Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

32. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 3, 1955—9 p.m.

3156. Re Embtels 3095 repeated Paris 863² and 3067 repeated Paris 860.³ Hoa Hao reaction to reports Trinh Minh The has rallied to government has been strong. Hoa Hao representatives of Gen. Soai returned Saigon February 1 from Cao Dai ceremonies at Tay Ninh deeply disturbed by reports they had heard. These representatives came to us same evening saying they had learned one of conditions for Trinh Minh The’s rallying had been agreement of Vietnamese Government turn him loose with government support against Hoa Hao dissident Ba Cut. (This of course does not coincide with information government has given us concerning conditions under which Trinh Minh The rallied.) Taken in connection with information they had gained that government was that very day beginning mount offensive against Ba Cut, as well as Hoa Hao basic suspicion Diem’s ultimate intention is to crush sects, they believe reports to be true. Purpose their call was to urge Embassy intercession with government to prevent this action. They warned that if Trinh Minh The’s forces were used against Ba Cut other Hoa Hao forces would defect and join Ba Cut against government and The.

We are informed Ba Cut ambushed nationalist forces in Long My area January 30/31 killing three officers and wounding 30 men. Defense Minister Minh has informed General O’Daniel he intends mount offensive against Ba Cut and is reported to have said, following rallying of Trinh Minh The, that this event would now free his hands to do so.

Fishel tells us that government actually intends use Trinh Minh The’s forces man four National Army posts Lai Vung area, thus freeing National Army troops for participation Ca Mau operation.⁴ Lai Vung is in vicinity Sadec in Hoa Hao Gen. Soai’s area. In our view use Trinh Minh The forces this area, even for garrison purposes, could be expected stir up hornets nest. Fishel says government aware of this but “has no other alternative troops available”.

Assistant Army Attaché who has recently returned from trip in central Vietnam and plateau area expresses his opinion that if Trinh Minh The forces used with government support National Army forces he has visited who are violently anti-Cao Dai, may very well revolt.

We are deeply disturbed by possibility government may actually carry out reported proposal use Trinh Minh The’s forces in Hoa Hao area. This could scarcely be better calculated provoke violent armed reaction from all Hoa Haos, no matter what persuasion, with added danger, as noted above, that certain National Army forces would react strongly. We intend to explore with Defense Minister Minh just what his intentions are this regard.

Kidder

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–355. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.
2. In this telegram, January 31, Kidder reported that on January 30 Diem, accompanied by Defense Minister Minh and one other officer, flew by helicopter to the Tay Ninh area for a secret meeting with Trinh Minh The, the Cao Dai guerrilla leader. At that meeting The agreed to rally his forces to the National Government. Diem flew back to Saigon and immediately announced the news. (Ibid., 751G.00/1–3155)
3. Fishel informed Kidder, who in turn reported in this telegram, January 30, to the Department the terms on which The would rally to the National Government: The would become a general in the National Army; 2,500 of The’s men were to be integrated into the National Army and not assigned to newly-liberated areas; the remaining 1,500 of The’s forces were to be employed as unarmed Social Action cadres and sent into newly-liberated areas (with a promise from The that they would not preach Cao Dai doctrine there). (Ibid., 751G.00/1–3055)
4. The Camau Operation was the first pacification campaign of the South Vietnamese Government in 1955. Camau Peninsula, at the southern tip of Vietnam, was one of the regroupment zones provided for the Viet Minh under the Geneva Accords. On February 8 the Viet Minh were to be out of the area and on that day the Vietnamese National Army moved in to take control. For an account of the operation, see Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, pp. 228–238.