33. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1
3162. General O’Daniel on Collins’ instructions discussed with Defense Minister Minh question of National Guard of 65 thousand as apparently envisaged by Diem. Minh informed O’Daniel he believes proper solution a National Gendarmérie of approximately ten thousand, that provinces should provide own police out of provincial budgets, but that as President has his own definite ideas on subject, it would be better approach him directly.
O’Daniel and I spent two hours discussing matter with Diem today. Diem opened conversation by showing us breakdown of proposed provincial security forces totalling 47,650, of which in round numbers 16 thousand are Provincial Auxiliary Guard in South Vietnam, 13 thousand local provincial forces in Central Vietnam, 12 [Page 77] thousand militia from North evacuated to South, and 6300 northern militia still in Haiphong enclave. These would not, he said, be a unified National Guard but local security forces.
We made clear to Diem Collins position as already expressed to Diem immediately prior Collins departure that US cannot support a militia force of size envisaged and at same time support National Army even with reduction in numbers as planned.
Diem went into great detail to justify what he states is necessity retain provincial troops under direct command of provincial chiefs. He argued National Army is not yet competent take over special role of militia who have advantage of proper type training, of being directly responsible Chief of Province, and of knowledge of local conditions. Chief of Province would be able to use army forces only after getting special permission through military channels and army not numerically large enough to secure the vast areas of Central and South Vietnam. As example, President pointed to difficulty with Hoa Hao dissident Ba Cut and said it necessary, if National Army is to surround and defeat Ba Cut forces, remove troops from many surrounding areas which would be left without protection were it not for provincial militia. Provincial militia enable local authorities act with greater dispatch and provide method Chief of Province keep localized banditry under control. He alleges provincial chiefs are unanimous in support his point of view. (Comment: They doubtless subjecting him to strong pressure.)
President’s convictions are very strong on this subject. In reply suggestion that during period between now and September when army remains at level of 150 thousand he might be able progressively reduce local militia, he said that army still untested and untrained, that, with regard to militia from North, he is under moral obligation keep his promise, given them as inducement to leave North, that they would be retained on payroll. Also militia has civil status which makes it impossible demobilize them in same way as military. He maintains it not feasible change status of military so that provincial chiefs would have direct authority over army forces in their areas. He elaborated on background of militia forces pointing out that they are of long historical tradition and that, contrary to propaganda spread by General Hinh, he had no intention of creating force which would oppose army. His intention was to codify all previous militia systems and build up organization based on already established provincial forces. Such force could in no way threaten a strong centralized National Army, although to be effective it would require rifles as well as side-arms.
I am convinced Diem intends remain adamant on this subject, and, if it not possible reach any reasonable compromise such as progressive reduction which would satisfy him, it will take drastic pressure [Page 78] on our part to make him change his concept and base his pacification and local security program entirely on territorial battalions as proposed in present organization plans for National Army.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/2–355. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Paris.↩