Office of the Historian

376. Memorandum of a Conversation, Blair House, Washington, May 9, 1957, 4:30 p.m.1

Washington, May 9, 1957, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Military Aid and Force Levels

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
  • His Excellency Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam
  • His Excellency Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State at the Presidency
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Honorable Elbridge Durbrow, American Ambassador
  • The Honorable Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
  • Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
  • Mr. Thomas J. Corcoran, Officer-in-Charge Viet-Nam Affairs
  • Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

The Secretary remarked that detailed discussion of military questions could take place during President Ngo Dinh Diem’s visit to the Pentagon on May 10.2

President Ngo Dinh Diem said that Viet-Nam had made much progress in military matters and it was now a question of holding what had been gained. In order effectively to train the army it was necessary to entrust to the Civil Guard and the Village Defense Forces the task of internal security which had heretofore been handled by the army. Thus far the Civil Guard had been an auxiliary to the army in matters of internal security. It was not like similar forces in other countries because the Viet Minh were organizing commandos equipped with automatic weapons and the Civil Guard had to deal with these. These groups were being organized near the frontier and, according to French reports, they were especially strong in the region of Stung Treng in the wartime maquis region near the triangle formed by the frontiers of Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam. It appeared that Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia was unable to put a stop to such activities on the Cambodian side of the frontier.

The Secretary asked if we had information of overt acts by such forces, Mr. Durbrow replied that there had been incursions across the frontier from Cambodia into Viet-Nam involving the capture of an airplane belonging to a rubber plantation and the robbery of plantation funds.

President Ngo said it was no longer merely a question of infiltration across the 17th parallel or from Cambodia. There was now an airline service from Hanoi to Vientiane to Phnom Penh. Also, although he did not know just why the Vietnamese Communists had established air parcel post communications between Hanoi and Laos. Thus the ChiComs and the Vietnamese Communists could send personnel and materials to Cambodia by air and from Cambodia they could organize operations in Vietnamese territory. They were organizing commandos in the regions behind the French rubber plantations and they were in contact with remnants of the old dissident sect forces.

The Secretary asked what Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem’s response to these maneuvers was. President Ngo replied that he was trying to [Page 801] handle this business with the Civil Guard while training the army in divisional operations. As he had told the Secretary’s representative at Canberra he also wanted to construct a human wall in the depopulated area near the three frontiers. He was calling for people from Center Viet-Nam to fill the vacuum in the High Plateau region and in the Plaine des Joncs. This policy prompted a violent reaction from the Vietnamese Communist and ChiCom radios because it threatened their subversive plans. Two days before the attempt on the President’s life (February 22) at Banmethuot (in the High Plateau region) Radio Hanoi violently attacked the resettlement plan on the grounds that it represented establishment of bases for “American Aggression.” The Viet Minh saw the logical invasion route for attacking South Viet-Nam as following the Mekong and since Laos was defenseless and the Cambodian Army worth very little the danger to Viet-Nam was great. Ngo has discussed this strategic concept with General Williams who concurs.

With conscription coming into effect (three months from May 2) Ngo saw the prospect of demobilizing 40,000 men a year who could be settled as farmers in the depopulated regions in order to be sure they did not hang on as unemployed in the cities. The Australians and the British were interested in this plan. If Cambodia and Thailand were to do the same thing there would be considerable lessening of tensions. Replacement of these people by lower paid conscripts would help the budgetary problem. The Secretary asked if these settlers would not have to be paid as members of the Civil Defense Forces. President Ngo said no. Mr. Durbrow explained the President envisaged that these people would be settled as farmers but that being loyal persons with military training they could constitute a reserve force or human wall and could by their presence deny the Communists use of the area.

President Ngo said that for the same reason he emphasized construction of highways along the High Plateau connecting with Laos.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/5–957. Confidential. Drafted by Corcoran. This memorandum and Documents 377 and 378 make up the record of an extended conversation which covered a number of topics.↩
  2. See Document 379.↩