Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

78. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) and the French Commissioner-General in Vietnam (Ely), Saigon, March 29, 1955¹

Saigon, March 29, 1955

1. Following the presentation of the TRIM study on sects forces,² Ambassador Collins remained at General Ely’s invitation to continue a conversation held on 27 March.³ General Ely said that in Sunday’s conversation he had the impression that he and Ambassador Collins were following the same line but that nevertheless there were certain points of possible difference which should be explored.

2. With regard to the sects, General Ely said they are an anachronistic survival and should be integrated into the society. He said, however, that Ambassador Collins saw the sects as anarchic groups in a normal society, whereas he sees them as highly organized bodies in an anarchic society. General Ely went on to say that the sects constitute the strongest anti-Viet Minh element in the South and that if elections were held under their jurisdiction, the Government could be certain of a 100% victory. However, if the sects are driven into the maquis by precipitate Government action, they risk being absorbed by the Viet Minh. In fact, Ba Cut and Trinh Minh The are already heavily infiltrated by Viet Minh elements. Ambassador Collins said that he believes his view of the sects was not substantially different from General Ely’s.

3. General Ely said that so long as there is no National Assembly Bao Dai must continue to play a part in Viet Nam. At the present he is at Cannes pulling wires. We should make it our business to insure that he is pulling wires in our behalf. He said he saw no necessary difficulties as between Bao Dai and Diem, so long as they were working in the same direction. Ambassador Collins said that there was no personal difference between him and General Ely with respect to Bao Dao [Dai]. But US public and congressional opinion is strongly against the Chief of State. General Ely interposed the remark that the French public opinion is also against Bao Dai, but he added that the latter would continue to play a part so long as there was no National Assembly. Ambassador Collins said that he had no way of judging exactly what Vietnamese opinion was regarding Bao Dai. Ely replied that there is no way of knowing. Moreover public opinion is not so important here as in the West, and can be created. Ambassador Collins asked what Ely thought Diem’s view of Bao Dai was. Ely replied that Diem hates Bao Dai but would agree to his intervention if that were the only solution.

4. General Ely went on to say that as the situation has developed, we are now in a political impasse. It is no longer enough to deal with the superficial aspects of the problem. The problem must be attacked at its roots. Use of force, he added, is the worst possible solution. Since it is in an impasse, there seems to be no alternative for the Government except to turn to the source of legal authority. He said he felt that Diem could now take the initiative and undertake to set up conversations between representatives of the Government on the one hand and of the sects on the other. Representatives will be able to reach agreement on certain points, but may have to refer others to Bao Dai. If we, French and Americans, were back of Bao Dai, and helping shape his decisions, this would be a workable system. It would not necessarily involve Bao Dai’s return to Viet Nam. Ambassador Collins said that there seemed to be merit in Ely’s proposal and asked if the TRIM study would not be useful as the basis for one of these conversations. General Ely replied that it was exactly this sort of precise point which he had in mind for discussion. Ambassador Collins said that except for the question of Bao Dai’s serving as an arbiter, on which he reserved judgment, he agreed with Ely’s proposal. He went on to say that if this proposal was adopted, he would have to make it very clear to the Department of State that he was not favoring negotiations between the sects and the Government as between two equal powers. Ely replied that the situation is not dissimilar to the strikes in the Western countries, where the Government meets with strikers’ representatives without impairing its sovereignty. Ambassador Collins objected that the Government was under an ultimatum. General Ely said that the ultimatum had expired without incident and that the Government should move quickly so as to retain its freedom of action and not be subjected to a renewed threat. Ambassador Collins asked General Ely if he did not take seriously the threats of blockade and violence which are being broadcast by radio. Ely said he did not take these seriously, but felt that the Government should move quickly before these threats took shape. Ambassador Collins agreed but said he wished to have more time to consider the question of using Bao Dai. General Ely said that somebody would have to arbitrate. It was agreed that they would discuss this matter at 3 p.m. on 29 March.⁴

5. Ambassador Collins asked Ely to report the highlights of his conversation of March 28 with President Diem. General Ely replied that he had reported on his trip to France and that Diem appeared satisfied with the present trend of French policy toward Viet Nam. Diem recounted his present difficulties. Ely stated, without going into the details stated above, that he had suggested to Diem that conversations should be undertaken between the sects and the Government. Ambassador Collins asked if he had proposed the use of representatives. General Ely said he had, explaining that Diem and the sects’ leaders were not on the same intellectual plane and accordingly possibly could not reach a meeting of the minds. Ambassador Collins asked if conversations were held by subordinates, whether there was any guarantee that these subordinates would be on a higher plane. Ely replied that the sects’ leaders did have political advisors who are somewhat better than they. Ambassador Collins asked who should represent Diem. Ely said that he did not know except that he might propose one minister and one other person from Diem’s own office. Ely said that he had also told Diem that the Prime Minister should do everything possible to get Bao Dai to work on his side.

6. Ambassador Collins said he was convinced that Bao Dai should not return at the present time, since this would probably render negotiations impossible. The sects’ leaders would turn immediately to Bao Dai, who would become the focal point of endless intrigue. General Ely repeated that his plan did not necessarily entail Bao Dai’s return, only that Bao Dai should be induced to work with the French and Americans. Ambassador Collins said this would involve a joint French-U.S. contact with Bao Dai in France. Ely replied that it would. He added that if Bao Dai were to return in the next few days, that would solve nothing, since he is not adequately briefed. If it were agreed that he should come at a later time, that should be only under the strictest conditions imposed by France and the U.S.

7. Ambassador Collins asked General Ely if Diem had indicated what he meant when he said he was willing to eliminate from his Cabinet certain ministers favorable to him. Ely said that he had asked the question but the answer was not clear. Diem had said something about forming a Government of technicians. Ambassador Collins said we must solve this problem of how the sects are to participate in the Government. He asked General Ely to consider this point so that they could discuss it later. General Ely said that the sects’ ministers have no idea of their jobs and it might be desirable that sect representation in the Government take the form of an advisory council without executive responsibility.

1. Source: Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VIII, Memos for Record. Secret. Drafted by Sturm, who initialed it.
2. A memorandum of this portion of the conversation, which included also General Gambiez and the U.S.-French TRIM Study Group headed by Lansdale, is ibid., Series VII, D.
3. See telegram 4159, supra.
4. See Document 80.