342. Memorandum of Conversations, Saigon, July 27, 1956, 4–7:05 p.m.1
[Here follows the account of a conversation between Admiral Radford and his party and Vietnamese officials.]
3. The Party departed from the Ministry of Defense at 1630 and proceeded to Independence Palace when the United States Ambassador joined the group prior to the interview with the President. The interview with the President began at approximately 1650 hours.
Present were:
- President Diem
- Mr. Chau
- General Ty
- Admiral Radford
- Ambassador Reinhardt
- General Williams
- Admiral Griffin
- Colonel Hotchin
- Lieutenant Colonel Usera (interpreter)
4. The President asked Admiral Radford if his trip had been a pleasant one and the Admiral responded that he had had a very fine flight. President Diem brought up the subject of strategic roads and he explained at some length the advantages of placing the primary emphasis on roads in the High Plateau in preference to the roads along the coast. He pointed out that the main advantage of the roads along the coastal plain (Route Number 1) was the fact that the population centers were on the coastal plain, but that the coastal plain was overpopulated and land was becoming very difficult to come by. Admiral Radford asked if there was no free land left and the President answered that he had distributed a small amount of remaining land among the refugees and that the only other land, outside of the High Plateau, was rocky and sandy soil which was not fit for cultivation. The President stated that industrialization of the coastal plain would solve this problem but unfortunately, there were no large mineral deposits available which would make industrialization possible in that area, therefore, the only answer was exploitation of the immense land area in the High Plateau. He called the Admiral’s attention to the fact that the French since the end of World War I had aimed all of their policies at the exploitation of this area in the High Plateau. The President went on to explain that in the High Plateau, there were great possibilities for fruit trees, coffee, rubber, corn and even some rice area. Admiral Radford told the President that he would assist in every way possible in obtaining these roads for Vietnam. The President went on to point out the strategic advantages of the roads recommended by him and the overall importance of east-west roads which would open up highways westward towards the Plains of Laos and Thailand. He explained the French and Japanese pre-occupation within the same strategic concept which he considered just as valid for Vietnam.
5. President Diem stated that politically, Laos was in a precarious position of falling into the hands of the neutralists and that the United States must assist diplomatically in orienting the Laotians towards SEATO in order to permit Laos to [come to?] the defense of Southeast Asia. He pointed out that the Laotians were militarily insignificant but that their territory, if at the disposal of the free peoples, could be of great assistance. The President stated that if an attack were to be launched northwards, Viet Minh would undoubtedly use the “scorched earth” policy of moving the coastal population westward to the mountains and that these people, most of whom are Christians, would undoubtedly infiltrate through Laos towards South Vietnam. He also remarked that Laos, if it were on our side, would constitute a threat to the Viet Minh flank. Admiral Radford asked if relations between Laos and Vietnam had been normalized, and the President stated that just five days ago the two countries [Page 730] had agreed to exchanging diplomatic representatives and that the Vietnamese were presently trying to rent a building for the Legation at Vientiane.
6. Admiral Radford then asked the President what the situation was with his other neighbor, Cambodia. The President answered that the Cambodians were all capricious and historically were unfriendly to all of their neighbors. Admiral Radford asked if all of the Cambodians were capricious and the President stated that all their leading government personnel were capricious. He pointed out that Prince Shihanouk was suffering from a complex due to the fact that he knew he was not the legitimate successor to the Dynasty. In 1942 the French had placed him on the Throne instead of the rightful successor because the Chief of the French Sûreté in Indochina had felt that Shihanouk would be safer than the legitimate Heir and would not sell out to the Japanese. Shihanouk, he stated, was a demigod [demagogue?] who wanted to make himself popular with the masses because of his feeling of insecurity. The Prince had then decided to place his father on the Throne and he made himself the Prime Minister. Admiral Radford asked if the legitimate heir was still alive. President Diem stated that the legitimate heir was alive but that he had to cooperate with the usurping branch of the Dynasty because the only opposition was a party which was dedicated to the overthrow of the Dynasty and replacing it with a Republic. The President pointed out that Shihanouk was playing a very dangerous game and that he had accepted the aid offered by Red China thinking that he could play off Red China and Russia against each other while he benefited from aid both from Red China and the United States. In imitation of India, he had visited Peiping and was playing the neutralist game to the hilt. The President mentioned the fact that the money given by Red China had gone to assist mostly the large Chinese Colony in Cambodia and that the police in that country were hard put to control the activities of this Chinese element which contained a large proportion of Red Chinese sympathizers. Admiral Radford asked the President if he had any recent intelligence from North Vietnam and the President made mention of the group of thirty refugees led by several Catholic priests and nuns who had arrived in Vietnam some twelve days ago and whom he had interviewed at the Palace. He repeated the information given General Williams in the conversations of the 24th of July.2
