Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

144. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 9, 1955, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, March 9, 1955, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• “Operation Oracle”

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand Ambassador
• Mr. G.R. Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, IO
• Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Amb. Munro said he was anxious to hear how the Secretary felt after his Far Eastern trip about the off-shore islands situation, and what he thought should be done next.

The Secretary said that before getting into that subject he would like to mention that he had enjoyed working with the New Zealand Foreign Minister at Bangkok. The friendly resolution addressed to the Afro-Asian Conference² was the idea of Foreign Minister Macdonald. This was a nice move. It would give our friends at the Afro-Asian Conference a card to play with. A theme had been established which delegations at Bandung could support.

The Secretary said he had talked to Eden at length in regard to the problem of the islands. He had told Eden that he felt we should proceed further with Operation Oracle. Eden had asked that we defer action on Oracle until he could explore the issue further with the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said the results of that exploration did not strike him as encouraging.

Amb. Munro agreed that the Chinese Communist reaction as he had received it from the British certainly was not encouraging.

The Secretary said that Eden had just returned from his trip and had been quite busy in the House of Commons. There was no personal message from Eden yet. However the Secretary had seen copies of the British correspondence with Peiping, but he did not yet have Eden’s views on the Chinese Communist rejection. The Secretary said his own feeling was that there was a likelihood that severe fighting might break out and there was a danger that the U.S. might be drawn in. It was his strong feeling that a more determined effort for a cease fire should be made in the near future. It was essential to get the record clear as to our genuine desire for a cease fire. He remarked that the Chinese Nationalists seemed as about [about as] opposed to a cease fire as the Chinese Communists. Neither side wanted any action taken which would stay its hand in the prosecution of the Chinese civil war. In Taipei the Generalissimo had spoken strongly against a UN cease fire effort. Nevertheless the Secretary felt that we must proceed further. He felt we should first give Eden a little time to catch his breath. Eden had been informed that we would probably want to go ahead with the UN move if the British did not succeed with their representations to the Chinese Communists. Eden had consistently been more optimistic than the Secretary as to the prospects of getting Chinese Communist concurrence. However the Secretary had not discouraged Eden in his desire to make the approach to the Chinese Communists. Eden had said in his speech yesterday³ that the time did not seem to be ripe to make progress. The Secretary did not think the situation would remain static. Eden had commended the Chinese Communist restraint, but the U.S. could not perceive any indication that the Chinese Communists would abstain from their declared objectives. The present lull is being used by them for a large-scale build up. U Nu had told the Secretary in Rangoon that he was convinced the Chinese Communists are determined to attack Formosa.⁴ U Nu thought that the Chinese Communist attitude was “Formosa or nothing”. A dangerous situation would exist if the morale on Formosa should deteriorate. The Chinese Communists might be successful in getting some defections through infiltration combined with military action. A few Nationalist Generals might defect. That could make trouble.

Amb. Munro asked if the Secretary could say anything further about morale on Formosa on the basis of his recent visit.

The Secretary said on the surface morale seemed pretty good. Admiral Carney was just back and he and Admiral Stump might be able to say something more definite on military morale, based on their longer stay.

Amb. Munro said that Eden in his speech yesterday seemed to set forth publicly more or less what he had said privately to Chou En-lai last week.

. . . . . . .

The Secretary said he thought not. The Minute of understanding on “Oracle”⁵ clearly provided that discussion would be strictly limited. The objective of all three would be to stop the fighting. Other items such as the status of the two rival Chinese Governments, etc. would be strictly excluded. We would hope and expect that differences in U.S. and U.K. policy as to China would not come out. It would certainly be unfortunate if they did. Eden had already been informed that as things were shaping up, it seemed that fighting might be in prospect. The U.S. would want to proceed with a resolution in the Security Council, even if the U.S. should have to introduce the resolution itself. The U.S. would want to make it clear to world opinion that it was leaving no stone unturned to obtain a cease fire. This was an essential part of our case. If New Zealand should be inclined to hesitate, the U.S. would be prepared to make the move.

