Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

138. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Honolulu, March 4, 1955.

Dulte 29. For Acting Secretary Hoover eyes only from Secretary Dulles. Re Secto 57.² Following is memorandum of my talk with Chiang Kai-shek.³ Please send copy to the President as well as an information copy to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford:

Memorandum of Conversation. Place: President’s residence, Taipei. Date: March 3, 1955, time: 2:30 p.m., participants: President Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the Vice President,⁴ George Yeh, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office,⁵ interpreter and 1 other;⁶ the Secretary, Mr. Robertson, Ambassador Rankin, Mr. McCardle, Mr. Bowie, Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Carney, Admiral Stump.

I opened by asking President Chiang how he wished to proceed and whether he wished me to speak first or whether he cared to do so. George Yeh, interpreting for the President, said that the President wished me to make the initial presentation.

I expressed satisfaction at the bringing into force of the Mutual Security Treaty⁷ and said that if it were agreeable to the President, we might treat this as the first meeting of consultation under Article IV of the treaty. He agreed.

I said that I was happy that there were also present Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump who would be able to conduct military conversation with the President’s military advisers. I thought that there was probably a need to reconsider present planning so as to put it on to a basis related to the present threat rather than upon some long-term basis.

I said I wished first of all to clear up any doubts that might be in the President’s mind with reference to the UN proceedings. The US, as a member of the UN, has perhaps different responsibilities from those of the Republic of China. As far as the US was involved, the threat was international because our defensive undertakings were challenged. Therefore, the US was obliged to seek to resolve peacefully this international conflict. The position of the Republic of China might be different because it might regard hostilities as civil war and therefore excluded from UN competence by Article 2(7) dealing with domestic jurisdiction.

The US was not hopeful of a positive result and indeed we had not clearly decided as to whether or when we would proceed further. We anticipated a Soviet veto. However, we had a duty to ourselves and to our own public opinion and indeed to world opinion to seek to invoke the peaceful procedures of the UN; and if there was a Soviet veto, then the whole world would know where the responsibility lay. I said I wished to make a second point, which was that we did not seek for the UN any jurisdiction with respect to the territory or status of the Republic of China. What we sought was simply a “cease-fire” resolution which would stop the fighting, but not attempt to deal with the substance of the respective claims.

I then went on to discuss the question of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu Islands. I said that perhaps at the beginning of my talks with Foreign Minister Yeh there had been a temporary confusion for which I was prepared to take full responsibility. It was not now profitable to go into the explanation but the matter had developed in the US in such a way that the authority to use the Armed Forces of the US outside the treaty area had to be left to the future judgment of the President of the US and that therefore there could not be any actual present commitment. I said that the position was I thought accurately expressed in the statement which I was prepared to make on leaving Taiwan, and I asked Foreign Minister to translate to the President the relevant portion (paragraphs 6 to 10) of my Taipei departure statement.⁸ (Note: Entire statement had previously been cleared with the Foreign Minister.) The Foreign Minister interpreted this to the President.

I then said that I thought it would be important for the military advisers of our two governments to consider the problem of the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu, to calculate what the chances of success were, what the cost would be in terms of manpower and equipment; and I said I would like to hear the views of the President as to the importance of these islands in relation to the cost of their defense.

As the next matter, I turned to the question of the tanker Tuapse⁹ and the crew members of the Tuapse and of the Polish ship¹⁰ which have been seized. I said I would like to recommend to the President the release of the Tuapse and also the crew members who wanted to be repatriated. I said that in the case of the Soviet tanker, it was I thought useful to avoid giving the Soviets additional pretext for helping the Chinese Communists; and while I thought that the particular matter was not in itself important, nevertheless it could be used by the Soviets as a pretext for action with the Communist Chinese. I thought that the crew members should not be held against their wishes. We were complaining about unlawful detentions on the part of the Chinese Communists and hoped that the Republic of China would set a better example to the world.

