Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

379. Memorandum of a Conversation, The Pentagon, Washington, May 10, 1957, 10:40 a.m.–12:40 p.m.¹

Washington, May 10, 1957, 10:40 a.m. to 12:40 p.m.

PRESENT WERE

• President Ngo Dinh Diem
• General Tran Van Don, Staff Chief of the General Staff
• Vietnamese Ambassador Tran Van Chuong
• Nguyen Huu Chau, Secretary of State for the Interior and to the Presidency
• Rear Admiral D.L. McDonald, Aide to President Ngo Dinh Diem
• Deputy Secretary Donald A. Quarles
• General Nathan F. Twining
• Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
• Lt. General Alonzo P. Fox, USA
• US Ambassador to Viet-Nam Elbridge Durbrow
• Assistant Secretary of State Robertson
• Mr. Kenneth Young, Dept. of State
• Mr. Sedgwick (Interpreter)
• Captain B.A. Robbins, Jr., USN

Secretary Quarles opened the meeting by explaining that instead of a briefing for President Ngo as had originally been scheduled, it was felt that this might be considered presumptuous in view of the President’s knowledge of Southeast Asia, and therefore the President was invited to express his views on the situation.

President Ngo proceeded to sketch out his thoughts on the strategic problem of Viet-Nam, the military situation and its requirements. He views Viet-Nam as a bridgehead, which in case of conflict would receive support and assistance from SEATO. Viet-Nam is endangered by two things: subversive elements under Communist direction and aggression by invasion. This latter may take the form of invasion at the 17th parallel, or over the high plateau and then down through Laos to cut off the capital from the west, or a combination of both. The invasion route across the 17th parallel would cut off a large percentage of the population and not enough would be left to raise additional forces for resistance. The interior line of invasion along the border area has no natural defenses after the enemy passes through the Annam Chain. This is a soft area for defensive purposes. Either one, or a combination of both, of the above routes is possible and feasible. Above the 17th parallel the Viet Minh have 200,000 regular troops and 250,000 regional troops. Secretary Quarles raised the question as to restriction on those forces by the Geneva Accords. It was stated that there is no restriction on the numbers. The troops, however, have been given modernized equipment and training by the Chinese Communists and their re-equipment is a violation of the Geneva Accords. President Ngo also stated the Russians are particularly concerned with the training of these forces and in accordance with Russian practice have emphasized artillery to the point that they have three times as much as Viet-Nam. He stated that the Viet-Minh air force has been training in Communist China since 1951.

The Vietnamese do not have sufficient forces to guard the entire border. Laos has a weak army, very poor roads and is lightly populated. Infiltration through Laos is both easy and dangerous to Viet-Nam. It is believed possible that the Viet Minh could infiltrate this interior route with as many as 100,000 troops disguised as coolies which could be very dangerous. President Ngo views a strictly defensive plan as unsatisfactory if only because of the demoralizing factor. He feels the plan must be both offensive and defensive. He covered this concept as follows: (1) Vietnamese do not know the SEATO Plan. (2) The General Staff first conceived a defensive plan which was considered demoralizing. (3) They have now conceived art offensive-defensive plan which has been referred to General Williams. (4) Population of the North is against Communism. If free to move it would move out to the South. In the North soldiers are the principals in the privileged class. (5) It is believed necessary in the event of aggression to bring airborne troops into the high plateau area of Laos–Viet-Nam, and also conduct airborne operations to pin down the Viet Minh and make possible an offensive to the North. In addition the line of the 17th parallel must be held as this is the route of refugees. Any airborne landings must be Vietnamese troops not foreign troops. Foreign troops should be limited to use below the 17th parallel as support forces.

Big question for Vietnamese is when do they get the foreign troops. Thai forces will be otherwise occupied. The civil guard is poorly equipped and would not be effective. There are no other ground forces available in the Southeast Asia area. In answer to a question as to whether the troops to be used in the plateau could be Thai, the President answered no. Laos is afraid of the Thais; they are afraid of a Pan-Thai movement to swallow Laos. Laos hates Cambodia, distrusts the Thais but likes the Vietnamese. They would like an outlet to the sea at Tourane. They have promised to send officers to be trained by the Vietnamese. President Ngo then commented on his planned second counter move which is to fill up the vacuum of the high plateau area, the forest border area and the Plaine des Joncs. This plan will be begun by placing trained demobilized men from the Civil Guard in these areas with their families, 3,000 so far. He is now appealing to the people of the central Viet-Nam area to settle on the high plateau and is asking people of South Viet-Nam, the southern areas, to move into the Plaine des Joncs.

SEATO has always recognized the need of the fight against subversion. Planting men in these areas will construct a human wall effective against Communist infiltration and subversion. The above goes hand in hand with construction of roads in the above areas. Stationing men and building roads serve both a strategic and economic purpose. The road building projects is [are] really a stage of the French plan that goes back to 1919 and continues to 1942.

