Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

327. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1956, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, May 28, 1956, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• TERM

PARTICIPANTS

• G—Mr. Murphy
• G—Mr. Bennett
• FE—Mr. Robertson
• FE—Mr. Sebald
• SEA—Mr. Young
• SEA—Mr. Kattenburg

This meeting was called for the purpose of deciding whether we should request the Defense Department to place a further temporary halt on the arrival of TERM personnel into Saigon, in the light of a new note dated May 26 from the International Commission in Viet-Nam to the Vietnamese Government² requesting that such arrivals be delayed until after the Commission could decide on the matter. Contingent of 86 Army personnel was now in flight between West Coast and Saigon and would depart from Clark Air Force Base, Philadelphia [Philippines], not later than 8:00 a.m. May 30.

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Murphy expressed his strong feeling that there should be no further delay in the movement of TERM personnel, that we had given ample time to the Commission to act, and that it seemed to him highly doubtful whether delaying this movement for another week or two would spur the Commission to faster action. Mr. Murphy felt that since this was a matter of great urgency, and in view of the statements he had made to the Secretary about it nearly two months earlier, indicating for example the likelihood of press leaks on this matter during Congressional presentation on foreign aid, he felt we had been “almost neglectful” in not proceeding faster. Mr. Murphy further indicated that when the United States takes strong leadership on an issue, the risks and consequences are frequently far less than expected; for example, in the recent issue of the NNSC in Korea, after we had indicated firmly that we would go through with our action, we had obtained unanimity among the 16 nations involved; moreover, in the case of TERM, we had told the Commission powers that we would go through with the project by the end of May.

Mr. Robertson indicated agreement with Mr. Murphy’s views and said that the matter had been kept pending for a long time because we had decided, at the urging of Embassy Saigon, to request formal Commission approval, beyond obtaining the approval of the Canadian and Indian Governments which had been secured shortly after the Secretary’s return from his post-SEATO trip. Mr. Robertson had the distinct impression the Secretary wanted us to have Commission approval of the project, but he also felt that the Secretary would not stop the project if we could not obtain such approval. Mr. Robertson thought the time for action had definitely come and agreed with Mr. Murphy that it was essential at times to take risks for the accomplishment of a major objective.

Mr. Sebald underlined that we had not sought Commission approval without qualifications, we had limited the period for Commission consideration to 30 days initially and this had been further extended thereafter. Mr. Sebald also indicated that he had understood from Mr. Gordon Gray that the Secretary had given Mr. Gray a very definite commitment that we would go in by the end of May with or without formal Commission approval, and that the British had been informed of this understanding. Mr. Sebald could not see going back over the very firm statements we had instructed our Embassy Saigon to make to the Indians and Canadians about our determination to go in at the end of May. Mr. Sebald further felt that we had given in considerably to the Commission recently and had become very much more involved in the armistice machinery than before, in terms of notification of MAAG arrivals, giving the ceiling figure for use of the Commission, etc. We had not yet received any quid pro quo for this increased cooperation.

Mr. Young dissented with the views expressed and thought the risks in our proposed action justified waiting another two weeks or so. He felt that since we had decided to obtain Commission approval, we should await such approval. It should be remembered that TERM had a double purpose and that the risks in the whole operation were not inconsiderable, that in view of the delicacy of the armistice question at this time we should obtain full Commission approval.

Mr. Murphy queried Mr. Young as to what possible serious consequences could come from failure to obtain Commission approval, and Mr. Young agreed that the consequences would probably not be insuperable from our point of view. However, he did not think the risks worth taking.

After some discussion of the degree to which we were actually bound by the decision to seek Commission approval, during which there was some evocation of the similarity between the Korean and Viet-Nam situations as to the extent to which the armistice circumscribed our actions in both areas, it was decided not to request Defense to place a further halt on the movement of this personnel. However, it was agreed that a summary history of the TERM negotiations³ would be sent out to Embassies Delhi and Ottawa to aid the latter in explaining to the Indian and Canadian Governments the reasons why we felt impelled to proceed with the movement even prior to obtaining final Commission approval.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/5–2856. Secret. Drafted by Kattenburg on June 12 and approved in substance by Young. Robertson initialed the source text. The meeting took place in Murphy’s office.
2. In telegram 2899 to New Delhi, May 29, the Department reported learning that “note dated May 26 addressed to French Liaison Mission Hanoi, International Commission in Viet-Nam informs Vietnamese Government that entry initial contingent TERM personnel into Viet-Nam should be further delayed, so that Commission may complete consideration of matter prior arrival this personnel.” (Ibid., 751G.00/5–2856)
3. That summary history is in telegram 2899 to New Delhi, May 29, sent also to Ottawa and Saigon and repeated for information to London and Paris. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–2856)
4. TERM was finally activated on June 1.