88. Memorandum for the Record, by Senator Mike Mansfield1

SUBJECT

  • Indo China

At 1:30 p.m. today I received a call from Secretary Dulles at which time he asked me to come down and discuss the Vietnam situation which he said was getting progressively worse. I met with Mr. Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson and Ken Young in charge of the Southeast Asia desk at 4:00 p.m. and there, read certain cables relative to the situation in Vietnam. In these cables, Collins said that the recent coming over of 10,000 Codao [Cao Dai] troops was probably of only a temporary nature; that Diem’s brothers were very close to Diem; and that the possibilities were that difficulties of very grave nature might arise shortly. He seemed to imply that Diem was too rigid; his authority too personal; and that team-work in the cabinet was lacking.

He offered four alternatives: [Page 177]

1.
That if Diem was replaced, he would be replaced by Tran Van Do.
2.
That he be replaced by Quat.
3.
That Bao Dai exert some sort of pressure on Diem to broaden his government.
4.
That Bao Dai return to Vietnam as President with the retention of Diem as Premier.

When asked for my opinion, I said I thought all four alternatives were worse than keeping Diem in office; that we did not have too much time; that if Diem quit or was overthrown, there would very likely be civil war; and that as a result that Ho Chi Minh could walk in and take the country without any difficulty. I suggested that someone from the Paris Embassy be sent down to Bao Dai and that if necessary, serious consideration be given to subsidizing him, in part at least, for revenues which may have been lost through Diem’s crack down on the Binh Xuyen. I also suggested that if it could be worked in some fashion that contact be established with Bao Dai; to use his influence to get Diem to take Quat into the Cabinet either as Minister of Defense or Minister of the Interior. Quat seems to be the one man everyone except Binh Xuyen seems to think should be in the Cabinet. The most difficult person to deal with is Bay Vien, head of the Binh Xuyen who has not been in contact with Diem for the past two months even though efforts have been made by Diem to arrange a meeting with him.

While Ba Cut seems to be the first military leader, the defection of his Cao Daist [?] to Diem and the blessings by their Pope has taken away a lot of his strength. My parting suggestions were to contact Bao Dai along the lines enumerated above and to try to find ways and means of getting Diem to accept Quat into his cabinet.

  1. Source: University of Montana, Mansfield Papers, Series XXII, Box 107, Vietnam.