267. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Acting Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe) to the Acting Secretary of State1
Washington, October 26,
1955.
SUBJECT
- NIE 63.1–3–55: Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 19562
On October 11, 1955, the Intelligence Advisory Committee approved an estimate of probable developments in Vietnam to July 1956. The principal conclusions of this estimate were:
- 1.
- At least until July 1956, the Viet Minh will probably continue to concentrate primarily on a “political struggle” designed to exert pressure for implementation of the Geneva agreements and to bring to power in the south personalities amenable to coalition government with the Viet Minh.
- 2.
- The Communists probably recognize, however, that unless they effectively challenge the position of the Diem government the latter will gradually strengthen and stabilize its position. They might therefore decide to initiate guerrilla warfare in the south, provided such action was consistent with over-all Bloc policies and provided they estimated that such a course would not provoke Manila Pact counteractions.
- 3.
- Should the Viet Minh initiate large-scale guerrilla operations, supported by substantial infiltration from the north, the south Vietnamese government could not long survive without military assistance from outside. However, the Vietnamese National Army probably could maintain the government in power against potential Viet Minh opposition now in South Vietnam, and could retain control of major urban centers and lines of communication.
- 4.
- If Diem continues to receive wholehearted US support, he will probably be able to cope successfully with non-Communist dissident elements.
- 5.
- Diem will almost certainly not agree to hold national elections for the unification of Vietnam by July 1956. Although Diem, under Western pressure, might reluctantly agree to indirect consultations with the DRV concerning elections, he would insist on conditions which he felt certain the Communists would be unable to accept. Aware that such a position will probably cause the Viet Minh to increase their efforts to destroy his government, Diem will probably seek to bind the US more specifically to the defense of Vietnam.
This estimate will be released to the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
Fisher Howe