Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

92. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 2, 1955—midnight.

4301. For the Secretary from Collins. Reference Embassy telegram 4292 rptd Paris 1148;² Department telegram 4284 rptd Paris 3498.³

1. I met with Ely morning April 2 to continue discussion reported ref Embtel. Ely said he desired present complete picture of situation as it appears to him and outline measures he feels must be taken in immediately ensuing days. Ely said that in conversation April 1, I had raised two questions:

(a) Possible replacement of National Police Chief and Diem’s threat to attack police headquarters with troops, and

(b) General conditions under which Diem experiment might succeed. Ely said in his view these questions were closely related and had to be treated together with respect to whatever joint action we might take in future.

2. Ely said that he believed first of these questions had to be treated immediately. He added that as Commander-in-Chief he believed any continued delay in our arriving at common position as to advice we should give Diem in this matter entailed risk of even more acute political crisis and possibly civil war. Unless we reached joint position both with regard to immediate and long range aspects of the problem the worst might happen. Ely said he agreed that Diem could not long retain Sang as Police Chief, for latter is both a gangster and inefficient. He agreed that we must both back a new policy when appointed but said he was still gravely concerned with question of timing of such appointment. Immediate problem we had to face was what recommendations we should make to Diem. That is, whether or not we should dissuade him from using force to remove present police chief and install his own man. Bay Vien might answer force with force and Diem’s and our trouble thereby would multiply enormously. Even if Binh Xuyen did not respond with show of violence, Ely continued, there would be in effect two police establishments between which clashes would be inevitable. Accordingly, this course, even if involving no initial use of force could not really solve problem. Accordingly, Ely added, it was his profound conviction that Diem cannot now settle problem by arms with means at his disposal and that any attempt on Diem’s part to do so could only aggravate crisis. Bay Vien, he said, is protected by Bao Dai, who might or might not support Sang’s removal. In any case, a partial solution of overall problem, which dealt only with control of police, would still leave Bao Dai pulling the strings, since it is not to be anticipated, short of a general settlement, that Bao Dai will agree to Bay Vien’s elimination from political scene. I interrupted Ely to ask whether he meant that Bao Dai would not approve Diem’s removing Sang and might advise Bay Vien not to yield to Diem’s order. Ely replied that it is hard to say what Bao Dai will do. In any case, Diem has not the means to defeat Bay Vien so long as latter is assured of some degree of support from Bao Dai, even if only “moral.” Moreover, through his ally Bao Dai, Bay Vien might be tempted take one last blow at Diem. I assured Ely I knew that Bay Vien could not be disposed of easily. However my position remained that unless we came up with an adequate solution, Diem had no option but to relieve Sang quickly. Therefore I had proposed that we tell Diem we would support him in removing Sang under certain specific conditions, such as that Diem not resort to force unless attacked.

4. [sic] Ely said that in his opinion we could not break present problem down into its component parts but would have to treat crisis as a whole. What, he continued, might be a valid solution to problem of South Viet Nam? He believed such a solution would be to set up a broadened govt capable of honorably representing Vietnamese people, of participating in pre-election discussions with Viet Minh, and of winning elections. He said we must put aside any idea of reaching an ideal solution. South Viet Nam would have to defend its existence against Viet Minh with available men and means, even at sacrifice of some theoretical principles both on side of Vietnamese and ourselves. No Vietnamese Govt could hope to succeed unless fully supported by France and U.S. He recognized that parliamentary opinion in France and U.S. tends to lag behind realities and said he felt it was our duty to shape such opinion in this instance rather than merely be guided by it.

5. Ely went on to say that Diem’s position despite our full support is now much weakened. French public opinion initially was strongly against Diem. That had caused Ely grave difficulties which he had managed to overcome only at cost of great effort. However, he had managed to resolve this difficulty and swing full support of FEC to Diem. He shared my regret fully that experiment so far has not succeeded.

