Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

326. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 24, 1956—10 a.m.

4592. 1. General Williams and I accompanied Deputy Secretary Defense Robertson when he called on Diem morning May 23.² President devoted interview to expounding his latest views on most urgent defense requirements of Vietnam. According to his best information and appreciation there was little danger of all-out overt aggression from North which would involve flanking movement through Laos and Cambodia aimed at the total conquest of South Vietnam. Most probable danger, he said, was Viet Minh invasion across 17th Parallel which violated no third country frontiers and had limited objective of occupying Quang Tri and Hue Provinces, with possible view to withdrawal as soon as certain political concessions had been extracted from South. For this reason, he had instructed VN General Staff to abandon French defensive planning which called for withdrawal from the area of the 17th Parallel in event of attack and to plan for proper defense in immediate vicinity of Parallel. (This latter reflects successful germination of idea General Williams has been endeavoring to plant in VN thinking for some time.)

2. With foregoing in mind, Diem had three specific requests:³

• First, that the United States Government make it clear to world it would regard limited aggression of this nature by Viet Minh as aggression in absolute sense and would react accordingly.⁴
• Second, that US assistance to VN road-building program be accelerated so that strategic roads planned for area immediately behind 17th Parallel and necessary to its defense as well as economic development could be completed as soon as possible. The priority here was early arrival of much-needed road-building machinery.
• Third, the President urged equal speed in implementation of plans to equip the Civil Guard with adequate communications and transportation matériel. In absence of this it was impossible for the Civil Guard to relieve National Army of its internal security assignments in South and West and redeployment center.

3. Detailed discussions took place only on second point during which General Williams pointed out his efforts to coordinate MAAG contribution to road-building problem with USOM and VN Departments of Defense and Public Works. Deputy Secretary Defense Robertson suggested that excess quantities of road-building equipment now in armed forces hands elsewhere in Far East might be made available to fill this requirement. At his request he is meeting May 24 with Chief MAAG, USOM Director and myself on this problem.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/5–2456. Secret. Passed to Defense and CINCPAC.
2. Reuben Robertson’s visit to Saigon was part of a larger trip to the Far East to study and assess the military situation there.

3. Diem made similar requests through the Vietnamese Ambassador in Washington, Tran Van Chuong, to Department officials on May 29. According to a memorandum of conversation of the meeting with Tran Van Chuong, Young treated these requests sympathetically and agreed to pass them on to Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, but Young did note that the United States had no reliable indications that hostilities by the Viet Minh were imminent. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–2956)

   Department of State intelligence had low-level and unreliable reports that officials in Hanoi in mid-April had decided to evacuate from the Dong Hoi area (just north of the 17th parallel) all children, women caring for children, women over 30, and men over 50. In a memorandum to Walter Robertson, May 25, Park Armstrong pointed out that these evacuation plans provided an ominous comparison with the situation in Korea north of the 38th parallel in May and June 1950. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–2556)

4. According to telegram 3922 to Saigon, June 1, the Department gave consideration to Diem’s request for such a statement, but it believed reports of Viet Minh intentions to commit armed violation of the demarcation line were of uncertain reliability. Furthermore, the general posture of the Communist bloc as well as current propaganda of the Viet Minh did not bear out the likelihood of such a move. (Ibid., 751G.5/5–2456)