343. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense1
[Washington, August 22,
1956.]
VIETNAM
Admiral Radford felt that the
overall situation in Vietnam has continued to improve. President
Diem and his top leaders are
perhaps less aware of the progress made, and more sensitive to the
problems still confronting them, because they live closer to the
situation than an observer from far away. President Diem was energetic, talkative, and very
friendly.
The internal security situation is basically good—about as good as it
ever has been in the last ten years. Organized large-scale dissident
groups have been broken up into small bands. In some ways, it might be
said the situation is now about normal for the area. There usually has
been some small scale strife with dissidents, bandits, and those in
opposition to the Government.
The biggest single problem confronting President Diem at this time in Admiral Radford’s opinion is the
selection of properly qualified people who will serve him loyally. The
background and education of President Diem have made this problem especially difficult.
The second biggest problem is the refugee problem—the caring for and
relocating of refugees from North Vietnam in such a way that they will
be able to care for themselves over the long pull and feel themselves
identified with the country.
President Diem seemed more
concerned about the dangers inherent in the situation in Laos than he
was about Cambodia.
Admiral Radford felt some
apprehension about the lack of contact between President Diem and the leaders of neighboring
countries. President Diem
expressed an interest in such contacts, but did not seem to know exactly
how to go about establishing them.
[Page 734]
[Attachment]
2
I. MAAG Vietnam
From 1345 until 1510 on 26 July 1956, Admiral Radford and his party were briefed at MAAG Headquarters. Present were U.S.
Ambassador Reinhardt;
LGen. Williams, Chief
of the MAAG; and members of their
staffs. The briefing covered the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the
Training Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). The highlights of the briefing and the
discussion are as follows:
The principal problems confronting the MAAG are (1) the self-imposed international ceiling of
only 342 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam; (2) the recovery,
relocation, and out shipment of excess matériel; (3) the reduction
of the Vietnamese Forces to more acceptable levels; and (4) the
Combined U.S.-French Training Mission (TRIM).
The overall Vietnam situation is one of improved stability together
with a degree of internal security much improved over two years ago.
French Armed Forces have been withdrawn, except for about 5,000. The
Vietminh continue building up their strength in the North, and
infiltrating their agents into the South. Some civil war with
dissident sects continues, but is no longer regarded a serious
threat. The sects are now considerably less powerful.
A new force basis for the Vietnamese Armed Forces totalling 170,000
has been proposed in lieu of the present level of 150,000.3 One
reason for the proposed increase is to make possible expansion of
the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. It was Admiral Radford’s view that it
probably would be all right for the Navy and Air Force to have more
forces, but any such increases should come by means of adjustments
made within the present force level of 150,000.
The French no longer are training the Army, but are still very
influential in training the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. In these
two fields, French influence is considerably stronger than that of
the United States. French authorities do not cooperate with U.S.
officials, and are still reluctant to discuss or let us see MDAP equipment they have cached away.
The inadequacy of French cooperation is one reason why the
Vietnamese supply system cannot be made a great deal more
effective.
[Page 735]
LGen. Williams confirmed
that no Vietnamese students were in training in the Philippines. He
understood the Philippines had run into real estate trouble, and
that the costs per student would be too high to warrant sending them
to that country. There were seventy-four now ready to go, but in the
absence of facilities and in view of the costs, they were not going
to be sent. His instructions from Washington were not to send any
students to the Philippines.
Admiral Radford said there
was something funny about this, and that he intended to follow up on
it when he returned home. The Admiral outlined his discussions of this matter
during his recent visit in the Philippines, and he made the
observation that it could not cost any more to send a Vietnamese
student to the Philippines for training than it does to send him to
the United States. Admiral
Radford suggested that LGen. Williams establish direct contact with MGen.
Harper4 and try to push the development of a major
training effort for South East Asia into the Philippine Islands.
President Magsaysay had been receptive to this concept. In addition,
it would be advantageous to help bring these people closer
together.
Admiral Radford asked about
those Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam which had been
made possible by introduction and support from the sea. Admiral Radford wanted to know why
the Vietnamese could not stop hostile small boats. The Chief of the
Naval Section said the Vietnamese now have two PCs, and in a few
months they will have five. Their capabilities are improving, and it
should not be too long before the Vietnamese could stop such traffic
along the coast. Admiral
Radford felt that with air-search to locate Communist
craft, the craft could then be intercepted by a patrol boat and all
such movement off the coast of South Vietnam would soon be stopped
altogether.
As a final comment, Admiral
Radford cautioned the senior officers of MAAG to remember that our requirements
are really met when Vietnam is able to take care of its own internal
security.
. . . . . . .
