Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

76. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, March 28, 1955—5:41 p.m.

4197. For Collins. Further to Young’s comments in Paris 4074 of Department repeated Saigon 595.² Young’s conversations March 23 and 24 with French officials including Prime Minister further confirm impressions contained final paragraph reftel. French overestimate sect capabilities and tend believe sect leaders have relatively more power than at Diem’s disposal. As of last week French inclined doubt solidity national army behind Diem or ability national army battalions move effectively against Binh Xuyen or sect military groups. French officials left Young with impression they are not trying to maneuver Diem out of office but are willing now to support his government in principle. They do intensely wish to see it strengthened with effective appointments. Ely and Roux mentioned Quat in particular.

However, last week French officials put Diem and sect leaders on same plane because of French evaluation of relative power positions. For this reason they also all agreed resort to Bao Dai was essential to settle dispute and prevent armed conflict at all costs. Top French officials and also French senators interested in Indochina with whom Young talked at Faure’s lunch Thursday³ all suggested some sort of “presidium” or national council including sects as device to compromise sect–Diem feud and also increse representative character of government of Diem.

In several conversations with Ely present as well as with him alone Young tried his best to emphasize

1) Absolute necessity of upholding authority central government and Prime Minister.

2) Sect leaders are in fact rebels and should not be treated or given assistance on a par with Diem. (French admitted this in principle but insisted realities of sect military power gave them whip hand over Diem.)

3) Personally felt time for joint or individual French-US démarche to Bao Dai very premature.

4) Pointed out Diem had many cards to play and probably had more support in Viet-Nam in general as well as against unpopular sect leaders than French seemed willing to concede.

5) Concurred necessity bringing more representative as well as competent nationalist figures into cabinet under Diem which you and General Ely have been trying for so long to persuade Diem to do.

6) Made no comments on presidium idea except to say it would not add much until sect affair cleaned up and authority central government established.

Based only on several conversations during two days in Paris, left with impression French officials now in charge Indochina affairs much more frank, open and closer to our viewpoints than heretofore, although there remain above differences of emphasis. While there may be some reservations in background French thinking not revealed during these conversations, Young’s impression is there is firmer agreement on overall objective in three Associated States and on stronger French intention work closely with us there.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–2355. Secret. Drafted by Young and cleared by Sebald. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. Document 71.
3. March 24; for a report of part of the conversation, see telegram 4116, Document 74.