374. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)1
Dear Mr. Sprague: We are still studying long range solution of the TERM and MAAG problems along the general lines set forth in the Department’s telegram 2630 of April 92 and Embassy Saigon’s telegram 2772.3 The related problem, also described in your letter of April 15, which is presented by President Ngo Dinh Diem’s intention to send away the French air and naval training missions, is also being considered. This problem appears to be by itself considerably less urgent than the basic MAAG–TERM problem since when the possibility of a French withdrawal of their air and naval missions arose last summer we made plans to assume the functions of those two missions within the MAAG ceiling should they be withdrawn.
The main problem as we see it remains the augmentation of the army training mission. The situation presented by the impending withdrawal of the French air and naval missions and the few French army personnel still in Viet-Nam should be regarded primarily as providing an additional reason for bringing about a solution of the army training problem.
As a first step toward finding a solution to this problem we intend informally to sound out the British, French, Canadians, and Indians in order to get some determination of their probable reaction to what would be for all practical purposes the incorporation of TERM into MAAG. We would explain that TERM’s original mission had almost been accomplished and that urgent new problems have arisen requiring new solutions. We would emphasize that the total number of technicians included in the newly organized MAAG would be insignificant in comparison with the total number of French combat troops withdrawn since the armistice began. We would also stress the problem presented by the departure of the French air and naval training missions as well as the French elements still attached to army training facilities and the miscellaneous French elements whose presence in South Viet-Nam contributed to the performance of the French air and naval training missions.
This is, of course, an extremely delicate matter which will have to be worked out in terms of our relations with those friendly nations having an interest in the Geneva armistice control machinery [Page 794] and in the light of our best estimate of the probable Communist reaction to the expansion of MAAG. For these reasons and in view of our Embassy’s warning in Embassy telegram 30794 that prompt arrival of U.S. naval and air personnel would be a strain on our relations with the French and cause obvious problems with the ICC, it seems impractical as well as undesirable to resolve this question prior to President Ngo Dinh Diem’s arrival in Washington on May 8. We hope, however, to commence our discussions with other friendly powers before that time and to talk with President Ngo Dinh Diem about the whole problem during his visit.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/3–1257. Secret. Drafted by Corcoran and cleared by Kocher, Young, and Jones.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 370.↩
- See footnote 2, ibid.↩
- Dated April 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.56351J/4–1157)↩