Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

375. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House, Washington, May 9, 1957, 11:13 a.m.–12:05 p.m.¹

Washington, May 9, 1957, 11:13 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• General Discussion of Situation in North Viet-Nam by President Ngo Dinh Diem

PARTICIPANTS

• President Eisenhower
• His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
• His Excellency Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State to the Presidency and Secretary of State for the Interior
• His Excellency Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam
• The Secretary of State
• The Honorable Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
• The Honorable Elbridge Durbrow, American Ambassador to Viet-Nam
• Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

After introductory remarks by the President praising President Diem for the excellent achievements he has brought about in the last three years in stabilizing the situation in Viet-Nam, President Eisenhower asked President Diem to outline the principal problems he is facing today.

President Diem replied that his country has gone through a very grave and serious crisis and has been able to hold on despite strong pressures from all sides. The principal problem of establishing internal security and building up their defense posture has been achieved to a considerable extent. The principal reason Viet-Nam has been able to hold out against these pressures has been because of the sympathy and encouragement given by the United States despite the fact that for a time even some people in the United States did not think that the Diem government could maintain itself.

At the present time Viet-Nam is faced with the possibility of a strong Communist offensive from the Vietminh who have 400 thousand men under arms. Fortunately, however, the Vietminh are faced with serious problems such as high taxes needed to maintain this large force and must have other controls which have caused discontent among the population in the North. Diem feels that Red China is faced with the same problems. They are maintaining a large army which requires heavy taxes and controls over the people, which Diem hopes in the long run will force the Chinese Government to demobilize a considerable portion of their forces and treat the people in a more liberal manner. There is, nevertheless, the possibility that the Vietminh with their large army might try to attack now while they have a superiority in numbers. The Vietminh during the first year after the Geneva Conference did not think it would be necessary to use armed force to take over the South; they thought the government in the South would crumble and they could take over without difficulty. With internal stability in Free Viet-Nam and the build-up of their own armed forces, they have now the possibility of holding out for a few years more during which time Diem reiterated the strain and drain on the economy of the Vietminh may cause them to demobilize some of their forces and adopt a more liberal attitude toward the population.

Free Viet-Nam now has 150 thousand men under arms which has been the principal deterrent to an armed attack from the North. In order to put the Free Vietnamese forces on a more solid basis, Diem has recently decreed universal conscription. In three years, over two-thirds of the forces in Free Viet-Nam will be conscripts. This development will cut costs considerably since conscripts will only be paid about half as much as the regular troops are paid today.

Despite the fact that the Free Vietnamese forces have been built up into a fairly strong organization, the structure of the army is not orthodox. Diem pointed out that the figure of 150 thousand was arrived at during the time the French had considerable military influence in Viet-Nam and the French were convinced that it would not be possible by training to make good soldiers out of the Vietnamese. The French, therefore, proposed the creation of a mixture of light (about 5500 men) and heavy (about 8600 men) divisions. Furthermore, the so-called heavy divisions were not really heavy in fact. Diem would like to have a more balanced military force by having the army made up of all heavy divisions of 10 thousand men each. In order to do this, the overall number of troops under arms should be raised by 20 thousand to 170 thousand. This increase can be brought about with the change over to conscription, without additional cost for the remainder of the calender year 1957, since there is enough material on hand for the initial equipping of the additional 20 thousand men. However, as the American military advisers in Viet-Nam know, a lot of the logistical support equipment is old and they do not have enough artillery. This, therefore, should be replaced as soon as possible. The Vietminh have three times as much artillery as Free Viet-Nam and with that they could probably break through the demarcation line at the 17th parallel.

In Diem’s opinion his main military requirement is ground forces. Diem is convinced that because of the poor visibility of low cloud cover prevailing through most of the year, it would be difficult if not impossible to give adequate air support to the ground forces. He is afraid, also, that any Vietminh-Communist attack would probably come down the Mekong River Valley through Laos, which is a scantily populated area where it would not be possible to use tactical atomic weapons since there would be no concentrated targets suitable for A-bomb attacks. He added that while the Laotians are sympathetic to the Vietnamese cause, they do not have a strong army and hope that the Vietnamese could help defend Laos. The Laotians, however, do not have too much courage and are intimidated by the presence of Red China to the North.

Diem then reiterated that Viet-Nam has attained stability due primarily to the volume of American aid. He pointed out that the magnitude of American aid permitted the US Government to have a large number of advisers and consultants in Viet-Nam who not only can assist Viet-Nam with its problems but also follow closely developments and the use to which aid is placed. In contrast, the small amounts of aid given to other countries, such as 20/30 million dollars, does not permit the US Government to maintain such close control over developments in other countries as is the case in Viet-Nam. Diem pleaded for the maintenance of the present aid level of 250 million dollars a year of which 170 million dollars is allocated for defense purposes. This aid has permitted Viet-Nam to build up its armed strength and thus play an important role in Southeast Asia. If this aid should be cut both the military and economic progress would have to be reduced. This would cause serious repercussions not only in Viet-Nam but among neighboring countries in Southeast Asia who look on Viet-Nam as an example of the good US aid can bring. Any cut would also bring serious political repercussions in Viet-Nam.