In the conclusion of my presentation, I dealt with the role of Free China. I said that in my opinion, the Republic of China did have a continuing and important role to play but it minimized this role to be constantly talking about an armed reconquest of the Mainland. Opportunities might arise and almost surely would arise, but they could not be created by the Republic of China alone. They would be created by the nature of the Communist regime. For example, there were almost sure to be splits between the Communist leaders as there had been in Soviet Russia when Stalin and Trotsky broke, when Beria was liquidated and now when Malenkov was ousted. If, during this period, there had been a free Russian Government possessed of power in close proximity to the Soviet Union, it might have exerted a possibly decisive influence as between the factions. Such opportunities were likely to occur in relation to Communist China.

Furthermore, there was the possibility that the Chinese people in all or parts of China might sometime be prepared to revolt against the harsh treatment and bad economic conditions which were applied to them. Food conditions were reported as very bad. If that situation came about, then again there might be an opportunity.

Furthermore, there was a possibility that Chinese Communist aggression might create a situation where there was a general war against China. There might, for example, be aggression against Southeast Asia or Korea, in which case again there would be opportunity for the Republic of China. The main point I wished to make was that these opportunities which were quite likely to arise where [were] not opportunities which could be created by the Republic of China alone or which could be dated. The opportunities would be created by forces outside the Republic of China. Under these circumstances, it seemed rather foolish for the Republic of China to try to hold out dates when the forces of the Republic of China could successfully conquer the Mainland. This was belittling and exposing the Republic of China to a measure of ridicule abroad, as it seemed to others that it was foolish for the Republic of China to be talking along these particular lines. There was in fact a bigger role for the Republic of China, and we hoped that the President could find it possible to explain that to his people.

The President replied that he fully shared my view regarding the future role of his government. In actual fact, there was nothing else it could do. Now that the Mutual Security Treaty was in force, he wished to assure me that he would take no independent action insofar as the use of force was concerned, and would undertake no large-scale military operations against the Mainland without full consultation with the US. He said, however, that he had had to give due consideration to another important problem; namely, the public handling of these matters in order to bolster morale and keep hope alive regarding a return to the Mainland. This was another problem.

The President said for me to inform President Eisenhower that he would take no military action against the Mainland without consultation with him. He also asked that President Eisenhower be informed that he could treat Chiang as a true friend and the Chinese Government as one which will cooperate on all matters of major importance. He would not fail the United States in this respect.

Regarding the question of the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and also the situation with respect to Quemoy and Matsu, he fully agreed on the need for the military people to go into this problem more deeply and actively than had been done heretofore. He recalled that two years ago the US and Nationalist China had engaged in military consultations¹¹ although nothing much had ever come out of these talks. He felt that a joint military council, consisting of military representatives of the US and the Republic of China, should be established to examine thoroughly military problems. He hoped that Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump would be empowered to discuss the defense of Formosa and Pescadores as well as the defense of Quemoy and Matsu with his military advisers. Although he recognized there might be a difference in the degree of such consultation as it related to Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and Quemoy and Matsu on the other, he sincerely hoped however that these matters could be discussed during Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump’s present visit to Taipei.

In addition to the above major problems which should be studied by the military representatives of the two governments, there was another small matter. When Admiral Radford was here,¹² the President had discussed with him the possibility of maintaining 21 fully trained and equipped active divisions, and in addition the training and equipping of 9 reserve divisions. This was 2 or 3 months ago, and he had received no word regarding this project. He hoped that I would recommend that this project be carried out since it was important.

I replied that I was not familiar with the details of this matter and that it should be discussed with Admiral Carney during his present visit. The President said he hoped a decision could be reached during Admiral Carney’s stay here, to which I made no reply.

The President then said he recalled an Air Force plan worked out last year which had not yet been fully implemented. The objective of this plan was to so equip the Chinese Nationalist Air Force so that it could look out for the defense of Chinese Nationalist-held territory in peacetime without requiring active US Air Force support. This was a relatively small matter in terms of the overall problem, but was nonetheless important.

I replied that I was not familiar with this question, but that immediate military planning should be related to the military threat and perils of today. I said long-term peacetime planning should be postponed because I believed the immediate peril was very great and the study of how to meet it should not be subordinated to overall long-range planning.

The President said he understood me to mean that I did not wish to avoid long-term planning but wished to give priority to planning against the immediate danger. The problem of Formosa’s air defense was he felt related to the immediate defense problem.

