Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

332. Memorandum of Discussion at the 287th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 7, 1956¹

Washington, June 7, 1956

Present at the 287th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in the action on Item 2); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in the action on Item 2); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Robertson; Mr. Edmond C. Hutchinson, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Jackson; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC. Also attending this meeting were the members of the NSC Planning Board, as follows: Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Gordon Gray, Department of Defense; Jarold A. Kieffer, Office of Defense Mobilization; Andrew N. Overby, Department of the Treasury; William E. Foley, Department of Justice; Robert E. Matteson, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; C. E. Nelson, Atomic Energy Commission; Maj. Gen. F. W. Farrell, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of item 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Capability To Deal With Local Aggression in Vietnam (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955;² NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated February 13, 1956;³ NSC Action No. 1522–c⁴)

Mr. Anderson reminded the Council of the considerations which had led to the presentation on the reference subject, and then called upon Admiral Radford to present his report. (A copy of Mr. Anderson’s brief is filed in the minutes of the meeting.⁵)

Admiral Radford described his presentation as one dealing with the capabilities, “with or without atomic weapons”, of U.S. ready military forces to deal with local aggression in Vietnam. He next ran through the assumptions which had been made for the purpose of this presentation, and followed this with an outline of the present military situation in Vietnam, both in the North and in the South. He next covered the principles governing U.S. participation, the concept of operations, force deployments and tasks, preparatory military steps, supplementary actions, and implications. In summary and by way of conclusion, Admiral Radford said he wished to stress that the United States was in a position to intervene on the side of Free Vietnam along the lines outlined in his report, without serious disruption in other areas and with good prospects of success. He also desired to point out that initially the forces required, whether or not atomic weapons were to be used, would be essentially the same, since there were no known fixed military targets in North Vietnam that could not be destroyed by conventional bombing. On the other hand, if concentration of Viet Minh troops provided an atomic target, the use of atomic weapons might end the aggression very rapidly. If the Chinese Communists intervened openly, all this would change. Our air forces would of necessity use atomic weapons against Chinese air and logistic bases at once. Admiral Radford closed with the statement that when U.S. forces were deployed rapidly in such situations as the one described in Vietnam, they must be prepared to defend themselves or to take offensive action immediately with atomic weapons. Without such an assumption, our military deployments, if not to be of the emergency desperation type which characterized the Korean intervention, would of necessity be larger and much slower. (A copy of Admiral Radford’s report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.⁶)

At the conclusion of Admiral Radford’s report, the President turned and asked the members of the Council if they had any questions to ask.

Secretary Dulles replied that he thought the presentation had been admirably handled. It was not only encouraging from a military point of view, but indicated that assistance to Vietnam against external aggression was well within the political capabilities of the United States. Thus, continued Secretary Dulles, we could anticipate assistance from the contingents of the Thai, Filipino, Australian, New Zealand, and Pakistani armed forces. He was more doubtful of British and French military participation. Admiral Radford said that he agreed with this estimate of Secretary Dulles, but added that in any case the United States would not desire French participation, and the main objective would be to assure Asian military participation with the United States in helping Vietnam or any other Southeast Asian state to resist external aggression. Admiral Radford added that the British would almost certainly provide naval assistance if such a contingency arose.

Turning to Admiral Radford, the President inquired how far our military people were making plans with Prime Minister Diem against the contingency of aggression against Free Vietnam. Admiral Radford replied that we had not as yet done any military planning with the Vietnamese. He thought, however, that permission should be given to our military people to sit down with Diem’s military people and devise plans for resisting aggression. At the present time the Vietnamese authorities entertained genuine doubts as to whether the United States would actually intervene to assist Vietnam if it were the victim of Communist aggression. They fear that the United States might take the stand that aggression by the Viet Minh was simply a civil war, although such a notion, said Admiral Radford, had never even occurred to him. Briefly discussing possible invasion routes which would be used by an invading Viet Minh army, Admiral Radford reassured the Council that the present military dispositions of the Viet Minh indicated no current intention to launch any large-scale military aggression. Moreover, said Admiral Radford, they would be very foolish indeed to attempt such an aggression.

Secretary Dulles observed that if the peoples of the area of Southeast Asia could have any idea of the nature of the discussion which was now taking place in the National Security Council, the effect of such knowledge would be altogether revolutionary. It would, in fact, change the whole attitude of these nations. Secretary Dulles realized how hard it would be to convey an idea of the nature of this discussion without raising serious problems of security. Nevertheless, if such knowledge could filter to the governments and peoples of these Southeast Asian countries, it would revive hope and confidence and would constitute a very great deterrent to aggression and war.