6. Ely said that he could see only two possible solutions. These were:

(a) Use of force by Diem. Speaking as C-in-C, he said, he should reject this solution; nevertheless he was willing to examine it. After mature reflection on the means and time at Diem’s disposal, he believed that if Diem took on sects militarily and by some improbable development were able to defeat them, he would so have exhausted the energy and resources of South Viet Nam that his govt would not have strength left to defeat Viet Minh on political and psychological fronts. Moreover, the govt, assuming it was victorious over sects, might be too weakened to cope with internal disorders created by Viet Minh. He believed National Army less to harry National Army.⁴ Moreover, loyalty of National Army has been shaken, in recent days, by resignation of DefMin Minh. He said that it was unrealistic for Diem to count upon integration of Cao Dai forces into National Army as an asset in this struggle. In consequence, he believed no solution by force to be practicable.

(b) Political solution. Theoretically, Diem has full powers and could reform his govt and carry out programs we have helped him develop. To do that however he would need new men. But new men are not coming forward, not only because of Diem’s dictatorial methods but also because Diem has been almost repudiated by Bao Dai. In absence of a National Assembly, Ely said, Diem must turn to only higher legal authority which is Bao Dai.

7. Accordingly, Ely formally proposed that US and France ask Bao Dai to arbitrate present crisis. He was aware of US opinion regarding Bao Dai and was not proposing that latter return to Viet Nam at present In any event, Bao Dai is pulling wires. We must insure that he pulls wires as we wish and direct. He said French had no more love for Bao Dai than Americans, but that in present crisis he sees no other solution and urged me give it full consideration. As an initial step he proposed that Bao Dai proclaim a 10-day truce. Simultaneously Bao Dai should summon Diem, sect chieftains, and certain political leaders such as Quat, to France. In order that proper distinction be made between Diem and others, Ely proposed that French extend to him formal State invitation. He added that French and American representatives, having first reached full accord, should inform Bao Dai of solutions we wished to reach for each question considered. He added that he was fully cognizant of Diem’s virtues and hoped they could be saved for good of Viet Nam. He urged me to study this proposition at once, adding that to save Viet Nam is an essential policy objective of our two countries. In particular, we have profound responsibility to hundreds of thousands of refugees we have been evacuating from north. Concluding, Ely asked pardon for the passion with which he had spoken.

8. I replied that I appreciated the clarity of Ely’s expression, and while I saw difficulties in his proposal I also recognized its merits. However, I wished to clarify certain issues:

(a) I said that if possible I would like to see as prior condition that pressure be brought on Bao Dai to support Diem in removing Sang. This might result in instructions from Bao Dai to Diem authorizing Diem discharge Sang and appoint an acting Police Chief. In this connection I said it was vital to avoid any appearance of supporting gangsters against legal govt. Ely replied that this might be possible as part of a larger program. However, he fears situation is on verge of explosion and that this might detonate it.

(b) I asked, if Ely’s proposal were adopted, whether he thought our advice to Bao Dai should be communicated through US Embassy and Associated States Ministry in Paris. I said that I believed he and I should not go to France for this purpose, since we are so closely identified with local situation. Further discussion with Ely and his advisors led to agreement that if proposal is adopted it would be better that Bao Dai meet with Vietnamese leaders and sect representatives in Paris rather than Cannes as first suggested, where French influence could be brought to bear more discreetly than in Cannes.

(c) I agreed that it would be wise if Diem, an explosive element at present, were to leave the country for a while and it would be a good device for French to extend State invitation to Diem, to give him greater prestige than sect leaders in Paris. Meanwhile, [garble] conduct govt discussion of this point led to agreement that best acting PriMin would be Tran Van Do. Otherwise, a three-man executive composed of Do, [name and title deleted], and Minister for Plan Thoai might be workable alternative. In either case, delegation of power should be made by Diem.

9. I pointed out we would have to take steps both with Diem and Binh Xuyen to prevent further outbreak of hostilities over weekend. We agreed we would see Diem together to urge he accept three-day truce and Ely would alone contact sect leaders, beginning with Bay Vien, to secure their assent to truce. We agreed we would make no reference whatever to possible intervention by Bao Dai, as described above, and that that proposal, until and unless accepted by our govts, would remain most secret.