Secretary Quarles asked the status of the road construction now. The President answered it had not yet begun but Capital Engineering Firm was starting construction studies and he thought construction could begin next year. These roads in the interior are important because the road along the coast is easily disrupted. It has many bridges and that is why French, thinking of the possibility of Japanese aggression along the coast, thought roads in this area desirable. This was part of the French Empire Plan to tie together Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. It is still a good plan for the defense of South-east Asia. It includes a road across the interior to Pakse on the Mekong which is near the Thai Railroad terminus at Ubon. Route 9 from Tourane to Savannakhet is too close to the 17th parallel, but Laos is interested in an outlet to the sea for economic reasons. SEATO principles are (1) to parry aggression (2) struggle against subversion and (3) economic and social aspects required to support the above. The French and British are interested mostly in number 3. The military strategic aspects of offensive-defensive plan are favored by the air force and navy. In case of aggression tactical atomic weapons could be used. Vietnamese feel they must emphasize ground weapons because the Viet-Nam war showed that it was difficult to use air effectively in this country. Communist troops are very mobile. The irregular forces advance ahead of regular troops to sabotage and cut communications. They also follow the regular troops to subdue the population. Use of atomic weapons against the aggression through the sparsely settled territory of Laos would not be effective. Therefore, the President believes that the Vietnamese must reorganize their Army to be prepared for such a struggle.

Despite the efforts of General O’Daniel the present Army structure is now not satisfactory. This is due to the French policy which insisted on keeping Vietnamese forces in small units no larger than a battalion, preventing the development of a proper Viet-Nam Army. This is why Diem could not come to power sooner. French said Vietnamese couldn’t be trained and were too weak physically. They limited them to light forces. After the Armistice the French continued to control the forces. Following the French phase out, and the elimination of French forces, training was conducted under a mixed French-US training group. The French concept of light battalion, light division, heavy division, made no sense at all not even for use against the sects. I [i.e., President Diem] therefore felt the Army should be completely reorganized, and consolidation of training into a strictly US mission made this possible. The US military know that the Vietnamese make good soldiers. I have talked over my idea with General Williams, and it is to reorganize my 6 light and 4 heavy divisions of 5,600 and 8,300 men respectively, into the same number of field divisions with 10,000 each, with 3 regiments per division. To achieve this the Army must increase to 170,000. This would avoid a complete shift of the present division. If we stay at the present 150,000 men it would be necessary to shift or change the basic structure. If our total forces are raised to 170 thousand we could increase each division to 10,000. To reduce the impact on the budget I have decreed a draft as a stop gap plan. Draftees will be inducted for 1 year terms in the age group 20 to 21. Beginning 1 August 150 per day will be inducted. This will amount to 48,000 per year. In 3 years this will make it possible to replace 2/3 of the Army at the end of 3 years. The budget will be stabilized. At the present time Viet-Nam Army is organized along French colonial lines with the families traveling with the troops. The average pay is a thousand piasters a month. The military budget is 170 million dollars a year. The use of draftees would reduce the cost by half. Draftees would be young people with no families. The U.S. military recommend that I not replace all my troops with draftees but retain 30,000 minimum as a hard core. I believe the above is necessary because in my view to meet aggression in my country requires emphasis on the ground forces. As the present troops with their families are demobilized they would be settled in the high plateau and the Plaine des Joncs area. This would be beneficial both from [for?] economic and strategic reasons.

At this point Secretary Quarles noted that the President was due at the Press Club shortly and requested time for a few U.S. questions. His first was whether the Geneva Accords inhibited [prohibited?] (US) training personnel. President Diem replied that there had been no protests—there had been embarrassing questions, but the Geneva Accords only prohibited troop reinforcements.

Mr. Quarles asked a general question on the status of training and equipment of the Viet-Nam air force. General Don replied that the planes turned over by the French had been retained for training until no longer usable and then returned. President Ngo said that in general vehicles and communications equipment were in bad shape. These can be replaced with the same type used by the French without violating the Geneva Accords. He continued to say that the French training of the air force and navy in his opinion was very poor because the French were dragging their feet. For the Viet-Nam Air Force actually they were providing only 6 months training for mechanics which U.S. military personnel considered inadequate. When the French questioned him about the renewal of their training contract the conversation resulted in an agreement to withdraw the French Air Force training mission with the exception of special French personnel who would remain until the end of the year for technical training. All other requirements would be met by the U.S. He had therefore requested the [that] MAAG provide these training personnel and several instructors for the military academy (Armed Forces Academy).

After brief closing remark by Secretary Quarles the session ended.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 887, Diem Visit. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1103–1107. Drafted by Captain B.A. Robbins, USN, Regional Director, Far East, ISA, on May 15.