Admiral Radford pointed out that U.S. military officers in the Far East were constantly being shifted as their tours of duty ended. He recommended that before new replacements were sent to the Far East, an opportunity should be provided to these new commanding officers to visit those areas of South Vietnam which in the course of his report he had indicated would be the areas to which U.S. forces would be deployed in the event of a Viet Minh aggression against Free Vietnam.

The President asked Admiral Radford why General Williams in Vietnam could not arrange for our officers to visit the sites he had mentioned. Admiral Radford said that of course General Williams could make such arrangements, but that if he did so the facts would presently become public knowledge. The President replied by stating that some additional evidence of U.S. concern for the independence of Vietnam might be usefully conveyed by the appearance of these officers. Admiral Radford agreed heartily with the President’s point, but indicated that the terms of the Geneva Agreements on Indochina prevented our sending in additional military personnel. The President’s advice was to take out an orderly temporarily and put a colonel in his place (laughter).

Secretary Dulles asked the President whether he could call on Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to make a brief comment on the matter of using atomic weapons which had been alluded to by Admiral Radford in his report. The President agreed, and Secretary Robertson stated that of course all the members of the National Security Council would agree that the use of atomic weapons in Asia would have the very gravest impact on public opinion throughout Asia, and that we would not resort to the use of atomic weapons in that area except in the gravest of situations.

Admiral Radford replied that he certainly could not be included in the group which would subscribe to the view just presented by Secretary Robertson.

At this point the Acting Secretary of Defense, Mr. Reuben Robertson, pointed out that he had not long since had several hours of conversation with Prime Minister Diem, and would like to indicate to the Council some of the points he had learned as a result of these conversations. He said that, in the first place, he shared Admiral Radford’s feeling that Prime Minister Diem was very uncertain about the willingness of the United States to intervene to assist Vietnam in the event of external aggression. He was very anxious that in our program of economic assistance we devote resources to improving roads and communications, particularly lateral roads in the northern area of Free Vietnam.

Secondly, up until now Diem had been adhering to the French plan to meet a Viet Minh aggression. This French plan did not contemplate an immediate defense on the 17th parallel, but a withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces when the attack was launched, from the 17th parallel to the area of Tourane. Now, however, Diem has embraced the U.S. concept of a vigorous defense at the 17th parallel.

Thirdly, Acting Secretary Robertson also agreed that if the Vietnamese had any idea that we would surely back them up in the event of aggression, it would have a most revolutionary effect on their thinking and on their courage.

Finally, as to the problem of atomic weapons raised by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson a moment ago, Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson said he had had some discussion of this problem with the leading officials … not long since. They had been enormously impressed with … evidence of atomic capabilities. . . . . Diem had likewise shown no concern with respect to the possible use of atomic weapons in resistance to Communist aggression. He shared the view … as to the great value of a show of strength.

In response to Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson, the President wondered whether we could not send some Nikes to Southeast Asia equipped with small atomic warheads.

After further comment and discussion by the President on the purely military tactics of resisting a Viet Minh invasion, Governor Stassen said that he would like to comment on this matter of “a show of strength”. He believed that if it was at all possible, the United States should strongly suggest that the future of Asia rests with those Asian countries which were allied with the West. This he believed was the kind of psychology it was desired to instill in this area.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson stated his belief that if it could somehow be contrived to introduce some American colonels, or other American officials of high rank, into those sites in Vietnam to which U.S. forces might be deployed in the event of aggression, such a course of action would have the tonic effect which Secretary Dulles had commented on at the conclusion of Admiral Radford’s report.

The President replied that he of course had been facetious in suggesting that orderlies be withdrawn and colonels substituted in their place. Nevertheless, he was earnest in his belief that our military people should discreetly indicate that the United States has an active interest in the area of Free Vietnam. This is the real point that we wish to get across, and it should be possible to devise methods by which our attitude in this respect could be made known. Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson stated that the Defense Department would certainly proceed to make plans along the line suggested by the President.

Mr. Allen Dulles then indicated that the intelligence community believed that the greatest threat at the moment to Free Vietnam was the soft position of Laos and the weakness of Cambodia. Laos was divided, and Cambodia had embarked on a neutralist policy. These facts exposed Vietnam to possible invasion through Laos or Cambodia at some future time.

The President replied that, as everyone knew, he was all for helping countries which are determined to maintain their own independence. He too doubted whether the Viet Minh would attack Free Vietnam through the narrow corridor along the sea and across the 17th parallel. If they undertook to invade, the Viet Minh would probably march down along a broader front through Laos.

