the issue here is really the morale on Formosa. The subject has not been raised with Chiang Kai-shek and the Secretary said he did not feel he could give an affirmative answer before exploring the subject with the Chinese Nationalists. For its part, the U.S. would consider that the added value of such a declaration would more than offset the strategic value of Quemoy and the off-shore islands. However, [Page 478] he could not undertake to speak for the Chinese Nationalists until after they had been consulted.
Sir Percy answered that if the matter, once raised by the Australians with the British, were now allowed to drop, it would be difficult to revive it later.
The Secretary repeated that he could say no more than he had already said at this moment. He would, however, like to consider Sir Percy’s question for a day or two.
The Ambassador indicated that he would prefer to wait for a considered reply than accept the Secretary’s immediate reaction.2
The Secretary expressed doubt that the British were in any position to act on a matter of this importance and controversy prior to elections. He inquired whether Menzies had any real reason to suppose that the UK could reach such a decision before the elections.
The Ambassador indicated that he was inclined to share the Secretary’s point of view on this aspect of the matter.
Sir Percy then introduced a new subject. He said that the Australian Parliament sits on April 19 and on the following evening Prime Minister Menzies intends to give a radio broadcast on Australian defense policy. In the course of it he will use the agreed text of the statement which the Secretary had given him just before he left Washington.3 The Secretary indicated his assent. There was some brief discussion as to what effect on the Bandung Conference Menzies’ speech might have but there was agreement that it was better to continue our normal business without regard to Bandung.
Sir Percy then inquired whether or not there was any evidence that the Soviets were exercising a restraining influence over the Chinese Communists in the Formosa area.
The Secretary said we had no evidence on this one way or the other. It was a fact that Soviet military assistance in the form of guns and planes were flowing in volume into China. He supposed that if they were being sent there, there was the intention ultimately to use them.
As Sir Percy rose to leave he remarked that the situation in Vietnam from latest reports seemed depressing. The Secretary agreed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4–1455. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.↩
- An April 20 memorandum of conversation by Merchant states that he told Ambassador Spender that day that the Secretary still felt it was not desirable at that time for the Australians to press the British on the subject. (Ibid., 793.00/4–2055)↩
- Enclosed with a letter of March 18 from Dulles to Menzies scheduled for publication in the documentation on East Asian security in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.↩