The President said he wished to comment on the proposed cease-fire effort in the UN. He again reassured me and pledged now that the US-China treaty was in force, he would not initiate any provocative action against the Mainland. However, for political reasons he could never agree to a cease-fire against the Mainland. He fully understood the position of the US, and why we had agreed to the New Zealand proposal in the UN. He also understood and appreciated the moral gain which the Republic of China could derive from a Soviet veto of a cease-fire resolution in the UN. He said that while he could not stop efforts in the UN for cease-fire, he wished to make it quite clear that when it came to substantive discussion there, the Chinese Nationalist Government would not approve such a resolution.

I replied that I did not ask him to support such a UN resolution. It was entirely acceptable that he express his reservations. I must, however, request with the greatest possible strength and earnestness that if such a resolution came to a vote he would not veto it but would let the Soviets veto it. I added that he might feel that the action in the UN was some form of British plot, but the very fact that today the UK was strongly opposed to pressing a cease-fire resolution in the UN, was evidence that it was not such a British design.

The President laughed and said that he had told Mr. Robertson last year when this subject had been discussed that he feared UN action was a UK machination. I replied that when I had recently seen Sir Anthony Eden, he had urged me strongly not to proceed with this matter at this time. Regarding a Chinese Nationalist veto, the President said he would consider the matter. Perhaps the matter would not come up and a decision would not have to be made, but tactically he would prefer to let the Soviets veto it.

The President said he next wished to comment on my remark that the Chinese viewed the struggle with Communist China as a civil war. He said that he and his government took a different position than the Chinese Communists. His government believes the case should be presented to the UN as a situation threatening peace. He would like to put the responsibility for the present aggression on the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. He thought that a ceasefire resolution would open the way for acceptance of the concept of 2 Chinas. If the UN Security Council really meant business, it should treat the present Communist aggression as a matter threatening peace. He said that he did not consider it a civil war but an international affair.

He then said that there was a good deal of plotting and conspiracy to get Red China accepted in the UN. He was aware that much pressure was being brought to bear on the US in this regard. He hoped the US would understand that the Chinese Nationalist Government would never sit anywhere at the same table with the Chinese Communists, much less in the UN. This was a question of principle and character and he would rather lose Nationalist China’s seat in the UN than share it with the Communists or sit at the same table with them. He said the UK would doubtless be glad to know of this decision. The UK might view this decision as one of intransigence but he hoped the US, which he regarded as the leader of the free world and the leader in the UN, would understand his view. No matter what other nations like the UK might do to support Communist China’s entry into the UN, he hoped the US would oppose it. It would be the irony of fate if after all the sacrifices made by the Allies in the last war and after the creation of the UN by the efforts of these Allies, Nationalist China should be condemned to accept a regime which has used all its aggressive power against it and the rest of the free world in the last few years.

I replied that the US had no intention of supporting Red China’s entry into the UN. The President said he hoped I would not only not support it, but would actively oppose it. He observed that since I had been Secretary of State, I had carried out this policy, and he hoped that I would continue so to do with added firmness. I said I did not know how I could possibly add anything to my firmness in this respect. The President laughingly agreed.

The President then said he would like to inquire whether Admiral Carney had anything to say. Admiral Carney replied that he was looking forward to talks with the Defense Minister and others of the President’s military advisers. He hoped that they could identify the problems relating to the proposal regarding joint and combined military planning.

I then observed that the President had made no comment on my suggestion regarding the release of the Tuapse and those members of its crew who wished to be repatriated. I said that there was an American proverb which said that silence meant acceptance, and I hoped that this was also a Chinese proverb. The President replied that he would release the Tuapse and its crew members at a price. He did not wish to release it as a token of goodwill toward the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists were holding innocent flyers, had flagrantly violated the Korean Armistice and the US had done nothing about it. He did not believe that the Tuapse should be released when the Communists behaved as they did. The price would be the release of the flyers. He could not see why he should release the ship at this time. I asked him whether this also applied to the crew desiring repatriation. He said he would set free those who had not chosen asylum.

Madame Chiang immediately interrupted to say that the crew would not be released unconditionally, but only if the American flyers were released. She added as an afterthought that this was her understanding of what the President had said.