Mr. Allen Dulles then commented on the fact that we had not had a Minister or Ambassador in Laos for some considerable period now and, in view of the situation, should make every effort to get one there as soon as possible. Secretary Dulles replied that unhappily the last one had returned as a sick man and a casualty. The capital, Vientiane, was a terrible diplomatic post, with no sanitary facilities, no decent drinking water, or other elementary necessities. The President said, with a smile, couldn’t we at least ship out spring water? Secretary Dulles, also with a smile, replied that the President’s suggestion had severe budgetary implications (laughter). Secretary Dulles then indicated that he would have an able Foreign Service Officer in Vientiane not later than mid-July.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson then expressed the hope that the United States would undertake to repeat other operations modeled on the very successful Firm Link. He indicated that this was the strong recommendation of both the Thais and the Filipinos.

At this point Mr. Anderson asked the President whether he wished to have the Record of Action indicate a request to our military people to undertake joint planning with their Vietnamese opposite numbers and, furthermore, that our military take steps to indicate the firm interest of the United States in the continued freedom of Vietnam.

The President replied by expressing doubt as to whether the suggestions he had made along this line actually could lend themselves to inclusion in a formal Record of Action. Rather, the President said, what he had in mind was a “series of little things” done by our military people and other representatives, rather than a broad and formal course of action. For one thing, the President added, we must avoid making commitments to Vietnam that we are in no position to carry out. After all, the President said smilingly, the Council should not forget that this Administration may not be here in Washington after next January. Mr. Anderson said that he would try to draft an action in line with these ideas of the President. The President said he wanted Admiral Radford to concur in any proposed Council action on this subject. Further, Mr. Anderson must be sure that the action gave our military people the needed leeway and yet imposed the needed caution.

Admiral Radford pointed out that there was always a danger that if we do undertake joint planning with countries like Vietnam in the military field, their people think these plans constitute an actual positive commitment on the part of the United States to carry out such plans.

The President then turned to Secretary Dulles and inquired of him how far the Administration was authorized, under the SEATO Treaty, to intervene with military force to help resist aggression on short notice and without resort to Congressional authorization.

Secretary Dulles replied that the President could do this in a few hours if it should prove necessary, but that he strongly recommended consultation with the Congress if the Congress were in session at the time the aggression occurred. He cited the appropriate portions of the SEATO Treaty which he said had become the law of the land, but repeated his view that Congressional authority should be obtained, if it was readily available, in the event of the emergency.

The President expressed agreement with the view of the Secretary of State, and said that this would give a little more leeway to our military people in their planning, though we must carefully guard against the spread of any idea that we are sitting down to plan a war with our friends in Vietnam or anywhere else.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson noted the limits on the numbers of our military people in Vietnam, which were imposed by the Geneva Armistice Agreement. Under the circumstances, he wondered if Secretary Dulles felt that there would be any merit, in the light of the known build-up of Viet Minh military forces in defiance of the Geneva Agreements, for the United States following the same course of action that it had earlier followed in the area of the Formosa Straits. By this, said Secretary Robertson, he meant getting the advance approval of the Congress for intervention in the event of external Communist aggression.

Secretary Dulles said that he was opposed to Secretary Robertson’s suggestion. He said he believed that the conditions in Vietnam were not at all comparable with those in the Taiwan area. In brief, the United States could not portray any immediate danger of military aggression against Free Vietnam, as we had been quite justified in fearing in the case of Taiwan.

The President commented that in any event Chou En-lai keeps repeating that the Chinese Communists are going to take Formosa, by military means if necessary. Nothing quite comparable to this has been said by the Viet Minh with reference to South Vietnam. Admiral Radford expressed agreement, but said he must point out that some sort of tense situation might develop between North and South Vietnam around the first of next July, when the elections were scheduled to take place under the Geneva Agreements, but which, of course, Free Vietnam refused to be bound by. The President added that he was not worried. Congress would still be here at that time, adding, facetiously, he was “sorry to say”.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted and discussed a presentation on U.S. capabilities, referred to in NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of current policy (NSC 5602/1). The presentation was made by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522–c.

b. Noted the President’s view that it would be desirable for appropriate U.S. military authorities:

(1) To encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy.

(2) To discreetly manifest in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Vietnam, in accordance with the Manila Pact, to defend itself against external aggression.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows discussion of item 3. “MDA Program for Thailand”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NCS Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on June 8.
2. Document 254.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Partial text of NSC Action No. 1522 is in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1051–1053.
5. Not found.
6. Admiral Radford’s report is printed infra.
7. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1571, approved by the President on July 9, the record copy of which is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95.