10. In conclusion, I reviewed for Ely primary reason US supported Diem, despite his most serious inadequacies as an administrator, his present inability to develop executive team work, etc., has been our conviction that the selfless devotion of Ho Chi Minh and his phony religion of Communism could best be met by the leadership, however inadequate from practical standards, of a man of spiritual qualities, high integrity, moral courage, and devoted nationalism, such as Ngo Dinh Diem. No other Vietnamese has these qualities to same degree. (However, while I did not say so, I have grave doubts Diem will ever be able to work with other able men.)

11. Ely and I proceeded at once to PriMin’s Palace. As agreed, Ely presented proposal for three-day truce in order further study of situation and I followed with expression of complete concurrence. We said that our objective was to save the govt and Diem himself and to permit him to play his proper and essential role as PriMin. At beginning Diem was unreceptive, said that Sang’s men, in addition to terrorism in Saigon, intended seize town of Dalat by force, and asked Ely whether he would accept responsibility for whatever happened during truce period. Ely and I said that former would do everything possible to prevent conflict. Ely agreed in his contact with Bay Vien to seek latter’s agreement that National Police would not act against govt in Saigon or elsewhere. Ely and I agreed that Diem should cut off Sang’s post office telegraphic communications with provinces, and expressed surprise he had not done so already. Finally Diem agreed accept three-day truce on condition, to which we agreed, that civil and military authorities react with all means at their disposal in case of attack by sect or police forces, and that at end of 3-day period he could proceed relieve Sang. Ely agreed. (Our basic proposal provided for this being done by Diem reinforced by Bao Dai’s active support. See par 8 (a) above.) Ely undertook report to Diem results of his contacts with sects. We proposed that if general agreement was reached, Diem announce truce, but without reference to US-French intervention.

12. Recommendations:

(a) I believe Ely’s proposal is most promising yet made to escape from present impasse. Moreover, it has advantage of being a French proposal and conferences involved would be held in France. If it should fail it will tend to force French to be more amenable to any alternate plan we might then insist on. Meanwhile it should provide essential breathing spell during which tensions can be relaxed. I feel also that this proposal offers us a means of shifting our policy with respect to support of Diem’s govt, if we conclude that to be necessary, while at the same time maintaining a solid front with France. Accordingly, I recommend Dept accept Ely’s proposal in principle, subject only him working out details of consultations and specific recommendations to be made to Bao Dai. I recommend Embassy Paris be instructed to convey to French Govt our acceptance of this proposal, which Ely telegraphed to Paris following our conversation.

(b) Removal of Police Chief Sang as proposed in par 8 (a) above be included as an integral part of this plan.

(c) If plan is adopted, consultations and conferences take place in Paris.

(d) Neither Ely nor I participate in consultations and conferences.

(e) Either FonMin Do or an interim executive council composed of Do, [title deleted], and Minister for Plan be named by Diem to act for him in his absence.

(f) For immediate action, I recommend Dept instruct Embassy Paris niact make joint approach with French to Bao Dai asking him call for immediate ten-day truce in Viet Nam, beginning at expiration present three-day truce. If Dept has not completed consideration all elements this message I urge that this step of program be carried out in advance and if necessary without reference to entire plan, which has been reached at govt level. If this step would have to precede others, Bao Dai could be told that we are working on solution and require his assistance in order maintain peace during that period.

13. Your niact 4284 received just as we were finishing this message. I see no reason for changing any of above. Ref your par 4, I hope to forward very shortly program covering both short and long term aspects sect problem. We may well need some additional funds to make this program effective. Greatly appreciate Depts continued support my mission.

14. I have just learned that Bay Vien and Cao Dai have agreed truce conditions and Soai, who has not yet been reached, is expected agree a.m. 3 April.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–255. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Paris for Achilles.
2. Supra.
3. Document 90.
4. This sentence is printed as written in the source text.