Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

355. Letter From the Officer in Charge of Cambodian Affairs (Price) to the Counselor of the Embassy in Vietnam (Haraldson)¹

Washington, December 5, 1956.

Dear Wes: We have had quite a go-round on the subject of land reform. I do not know what response you wanted in answer to your telegrams 472 and 1372² but felt pretty sure that Icato 716 was not the answer needed or wanted. However, after four weeks of effort all I could do was get the two words “if possible” added in the second sentence of paragraph four of Icato 716.

My first inclination on receipt of your 1372 was to reply that we would get off our equivocal position as soon as you got off yours and to ask you for a specific recommendation whether the United States should help finance the down payment to the landlords if an adequate plan for administering the land reform program could be worked out. However, further study of the file on land reform convinced me that you in fact were asking us if the United States Government would be prepared to help finance such down payment and that we should give you a straightforward answer. Therefore, on October 25, I drafted the attached four paragraph telegram³ to which no one in State would agree except SEA.

After prolonged discussions within State, including two or three redrafts of the memo dated November 16⁴ (also attached) to satisfy several stylistic experts, we finally got the problem presented to Mr. Robertson. He, however, refused to move in the direction we requested because there was no recommendation from the field on the basic issue of whether or not we could give assistance for the down payment if an adequate plan for administration was worked out. He felt that Icato 716 was not as much a closing of the door as I thought it was. In both cases, events have proven that he was correct.

As this is being written another cable of enquiry has gone through channels asking a number of unanswerable questions.⁵ However, it also asks for your recommendation on the problem of down payment. I believe that with this we will begin to know what each other thinks of this particular program and the attachments certainly should give you an idea that I am very much in favor of it.

Sincerely,

C. Hoyt Price%%⁶

[Enclosure]

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)⁷

Washington, October 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

• US Support for Land Redistribution Program in Viet-Nam.

There is attached a draft telegram⁸ prepared in SEA giving Saigon guidance on US support for this program. While general statements have been made by US officials of friendly interest in this program, the US Government has not specifically instructed the Embassy on support. I strongly recommend that we do so now.

For two years the Department’s policy telegrams and papers on Viet-Nam have stressed the importance of an effective program of land reform in Viet-Nam to build up strength in the South and to serve as one of the major counters to the Viet Minh. The issue posed in this telegram and its references is whether or not the US should finance actual transfers of land from a land owner to farmers receiving specified allotments under the new ordinance which President Ngo Dinh Diem intends to announce today, October 26. There will be opposition in E and probably ICA to such a decision for it will set a precedent for other countries. However, the stark fact is that unless the US Government is willing to find some mechanism to help finance this crucial program in Viet-Nam, it may not be undertaken. President Ngo Dinh Diem and the Vietnamese Government would be able to say that this key program was stopped by lack of concrete support from the US.

I cannot stress too strongly the political, psychological, social, and economic reasons for our going ahead with this program in Viet-Nam, where the free way of life is pitted against the Communist as in no other country in Southeast Asia today. The long-term peaceful struggle for influence and control in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia will hinge on whether or not the mass of the farmers can be won over to a democratic constitutional regime and can be counted on not only in the South but in the North to increase their opposition to the Communists. It is a stated NSC policy in NSC 5612/1⁹ to make South Viet-Nam more attractive for all Vietnamese than the North. The sooner and the better we do this the more assured will be our long-term policy in Southeast Asia. I acknowledge that there are practical risks and difficulties in proceeding with US financial support for land reform anywhere, as well as in Viet-Nam. Nevertheless, I am confident that the US Government can apply the necessary ingenuity and find the resources to develop a prudent and feasible form of such support. I think we should explore long-term soft currency loan, token reimbursement by the Vietnamese, or a modest PL 480¹⁰ program to provide the local currency.

In sum, the political challenge to us and to the Vietnamese Government in this undertaking justifies in my opinion your support for this program. Therefore, I strongly hope that you will endorse this proposal and add your support in persuading other parts of the Department and other agencies to concur and to create the means for carrying it out. Without your endorsement and advocacy of this program, I am afraid that other elements and agencies in Washington will talk it to death.

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 59 D 630, Agrarian Reform. Confidential; Official–Informal. Price, in addition to his duties as Officer in Charge of Cambodian Affairs, had responsibilities for land reform in Vietnam.
2. Neither printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, supra.
3. The draft cable was not attached to the source text and has not been found in Department of State files.
4. Not attached and not found in Department of State files. Attached was a copy of an October 26 memorandum from Young to Robertson, printed as an enclosure to this letter. Apparently it was a draft of the November 16 memorandum.
5. Sent as joint State/ICA telegram 1527 to Saigon, December 3, in which State and ICA asked the Embassy and USOM to estimate (a) the extent to which the Government of Vietnam could provide a down payment for the land transfer out of its own budget and out of deficit financing in subsequent years, (b) whether the Embassy and USOM were satisfied that the program would be a success, (c) whether U.S. financial support was essential, (d) what would be the consequences of failure of the United States to support the program, (e) the extent to which U.S. financial suport would increase the price of land to be acquired, and (f) whether the Embassy and USOM recommended support of the program. Finally the Department and ICA asked a number of detailed questions on the number of hectares included in the program, the price of land, and the breakdown of costs of the program by fiscal years. (Department of State, Central Files, 851G.20/10–2456)
6. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.
7. This memorandum was classified Confidential. Also sent to Sebald and Jones.
8. Not printed, but see footnote 3 above.
9. See Document 345.
10. The reference is to the Agricultural Development and Assistance Act of 1954, approved July 10, 1954; 68 Stat. 454.