Office of the Historian

102. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 10, 19551

Washington, February 10, 1955

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH

  • Admiral Anderson
  • Admiral Orem
  • Mr. McConaughy
  • Mr. MacArthur

Admiral Orem said that the Tachens evacuation operation should be completed Friday afternoon February 11, or the next morning, Washington time. This would be considerably ahead of schedule.

Admiral Orem then gave Mr. MacArthur a copy of a proposed press statement planned for issuance upon completion of the evacuation. (Copy attached).2 He said the statement had already been cleared by Defense, Navy and Air, and by Admiral Radford for the Joint Chiefs. Mr. MacArthur said he would show the statement to the Secretary at once, and let the Admirals know if there were any changes to suggest. It would be understood of course that no statement would be issued without complete agreement.

Admiral Orem said he thought that possibly the Chinese would want to put out a statement of their own.

Mr. MacArthur said it was his own individual view that we should merely inform the Chinese in advance of our statement, and [Page 250] not encourage them to put out a related statement over which we would have no control. If they wanted to put out a statement without any encouragement from us, that would be their own affair. Mr. Robertson should have an opportunity to give his views on this matter.

Admiral Orem said the Navy public relations Officer anticipated quite a few questions from the press when the statement was put out. Admiral Carney was willing to answer questions in a generalized way. But he would not get into the particulars of the new disposition of the 7th Fleet, etc.

Admiral Anderson said that it was planned that most of the fleet would go to Subic Bay or Japan. The Yorktown, would return to the U.S. as scheduled for some time. Four aircraft carriers would be left in the area. The F–86 Wing now on Formosa would go back to its base except for one squadron. The various squadrons would be rotated to Formosa, one at a time. In answer to a question from Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Orem said that most of the communications personnel sent to Formosa with the Air Wing would stay there. The authorized complement of 600 was never filled, and MAAG would be able to finance the smaller complement which had been sent there. It was needed for other purposes already planned before the F–86s were sent to Formosa.

Admiral Anderson said that the Chinese G–2 had reported a concentration of about 600 junks opposite Matsu, near Foochow. The Chinese wanted to attack this concentration and MAAG had asked Cincpac for authorization. Cincpac had referred the matter to CNO. The attack had been okayed by CNO subject to confirmation by U.S. reconnaissance that it is a real concentration of some military significance. The White House is being informed through Col. Goodpaster, although strictly speaking, this is only required when a mainland attack is contemplated. Admiral Orem doubted whether the concentration had real significance. He thought the Chinese Communists would be foolish to concentrate shipping in the vicinity of either Matsu or Quemoy at this time. Air attacks might make sense from their point of view. However, Admiral Duncan thought the concentration of junks might have some military significance.3

D MacA
Douglas MacArthur II
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1055. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.↩
  2. The text of the statement, issued on February 11, is in Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1955, p. 290.↩

  3. A memorandum of February 10 from MacArthur to Dulles and several other Department principals, attached to the source text, reads in part as follows:

    “Re the concentration of fishing junks opposite Matsu, Admiral Anderson telephoned me later that CNO was inclined to agree with Admiral Pride’s estimate to the effect that approval should not be given to the Chinese Nationalists unless U.S. reconnaissance confirmed that the concentration of junks was a serious threat aimed at invasion of Matsu. CNO has sent a message to CINCPAC in this sense. I said that Secretary Dulles wished to be informed immediately if the Chinese were authorized to attack the concentration and Admiral Anderson promised to let me know at once in such contingency so that I could call the Secretary and Mr. Robertson.”

    No further documentation concerning this has been found in Department of State files.

    ↩