When asked about the possibility of devaluating the currency, Diem replied that any devaluation would bring about serious military and economic problems unless production should be increased sufficiently to prevent inflation. He added that they are just beginning their industrial development and if they should devaluate now the results would be disastrous for the economy. Diem reiterated that Viet-Nam is a pilot experiment in Southeast Asia which has made a strong impression on other countries in that area. He pointed out that in 1954 and 1955 the Indian Government did not believe that Free Viet-Nam could hold out against the Communists. Now, however, basically because of American aid, the situation has been stabilized and the Indians are now looking on Viet-Nam sympathetically.

Defense Plans

Diem outlined his strategic defense plans emphasizing first of all the need for a highway system in the plateau area. He stated that such a plan had been devised by the French after the First World War but had never been implemented. This plan was devised in order to operate against an attack by way of Laos. Diem is convinced that the new highway system should be given high priority. Diem stated that if the Communist attack comes, it will probably come by way of Laos which is the easiest route, through a sparsely populated area which constitutes an easy area for infiltration. In connection with Diem’s general strategic concept and the request for additional force levels, President Eisenhower asked whether the Geneva Agreement prohibited such increase. Diem replied that there are no limitations on the strength of the armed forces of either North or South Viet-Nam in the Geneva Agreement. Under the Agreement, however, additional war matériel could not be brought in but provision is made for the replacement of worn-out matériel. Diem pointed out that the French have withdrawn a very large quantity of matériel so that it would be legally possible to replace this matériel with new equipment within the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. President Eisenhower asked whether, with the planned conscription there would also be a hard corps of professional soldiers and whether the officers and men are given sufficient pay to make a military career attractive. Diem replied that about one-third of the future army forces would be professionals and the pay was high enough to be attractive.

President Eisenhower then reminded Diem that his territory is protected by SEATO. Diem agreed but believes he should have enough troops of his own to carry out his own defense. President Eisenhower then asked Diem whether the proposed highways were primarily important from a purely military standpoint or whether they were also economically desirable. Diem replied that the roads were important both from a military and economic point of view. The President, half jokingly, said that there was an old adage that roads sometimes were a “golden bridge for your enemies”. Diem replied that this aspect had been given careful study and his experts are convinced that the roads are important for the defense of Viet-Nam because the present highway system is very vulnerable and inadequate. These roads in the high plateau area are not only militarily necessary but from an economic point of view they would permit the opening up of new farm land, allow these scarcely populated areas to be filled by people from the crowded coastal area and thus fill a vacuum in a vulnerable area which is now easily subject to infiltration. Regarding SEATO, Diem said that he has studied this question carefully and while SEATO constitutes a good deterrent, there are only two countries which could possibly come immediately to the aid of Viet-Nam—Thailand and the Philippines. Pakistan is too far away. However, the Filipinos only have about 60 thousand troops and they would be needed to defend the Philippines and could not come to the aid of Viet-Nam. The Thais only have about 150 thousand men under arms and if an attack on Thailand should come by way of Laos these troops would be needed to defend Thailand itself. Diem feels there is a strong possibility that given the revolutionary situation in Southeast Asia, the Vietminh might attack by commando methods which would be hard to stop unless Viet-Nam has a sufficiently large ground force. Such type of warfare would not lend itself to tactical atomic weapon defense and Diem again questioned whether the SEATO plans which call for use of both tactical atomic weapons and air offensive would be effective in Viet-Nam where visibility is poor because of the overcast conditions throughout most of the year and the lack of any real concentrated targets for atomic weapons. Therefore, Viet-Nam must be in a position first of all to discourage an attack by having a large enough army. Secondly, if an attack should come, it would be possible with sufficient forces to hold out until SEATO machinery can get into operation. For psychological as well as political reasons, it would be necessary for Viet-Nam to counter-attack as soon as possible. This must be done by Vietnamese troops and not foreign troops. While naval and air support would help to diminish enemy potential and permit naval landings in the North in a drive toward Hanoi, most of the military operations would have to be done by ground troops.

President Eisenhower stated that he, of course, understood the need for a strong army but the maintenance of a large army brings about serious political and economic problems. While the US wants to do all it can to help its friends, it must be remembered that we have many international commitments which we must live up to and we have undertaken great obligations from Korea to NATO and the volume of aid we can give is not limitless. For these reasons, we must use our best judgment in allocating the resources we can make available. Our problem is to do all we can to fight Communism as well as develop satisfactory solutions for many problems facing us and the free world. We must, therefore, study these problems from a global point of view and adopt the best programs for all concerned.

Devaluation

Secretary Dulles again brought up the question of the possible need to devaluate the Vietnamese currency by pointing out that the official rate is about 35 to the dollar and the Hong Kong black market rate is about 100 to the dollar. He wanted to know whether Diem planned for a devaluation. Diem replied that this is a very serious and complex problem but he agreed to make a joint study of the matter.

Résumé

Diem stated that he is convinced that all must be done to advance the successes which have already been attained in Viet-Nam and he hoped that assurances could be given that future aid would continue at the present level. President Eisenhower replied that he has not had an opportunity as yet to study the proposed distribution of aid for fiscal year 1958 and emphasized that the amount of aid for that year would depend upon what the Congress will do, but in any event, he promised Diem to do the best we can once it is known how much money will be available.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings, Diem Visit, 5–57. Drafted by Durbrow; initialed by Durbrow and Robertson. Another copy is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

   Information on location and duration of the meeting is derived from Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments.