Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

341. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President of the Republic of Vietnam (Diem) and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams), Saigon, July 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m.–12:20 p.m.¹

Saigon, July 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m. to 12:20 p.m.

1. At 1030 hours, this date, General Williams was called to see the President. He was accompanied by Lt. Col. Usera as interpreter.

2. The President asked General Williams what he thought of the road situation after his trip. General Williams intimated that he was still of the same opinion as expressed in the last conversation but that he still felt there would be considerable difficulty in selling the program to USOM. The President remarked that the Minister of Public Works was now completely in accord with the paper as submitted to General Williams and he called attention to the fact that the Minister of Public Works had signed alongside the Assistant Secretary of National Defense. President Diem suggested that USOM should be interested in the proposed roads in view of the economic impact of these roads. As an example, he cited the fact that there was much unemployment in central Vietnam and that work on the project roads would give jobs to many of these unemployed thus relieving the situation, in addition to assisting in opening up new lands for cultivation.

3. The President then asked General Williams what he would suggest be taken up in a conversation with Admiral Radford.² General Williams suggested that the first thing should be the question of roads. Another question which General Williams suggested was the political situation in Laos and Cambodia which he felt was generally known in Washington, but to which the President could add much of his personal knowledge of particular situations as they affected Vietnam. A third suggestion made by General Williams was that the President also discuss the Force Levels including those of the Navy and Air Force. The last subject suggested by General Williams to be taken up with Admiral Radford was the matter of the Naval Arsenal at Saigon. The President made notes of these suggestions.

4. General Williams stated that he had three things which had been mentioned by CINCPAC which he would like to briefly discuss with the President. The first question was the desire of CINCPAC to send over within one or two months, some of the Unit Commanders who might be involved in command responsibilities in case of intervention by allied forces in Vietnam. These unit commanders and key staff members would discuss definite problems with senior Vietnamese Commanders, on the spot, in order to arrive at a closer understanding of the problems involved. General Williams explained that this should come after the return of the reconnaissance teams presently in Vietnam. After these teams made their report, there would probably be planning undertaken in Hawaii and after these tentative plans were finished, then the commanders and their staffs would come to Vietnam to discuss them with the Vietnamese Commanders. The President agreed that this was desirable.

5. The second thing the General wished to bring to the attention of the President was the present planning figure of over 2,000 advisors for the Vietnamese Armed Forces in case of war. He explained to the President that this was based on similar proportion of advisors as existed in Korea during the active fighting in that country. The General also stated that these personnel would be trained here in Vietnam and then returned to their home stations where they would be available in case of war for immediate assignment within the Armed Forces of Vietnam. The President agreed to this concept.

6. General Williams then took up the third question posed by CINCPAC which was the matter of command relationship between the allied forces and the local Vietnamese forces. He explained to President Diem that the concept of a unified command was a long standing American military tradition. It had been accepted in World War I; it had been accepted in Africa and Normandy in World War II; it had been accepted in Korea in 1950. The General asked the President what he thought of this matter and the President answered that “in principle” he was in favor of a unified command but that he wished to see some sort of schematic plan for this command before accepting it in total. President Diem explained that it was necessary to look up [at] the matter from the viewpoint of morale and propaganda value in both South Vietnam and North Vietnam. He went on to state that just yesterday he had interviewed a group of priests and nuns who had just escaped ten days ago from North Vietnam and landed in Quang Tri. General Williams asked if they had given him any information and the President answered that the information was actually much better than he would have expected. He stated that in the case of the escape of this group they had had active assistance from the Secret Police and the Surveillance Police in North Vietnam. The President stated that the priests were all unanimous in their belief that the continuous naming of President Diem in the propaganda broadcasts of the Vietminh had boomeranged. As an example, the Vietminh propaganda line that President [Diem] had chased out the French only to replace them with the Americans had caused a great deal of favorable response from those hearers who were impressed with the fact that he had managed to shake off the French yoke. As a result, the President continued, Ngo Dinh Diem is getting to be better known in the North than he is in the South. The President stated that he had questioned the women, who were simple country folk, as to the fidelity of the Armed Forces towards the regime and the women responded that the Armed Forces were pretty well indoctrinated and received such preferential treatment that it was doubtful if there would be any significant defection on their part. President Diem said that he questioned the priests as to what would happen if the Vietnamese were to make a raid, perhaps in Vinh, not with any intention of staying but only as a simple raid. He stated that the party all agreed that the population of Vinh would leave, en masse, with the Vietnamese soldiers if such an attack were to occur. The President went on to state that the matter of command relationship was therefore a delicate one which required consideration of the public reaction in North Vietnam as well as in Free Vietnam. He related that he was in favor of a unified command, in principle.

7. President Diem suggested that, if an allied attack Came, it might be better to divert the attack towards Laos in order to outflank the Vietminh forces and threaten their borders. General Williams mentioned the fact that an allied force would probably be composed of Americans, Australians, Philippinos and other members of SEATO. President Diem called attention to the fact that the use of Siamese to attack through Laos would not be very wise. He felt that the Siamese soldier would have considerable difficulty in passing over the mountain barrier into the Vietminh territory. In addition, the President called the General’s attention to the fact that the Laotians were very afraid of the Siamese and that the Siamese, if they ever came into Laos, would make trouble by looting and pillaging. He also remarked that the Siamese have a long standing claim to Laos which they consider ethnically a part of Siam and that once they entered Laos it might be difficult to get them out of there. The President went on to explain, at long length, how the Vietnamese for many centuries had protected Laotians against encroachment by the Siamese and the Chinese. He also pointed out that in 1884, when the French took over the Protectorate of Annam, the border was fixed at the Mekong River for Vietnam. Later, when the British incited the Siamese to attack in Indochina, the Vietnamese came to the assistance of the Laotians and drove out the invaders easily. At a conference in London in 1893, it was again established that the Vietnamese border would be the Mekong River.

8. The President mentioned the fact that Laos was showing a distinct tendency towards neutralism and that the United States Government should attack this problem diplomatically in order to keep Laos on the side of the Free World. He suggested that the best way to achieve this would be by getting Laos into SEATO and that, as a bait, the United States Diplomatic Mission might use the development of the rich area about Savanna Khet. This area could be opened for development by the opening of the road from Dong Ha westward through Laos to Savanna Khet. He pointed out that in a country as poor as Laos this could constitute a real economic future.

9. General Williams mentioned that he had received several notes from the Secretary of Defense which were to be presented to the President, and that in one of them, he had noticed an error in facts. In the note relative to the reorganization of the Vietnamese Forces on the 150,000 level, there was mention of a decrease in artillery strength to six battalions whereas the truth of the matter was that the artillery would be increased and not decreased.

10. The interview ended at 1220 hours.³

Vincent Usera
Lt Col Inf
Advisor ARVN

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Memos for Record 1956 (4). Secret. Drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Usera, USA, of MAAG, the interpreter.
2. Admiral Radford was in Vietnam July 26–27 as part of a trip through East and Southeast Asia. See infra.
3. Williams reported on this conversation in telegram MAGCH 4242 from Saigon to CINCPAC in Pearl Harbor, July 25 (259345Z). (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1955–56 (7))