Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

93. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 3, 1955—11:03 p.m.

4309. Saigon’s Tel 4301 repeated Paris 1151, repeated by Department to London as 5052.²

1. Our general policy was outlined in Department’s 4284, repeated Paris as 3498.³ we have carefully studied situation outlined reftel and have given full consideration proposal outlined by French and to your views. As much as we wish to follow your recommendations there are certain aspects of the matter which give us cause for concern.

2. What will be effect on Diem and how will proposal be put to him? Diem may not accept it and it may precipitate his resignation. Even if he did not resign, we might be put in undesirable position of having to persuade him to accede and go to Paris for proposed meeting and for Bao Dai’s “arbitration”, without Diem or ourselves knowing in advance what sort of solution is envisaged.

That is weakness of proposal at this stage. We don’t know what meeting supposed to accomplish or what French consider is the nature of the accord they expect us to reach and which will be Bao Dai’s basis for talks. To accept Ely’s proposal is to commit ourselves to unknown proposition and uncertain results. Until we have some idea what solution is envisaged we should not blindly commit ourselves to approving such a meeting. If purpose were clear, it might be something else. Do you and Ely have something in mind like para 3b of your 4292⁴ to propose to Bao Dai? Or does Ely have something else: What will French Government propose?

On basis Ely’s outline, it appears to us Bao Dai and Bay Vien would call the tune at any such meeting. Diem would be outnumbered. French have now in effect withdrawn their support, for continuing with Diem (Paris 4285 to Department⁵). They hold whip-hand in Saigon by logistic support for national army. Bay Vien and Binh Xuyen position remains intact and their challenge to Diem and central authority has netted them important and enhanced role with Bao Dai at Paris conclave. French can hardly be expected exert preponderant pressure on Bao Dai and Sect leaders in favor of Diem which they have conspicuously failed to do during past week. They noticeably refuse refer to Binh Xuyen action as that of defiance, which to us is crucial issue to deal with.

3. We regret there may be real differences between United States and French on approach and tactics re Bao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Diem. Unless and until these can be smoothed out, we see no benefits but rather possible harm in Paris conclave. Basic issue is whether French at all levels in Saigon will unequivocally let Bay Vien and Binh Xuyen know France and United States support Diem and national government and its national objectives. In addition to clarifications requested in para 1, we need to know where we stand with French re Binh Xuyen.

4. As for démarche to Bao Dai on 10 day or 15 day truce as distinct from a meeting called by Bao Dai we would prefer to receive above clarifications, and Embassy’s own general evaluation of situation, before committing ourselves to a truce.

5. In place of Ely proposal, we would prefer adopt a formula which attempted resolve matters in Saigon and involved neither: (a) Diem’s departure from Saigon, (b) his meeting on equal plane with rebel gangsters, notwithstanding attempt at glossing through device of official French State visit and (c) key role for Bao Dai. It would seem more in keeping for French to propose Bao Dai summon Bay Vien to Cannes or Paris to take away police powers, if Bao Dai’s intervention is actually needed in this matter.

6. We tentatively propose for your comment following suggestions meet situation:

a) United States and France make clear again we are fully backing Diem on condition he immediately announces broad program settle crisis;

b) His program could include items listed para 3b Collins’ 4292 to Department especially (1) government reorganization and cabinet reconstitution (2) integration necessary number sect troops particularly Cao Dai and Hoa Hao into national army, satisfactory severance pay, amnesty, and assistance in civilian resettlement for those not integrated, (3) special treatment (secret funds, material benefits etc.) for sect leaders, (4) government’s control of national police, (5) effort should be made distinguish between and deal differently with Binh Xuyen on one hand, and two religious sects on the other and removal of Binh Xuyen from any police or other powers, (6) reaffirmation national reform program particularly provisional national assembly, and (7) such other institutions as council of elders as might be helpful without compromising Diem’s position or governmental operations. Members should not in our view include Tam, Num or Buu Hoi.

c) United States and France should agree national government free take such measures it deems necessary against Binh Xuyen to protect integrity and legitimate functions of government. If Binh Xuyen resort to arms or terrorism or reject an attempt at peaceful settlement, French would have to assure Diem they would not restrict national army as at present. It also should be made clear to sect leaders United States will not continue present large-scale financial support for Government Vietnam if sects force out Diem and set up new regime.

d) Cease-fire period during which Ely and Collins, or some other source, would assist government try settle crisis peacefully with Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in particular.

e) United States and France together obtain Bao Dai’s support to this program, by any means as might be necessary.

7. Unless some understanding can be worked out with French, they should know that we will be compelled reconsider United States policy support Vietnam. We cannot envisage any person, aside from Diem, who could justify United States financial and other support on scale large enough have even reasonable chance of success. Present French tendency of neutralizing Diem, weakening and freezing his position, in effect, writing him off, and leaving Binh Xuyen intact or even in stronger position makes it even more difficult than ever for United States to carry on in Vietnam. If Binh Xuyen challenge is allowed to stand, there will be no government under Diem or anyone that we can support, and that can command respect or conduct urgently needed program in face of Viet Minh threat and problem of elections. Problem of other two sects might be worked out gradually, and we much prefer to work out matters along lines of my 4284 to you.

8. We feel that in the present circumstances a course of action more profitable for the United States, France and the Free World could be found than that put forward by the French. Basically we consider that French and United States policy should be to help Diem clear up his difficulty with the Binh Xuyen by strengthening him and by withholding any French support to this gangster mob. Once Diem has established his authority over the National Police, which is a right inherent in his position and, as we assess it, within his capability if the French give the logistic and moral⁶ support we feel they should, then his problems with the religious sects could be worked out.

9. French Ambassador called in by Secretary evening 3d and above position explained to him. His reaction will be reported separately.

10. Convey gist of United States position immediately to French authorities in Saigon and Paris. Embassy London should explain to Eden substance reftel and of our views.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–255. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Young and cleared by MacArthur, Murphy, Sebald, Wisner of CIA, and Radford of the JCS; signed by Dulles. Sent also niact to Paris as 3506 and priority to London as 5054.
2. Supra.
3. Document 90.
4. Document 91.
5. In this telegram, April 2, the Embassy transmitted a note from the French Government giving extensive reasons for its decision to withdraw support from the “Diem experiment” and stating in the final paragraph that “the Diem Govt must without delay become more widely based or give way to another.” In telegram 4281 from Paris, also April 2, Achilles reported on a discussion with LaForest in which the French Minister told the Chargé “in blunt and forceful terms” that “the time had come to consider alternative solutions” to Diem. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–255)
6. The words “logistic and moral” were added by a different typewriter. Apparently they are Dulles’ revision.