34. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1
3253. On eve Collins’ return, there is general impression atmosphere Free Vietnam has begun to lighten. There is a quickening of almost reluctant optimism in spite of heavy and dark clouds yet remaining. While country is far from reaching hypothetical line where its security and future may be considered even fairly safely assured, it is believed low point has been reached and trend, at least for moment, has begun to turn upward. Upward is relative term in this case, but that is direction.
It is difficult to realize weight of various factors which have contributed to this state affairs and following is in no sense attempt canvass all major elements of this particularly complex picture. Principal point to be emphasized is period of deep depression has been replaced by period of guarded optimism. This impression has been commented on to me by numerous observers including, for example, Director of Hong Kong–Shanghai Bank on visit from Hong Kong; Director of Shell Oil Company on visit from London; Harriot, editorial writer of Sydney Morning Herald, and several influential French businessmen.
Certain points may, however, be highlighted:
Collins’ mission and constancy of US support of Diem government have played critical role. National Army and Government are in relative harmony in most areas, although potential causes for renewed trouble remain. Diem has given evidence of unexpected personal popularity, particularly in center but also in south. Here we must guard against using our own propaganda efforts as measure of this new popularity. Diem’s new self-confidence, however, has helped create more optimistic atmosphere as have evidences that at least some dissident groups believe it politic get on Diem bandwagon. In spite of tragedy for Vietnam of Geneva Accords, Diem has [Page 79] been able establish fact of full sovereignty Free Vietnam and population is becoming increasingly convinced of this independence. Diem’s well-known anti-French sentiments, his honesty and stubbornness of purpose have proved valuable adjuncts.
Against above must be balanced weaknesses of Diem as leader, which have often been reported by this Embassy and extremely serious potential dangers from vast refugee resettlement program, from Viet Minh infiltration and subversion, from increasingly stormy activities of sects, and from machinations of politicians supporting persons such as former President Huu. A little progress has proved to be a heady draught for Diem and he is showing tendency with newfound self-confidence, a confidence not entirely shared by all, to take on all comers at once. This is cause serious concern for his well-wishers and very possibly may drive together widely disparate elements opposed to him. Given stability, wisdom and decisiveness, however, he now has better atmosphere in which attempt carry forward constructive programs.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–755. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris, Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Hong Kong, and Manila.↩