357. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)1
Dear Ken: The question of Vietnamese-American relations, raised in your letter of October 29,2 has been one to which we have devoted increasing attention in recent months. Although I do not believe that any fundamental change in the GVN’s attitude has occurred, I think there is no question that a gradual trend toward greater assertiveness vis-à-vis Americans has been developing for some time and can be expected to continue. Although American assistance is eagerly sought, American advice, as you well know, has never been accepted with any alacrity, particularly on political issues. The few occasions, moreover, in which our “political” advice has materially affected GVN policies have been essentially limited to international issues. Our influence in shaping internal developments, partly because we have voluntarily refrained from asserting maximum effort, has been extremely circumscribed.
There has been some evidence that President Diem, as he grows more sure of himself through the success he has achieved, is becoming less receptive to unofficial advice given to him by special advisors and close friends. There is probably little that we could do about this situation, and although it is regrettable, I do not consider it alarming. The major effect of this attitude will, I believe, be felt in our economic aid program. It may eventually be necessary, if serious differences of views develop in this field, to make clear to Diem that our continued ability to support the Vietnamese Government will [Page 760] depend on the adoption by the latter of certain basic economic policies which will permit us to justify such aid to the American Congress.
With regard to the problem created by Diem’s concentration of decision and power over such a seemingly wide range of matters, there is again little that can be done beyond recognizing that this unfortunate state of affairs has existed since the beginning of the Diem regime and will likely be with us for some time. Continuous efforts are being made by MAAG and USOM to point out the necessity of proper delegation of responsibilities and some improvement is made from time to time along these lines. With the passage of time and the development of really functioning governmental institutions and procedures it can be hoped that these efforts will increasingly bear fruit, although it must be recognized that the source of the difficulty lies principally in the personality of the President, which is not likely to change radically.
You also asked about the theory of “mandarinism.” This much used and misused word had been made to cover a multitude of sins. Essentially, as I understand it, it is mostly used to describe a form of bureaucratic aristocracy in which decisions of government are largely made by a small group of government officials steeped in the traditions of their office and distrustful of the masses, from which, ironically enough, most of them sprang. In the context of present day realities mandarinism essentially describes an attitude of paternalism approaching benevolent despotism. Certainly one can find elements of the mandarin tradition, in its better sense, in Diem’s philosophy of government. Yet I think it would be erroneous not to recognize that Diem is far too intelligent and forward-looking to be the prisoner of his own early training and experience as a member of the mandarinate.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
G. Frederick Reinhardt
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/12–2056. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
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This letter is attached to a copy of the letter from Reinhardt to Young of December 20, ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 52, 320 International Relations, A–Z, 1956–1958. Young observed that “several of us in the Department and the other agency have noticed recent indications of increasing difficulties in dealing with the President.” Young asked for Reinhardt’s reaction to the following questions:
“(a) The reaction of Ngo Dinh Diem and those close around him to American official and unofficial advice.
“(b) The prospects of such concentration of decision and power over such a wide and seemingly unnecessary range of matters.
“(c) The theory of ‘mandarinism’.”
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