356. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State (Richards)1

SUBJECT

  • Diplomatic and Other Exploitations of North Viet-Nam Uprising

On November 23 the Embassy proposed a five-stage action program for exploitation of the North Viet-Nam uprising.2 The Department approved the program, which was passed on to the Vietnamese on November 25.

The first three stages have been completed. That is: Diem issued a public declaration recounting the tragic events in North Viet-Nam, denouncing communist brutality and appealing strongly for a new look at the problem of freedom of movement between the two zones; Diem addressed a message to the Secretary General of the U.N., asking the U.N. [to] consider practical measures for the prevention of new massacres, protection of those who had taken part in the uprising and in obtaining freedom of movement; the same day the Vietnamese Government sent a letter to the ICC, transmitting a petition from recent escaped refugees from the North reciting incidents and claiming DRV authorities never informed the local populace of their rights to freedom of movement under the Geneva agreements and requesting a review of the whole question of freedom of movement.

We suggested that the Vietnamese undertake to obtain the services of a Thai spokesman at the U.N., and we have persuaded the Vietnamese to send their Ambassador to New York, since the degree to which this matter can be exploited will depend on the extent to which the Vietnamese themselves can make a case in New York and with countries with which they have representation.

At an appropriate time we are prepared to make a statement either within or outside the U.N. supporting Diem’s letter to the Secretary General and whatever statement is made by a Thai or other spokesman and announcing our willingness to assist in any refugee movement. Mr. Young is following the situation at New York.

We shall continue to keep this issue alive but believe it essential that we not overplay our hand. The available hard news on the uprising does not begin to compare with the news on the Hungarian situation, for example, and we must keep in mind the risk of sacrificing [Page 759] credibility to enthusiasm. At any rate, the extreme shrillness and anxiety betrayed by the Viet Minh radio reaction to free world exploitation of the uprising clearly indicates that they’re being hurt.

  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Vietnam, General. Secret. Drafted by Corcoran on December 5. Arthur L. Richards was the Operations Coordinator.
  2. See Document 353.