7. President Diem brought up the subject of French Military Missions and asked Admiral Radford whether the Vietnamese could expect more assistance from the United States in this matter. General Williams explained to Admiral Radford that the President meant assistance [Page 731] in furnishing Navy and Air Force Advisers. The President agreed that this was what he meant. President Diem went on to explain that he was reluctant to have the French Missions in the Navy and Air Force because of the influence these people might try to exert. He pointed out that the Vietnamese had three hundred military students in France and that he had given orders for these students to finish their course but that no more students will go to France in the future. The President explained that the Viet Minh Cultural Mission in France was exerting considerable pressure against these students to obtain the services of this trained personnel and that he felt there was serious danger of indoctrinated elements remaining in the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force because of this indoctrination. The President stated that Ambassador Hoppenot had asked him recently why he requested a French Military Mission when he refused to send students to France. Ambassador Hoppenot asked the President whether it was his intention to keep the French Mission only long enough for it to be replaced by the Americans. The President stated that he told Ambassador Hoppenot that his reason for not sending students to France was because the Viet Minh were propagandizing these young sailors and airmen right under the noses of the French Security elements and that he did not desire to have sabotage in his Navy and Air Force. He pointed out to Ambassador Hoppenot that this was not a case of being anti-French; it was simply self-defense against communist machinations. President Diem told the Admiral that recently twenty-two graduates of large French Universities had been talked into going with the Viet Minh after they finished their technical education and that there had even been some of the Military desert to the Viet Minh. He felt that this situation was dangerous because there were in France a total of five thousand Vietnamese students who were receiving francs for their education in France and that this large number could easily harbor saboteurs and traitors amongst them.
8. President Diem stated that he wanted to have the French Missions under the control of the Chief MAAG and that he wanted to limit the French Mission to a period of six months but the French had refused to accept any period less than one year. He stated that since the negotiations were practically finished he would like to know if the Americans could furnish the Mission so that he could turn down the French. Admiral Radford stated that this was too late to do this at the present. President Diem asked whether it would not be possible to bring American civilians and attach them perhaps to the Air Vietnam for the purpose of training Vietnamese pilots. Admiral Radford stated that this was possible but he felt the situation would better itself as more and more students went to the United States for training and returned to Vietnam. General Williams asked [Page 732] Ambassador Reinhardt whether he felt there was any hope that the ceiling of 342 could be ignored in the near future. The Ambassador stated that he felt sure this could happen sometime in the future but he called General Williams’ attention to the fact that this ceiling was now 700 men.3 General Williams explained to Admiral Radford and the Ambassador that ever since his arrival the Vietnamese have been anxious to get rid of the French Military and replace them with Americans but that we had always forced the Vietnamese into accepting French Naval and Air Advisers for some reason unknown to him and because of the unrealistic limit imposed by the Geneva Accords. General Williams turned to the President and stated that it was necessary, first of all that the Mission be limited to the least time possible and second, that supervision of the training be assured to make certain that the training was adequate. General Williams went on to say that this formula must be in black and white so that the French would not balk later on. Mr. Chau stated that the French would accept nothing less than one year for their Missions and that they had so stated on several occasions. Ambassador Reinhardt stated that Ambassador Hoppenot had agreed with him on the idea of a Committee chairmanned by the Chief MAAG as the controlling element for the Missions. General Williams repeated that it was necessary that this be clearly defined in any agreement or protocol arrived at. N.B. It is to be noted that the present Protocol for the French Military Missions does not contain any reference to this Committee controlling the Missions.
9. At 1905 Admiral Radford and his Party and Ambassador Reinhardt left Independence Palace to dress for dinner and return at 2030 hours.
Lt Col, Infantry
Adv to ARVN