I said that I did not quite like this position. It carried the inference that because the Communists do wrong, the Chinese Nationalist Government would similarly do wrong. I urged the President to set a higher standard than the Communists. This would carry with it moral advantages to his government, and be appreciated by the US. I believed it was better than to hold the crew members as hostages against the release of the flyers.

The President commented that this was the difference between the US as a leader of the free world and Nationalist China as a victim of communism. He said that he and his people had certain sentiments which he could not expect US to share. He would however continue consultations with US through the Embassy in Taipei on this matter. I replied that I recognized that Nationalist China was a victim of communism and that they had been subjected to grave aggravation. However, the driving influence behind the US people, of which Nationalist China is a great beneficiary, is the fact that we abide by, and are governed by moral principles. I suspected that in the case of Nationalist China this might require an especially great amount of Christian charity. The President said he would continue to study this problem. He knew my time schedule and that I was due to depart from Taipei shortly. Therefore he did not wish to make me late for departure. He had not finished all the things that he would like to talk about, but he hoped to continue this at a future meeting.

He hoped that I would make frequent visits to Taipei in the future. I said that I had made 2 trips in 6 months and that if I continued at this cadence, he might soon get tired of me. He assured me to the contrary.

Upon my departure Mr. Robertson, who was not scheduled to depart with me, remained behind at the President’s request for an additional few minutes of conversation. Mr. Robertson is reporting his meeting separately.¹³

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–455. Top Secret. No transmission time is indicated on the source text. Received on March 6 at 4:15 p.m. A copy bears the notation “File” in the President’s handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)
2. In Secto 57 from Iwo Jima, March 3, for Hoover, Dulles stated that he would send a full summary of his talk with Chiang Kai-shek from Honolulu and added, “Nothing sensational transpired.” (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–355)
3. The memorandum of conversation was apparently drafted by MacArthur and revised by Dulles. A copy, with revisions in Dulles’ handwriting, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 429. A brief summary of the conversation by Rankin was sent to the Department in telegram 2319 from Manila, March 4, which states that a detailed memorandum was being prepared by President Chiang’s secretary, Sampson C. Shen. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–455) Shen’s record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 444 from Taipei, March 15. (Ibid., 110.11–DU/3–1555)
4. Ch’en Ch’eng.
5. General Chang Chun, Secretary General of the Office of the President.
6. The other two Chinese participants were Premier O.K. Yui and Shen. According to Rankin’s report, Foreign Minister Yeh acted as interpreter throughout the conversation.
7. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Yeh had exchanged instruments of ratification earlier that day.

8. In a statement to the press before his departure from Taipei later that day. Secretary Dulles announced that the first meeting of consultation under the Mutual Defense Treaty had taken place; paragraphs 6 through 10 read as follows:

   “The decision as to the use of the armed forces of the United States and the scope of their use under Public Law 4 will be made by the President himself in the light of the circumstances at the time and his appraisal of the intentions of the Chinese Communists.

   “Since however the Matsu and Quemoy Islands, now in friendly hands, have a relationship to the defense of Taiwan such that the President may judge their protection to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, our consultation covered also these coastal positions of the Republic of China.

   “It is the ardent hope of the United States that the Chinese Communists will not insist on war as an instrument of its policy.

   “As President Eisenhower said, ‘We would welcome action by the United Nations which might bring an end to the active hostilities in the area.’ The United Nations is exploring the possibility of a cease-fire, as are also other peace-loving nations.

   “I have, however, made clear that the United States will not enter into any negotiations dealing with the territories, or rights of the Republic of China except in cooperation with the Republic of China.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 429)

   For complete text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1955, pp. 420–421.

9. See footnote 5, Document 4.
10. The Polish merchant vessel President Gottwald was intercepted by Republic of China naval forces in May 1954. A Polish note of February 12, 1955, charging the United States with responsibility for the seizure of the President Gottwald, the seizure in October 1953 of the Praca and the detention of the crew members, together with the U.S. reply of February 21, 1955 are in Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1955, pp. 430–432; see also Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 472.
11. Reference is apparently to staff-level discussions held in May and December 1953; see despatch 660 from Taipei, June 19, 1953, ibid., p. 210.
12. Radford visited the Republic of China at the end of December 1954 during a trip to several Asian countries; see Document 9 for his remarks concerning Formosa and the Tachens.
13. Infra.