Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

265. Draft Study Submitted to the National Security Council Planning Board by the Department of State Member (Bowie)¹

Washington, October 6, 1955.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES IN EVENT OF A RENEWAL OF AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM

The following study is submitted in response to the Planning Board Memorandum of August 16² which called for a State Department “study of political and economic measures which would be required in support of the operations” which are described in the JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated 9 September³ “including preparatory steps which might have a deterrent effect.”

A. Political:

Deterrent

1. The most important political action which the US could take to deter overt Viet Minh aggression would be a clear reaffirmation in official public statements of US intention to take vigorous action under the protocol to the Manila Pact in the event of such aggression.

2. Similar statements from other members of the Manila Pact would also provide a useful deterrent.

3. Possibilities of securing such statements would be affected by the degree to which the Government of Viet Nam could make it clear that the onus for any such aggression would lie with the Viet Minh. Similarly, demonstration by the Government of Viet Nam of its determination and intent to maintain itself as an independent anti-communist country will assist in securing for it international support and will serve as a deterrent to Viet Minh aggression. Accordingly, the US should continue to prevail upon the Government of Free Viet Nam to follow courses of action which will assist in such developments. In particular it should attempt to persuade the Government of Free Viet Nam to establish a National Assembly as soon as possible which would be endowed with authority to draw up a constitution to determine the relationship of Viet Nam with France and other countries, and declare the official position of Free Viet Nam with respect to the pre-election consultations with the Viet Minh and the elections called for under the Geneva agreement.

4. The US could also undertake political action to assist in establishing military deterrents to aggression such as arranging facilities for introduction of US mobile ground forces into the Southeast Asian area should such commitment of forces be decided upon. US political action would also be helpful if improvement of bases in Thailand or other areas in Southeast Asia were required.

Action in the Event of Aggression

5. In the event of Viet Minh overt aggression, the US should stimulate an official Viet Namese request to the Manila Pact signatories for assistance under the protocol to the Pact and Article IV of the treaty. The US should strongly support the Viet Namese request and use its influence to secure action by the members of the Pact under their treaty obligation.

6. The US should stimulate and assist a Viet Nam initiative to bring the issue to the Security Council of the United Nations in an effort to secure condemnation of the Viet Minh and a UN resolution calling for a cessation of aggression. The US should consider in the light of the circumstances at the time whether or not it should seek designation as United Nations Commander in an organized UN action.

7. The US would undoubtedly have to insist that a supreme command of any forces contributed either under the Manila Pact or under the United Nations should be vested in the US. The US would have to arrange for such command in a way to avoid derogation of the sovereignty of Free Viet Nam. It should emphasize that Free Viet Nam had formerly called upon its Manila Pact protectors to deploy troops within its territory to repel Viet Minh aggression. It should emphasize the fact that US exercise of supreme command and the presence of foreign forces in Viet Nam were strictly temporary phenomena and should allay any suspicion that the US intended to establish a colonial regime.

B. Economic:

8. Viet Minh aggression and consequent introduction of foreign troops into Free Viet Nam would seriously upset the Viet Namese economic pattern. The production of paddy and rubber would be further reduced. Support of forces would necessarily come from abroad. Viet Nam would become even more dependent upon foreign aid. Military necessity would require Viet Nam to accept increased foreign control of its economic affairs. Matters such as foreign exchange, and international trade would have to be delegated to the Supreme Military Command. The US would have to be prepared to extend substantial economic assistance to Viet Nam and to exercise a considerable degree of economic authority.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC Planning Board under cover of a memorandum by Lay, October 12, for information and use in its review of paragraph 5–d of NSC 5429/5. A copy of this study, located ibid., S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, June–Dec. 1955, indicates that Stelle was the drafter.
2. Document 244.
3. Enclosure to Memo for NSC, “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, September 16, 1955. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 254.]