127. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)1
JCS 976576. Following amplifies my 240901Z2 which may be helpful to you and perhaps to Sec Dulles. Use at your discretion.
Importance Matsu and Kinmen stems from psychological as well as military considerations. They are part of Gimo’s defense of Formosa. They are his outposts and warning stations which block two key port areas, use of which ChiComs probably would want in any invasion attempt against Formosa. Their retention by ChiNats makes most difficult secret build-up by ChiComs for invasion of Formosa and Pescadores.
More than that, however, Matsu and Kinmen offer Nationalist leadership their one hope of reestablishing themselves on mainland. Regardless of diverse views on this hope, it represents ChiNat feelings. Should we barter away their one hope so quickly, it could have serious repercussions psychologically amongst ChiNats and all through Far East.
Geographically and militarily, loss might be inconsequential, but diplomatic and psychological repercussions might be out of all proportion to its physical importance. ChiNat military posture on Formosa and their will to resist could begin to disintegrate with resultant [Page 305] decrease in over-all Western Pacific island chain, which is so important to Free World security. It could even result in an increased burden on United States if chain is to be kept intact in future.
On Formosa, as on other major positions of Island Littoral, it is militarily important in foreseeable future to have strong anti-Communist military forces.
I am still puzzled as to what particular part of my interview gave Sec Dulles the impression mentioned in your 240400Z.
- Source: JCS Records, CJCS 091 China. Secret; Operational Immediate. Sent via the Naval Attaché in Bangkok. The source text bears the date-time group 242048Z.↩
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Telegram 240901Z from CJCS to ALUSNA Bangkok, for Stump from Radford, February 24, replied to telegram 240400Z from ALUSNA Bangkok to CNO, for Radford from Stump, February 24, which reads as follows:
“Secy Dulles asked me send following. In his talks with Foreign Secy Eden he explained US policy re defense Formosa. Said due to expert concealment or camouflage abilities Chinese it might be necessary defend Matsu and Kinmen to prevent surprise attack on Formosa at time fleet not actually present. Also loss would aid ChiComs infiltration and subversion.
“Said your reported recent interview US News World Report seemed cut ground out from under him wherein you stated islands not necessary to Formosa defense.
“I expressed view you misquoted or you considered US fleet could defend and if surprise and fleet not present ChiNats could hold off until help arrived. I also said our problem would be much more difficult.
“Secy Dulles would like your views or any explanation which would help him with Anthony Eden earliest.”
Radford’s telegram 240901Z replied that he agreed with Dulles’ statement to Eden, that any implication in the interview that the two island groups were not necessary to the defense of Formosa was unintended, and that the interview had taken place nearly 3 weeks earlier when it was hoped that “evacuation of Tachens would make ChiComs more reasonable which is certainly not the case so far.” (Both ibid.; copies are also in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2455) Dulte 5 from Bangkok, February 24, for Hoover from Dulles, reported that Dulles and Eden had spoken privately about the Formosa situation on February 23 and had agreed to discuss it at greater leisure when Eden dined with the Secretary on February 24. (Ibid., 793.00/2–2455)
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