… Munro asked if the Secretary could give him an estimate of the likelihood of an imminent Communist attack on the islands?

The Secretary said there was no evidence of any significant new concentration of troops in the Amoy area yet, such as would be required to take Quemoy. Additional heavy artillery is being emplaced. An airfield directly opposite central Formosa is being improved—the runways lengthened and widened. There is nothing to show that an attack may occur in the immediate future, that is the next two or three weeks. Opposite Matsu, it is more difficult to judge the situation. It was reported that heavy artillery of Soviet design was being installed which would bring Matsu within range. The U.S. military people out there think that any assault will be preceded by a prolonged artillery barrage intended to interdict resupply of the islands. It is estimated that Quemoy and Matsu have some 35 to 40 days’ supply of food and ammunition. If resupply cannot be maintained, the ability to withstand prolonged artillery bombardment will be reduced. The Nationalists would be in a bad position unless the Communist artillery positions in the Mainland could be knocked out. These positions are well recessed in the hills and it might take atomic missiles to silence them.

… Munro said he had told Zaroubin⁶ that in his view the Chinese Communists could not wage a war for any length of time without Soviet support and assistance. Munro said he gained two principal impressions from Zaroubin’s remarks:

(1) The Soviets are concerned at the situation.

(2) The Soviets feel they are unable to control the actions of the Chinese Communists.

The Secretary said he could understand such a feeling. He remarked that we know from our experience with the South Koreans and Chinese Nationalists that it is not so easy to control an Asiatic ally even though you have physical control through the supplies which you furnish him. You can not just say, “If you don’t do this, you won’t get anything more”. Rhee and Chiang know that they could precipitate a difficult situation if they wanted to. The Chinese Communists could do the same. The Soviets would not have much choice but to support the Chinese Communists if they get involved.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Robertson remarked that under the tripartite agreement on Operation Oracle, there is no further commitment on anybody’s part, since the Chinese Communists have rejected the invitation to appear before the Security Council.

The Secretary said he thought the understanding was that we would wait a reasonable time, then consult on going ahead with the operation. He was sure the British would want to avoid debating the larger issues in the Security Council just as we do.

Mr. Robertson agreed that the only commitment was to consult on further steps.

Amb. Munro asked if the Secretary wanted to wait a few days before making the next move?

The Secretary said that this was correct. He wanted to give Eden a chance to think things over in the light of the Chinese Communist reply. Eden knew how the Secretary felt. The Secretary felt we should give Eden a few days more to consider the matter.

Amb. Munro said that Holcombe [Holland?] and Macdonald were now back in Wellington and the New Zealand Cabinet would be ready to consider the question promptly when the time came.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–955. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.
2. Reference is to a statement issued on February 26 by the SEATO Council in Bangkok extending greetings to the countries attending the Asian-African Conference which was to be held in Bandung in April. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1955, p. 373.
3. For text of Eden’s statement before the House of Commons on March 8, see Parliamentary Debates, vol. 538, cols. 157–166.

4. Dulles’ conversation with Prime Minister U Nu on February 26 was reported in Secto 41 from Rangoon, February 27; the portion relating to China reads as follows:

   “Secretary gave full exposition US position re Taiwan problem. Reiterated US would have to resist Chinese Communist attempt seize Taiwan, but if Chinese Communists genuinely desired peaceful settlement and will give assurance not to use force against Taiwan that would be different situation. However, they give every indication intention try take Taiwan.

   “U Nu commented that his visit to China [in December 1954] had convinced him Chinese Communists really fear Taiwan is going to be used as base for launching invasion against mainland. He repeated several times his distinct impression they have firm intention take Taiwan by force. This conclusion made him want to go immediately to Washington to inform Secretary. Various matters had prevented this, so he wanted now to convey this view to Secretary.” (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/2–2755)

   Dulles’ brief report of the conversation in Dulte 16 from Vientiane, February 27, did not refer to U Nu’s statement.

5. See Document 43.
6. Soviet Ambassador to the United States Georgi N. Zaroubin.