Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

262. Letter From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt)¹

[Washington,] October 5, 1955.

Dear Fred: One more matter while it is on my mind. It seems to me that developments have reached the stage in Viet-Nam where we should start to plan and operate on a longer-term basis than we have during the past twelve months. We have jerked from crisis to crisis and there will be more. Yet, it seems to me that despite many weaknesses in Viet-Nam, there are some positive trends in the international, political, economic and military fields that for the first time may allow us to take a longer view.

On the international plane, it seems to me we can now proceed with the assumption that there will be no all-Vietnamese elections in 1956. Barring major hostilities, the South will remain under a non-Communist regime for some time, despite great difficulties in the South owing largely to the administrative weaknesses of the Diem government, the unknown capabilities of the Viet Minh and mounting economic deficiencies. A free and united Viet-Nam should be our ultimate objective but, unless force is used which we forswear and which the Communists may forgo, I do not see any immediate prospects for an acceptable political unification. Judging only by such indications as the passing of July 20 without major incident, the rather leisurely pace which all the Communist leaders have so far followed regarding the consultation issue, and the hints from the Viet Minh on zonal “autonomy”, one can now speculate that Communist diplomacy will not put on unbearable pressure regarding this issue of unification by Geneva, although it may be heavy. Moreover, the British and the French have come a long way since last May–July when they were horrified and terrified over our approach. We got over the July 20 hurdle surprisingly well, which may be significant. Perhaps the Vietnamese can persuade the French to see that French interests in Viet-Nam will be better served by falling away from a strict implementation of the Final Declaration at Geneva. All these strains do not add up to international harmony on Viet-Nam, but the high pitch seems to be dropping, for the moment at least.

On the political side, Free Viet-Nam is now undertaking the intricate process of establishing some form of constitutional government. This is going to take months and years to work out successfully. I have just been reading “Representative Government in Southeast Asia” by Prof. Emerson of Harvard and published early this year. A few quotations are particularly pertinent now that we have the Vietnamese proposals to look at:

“The question may indeed be asked as to the propriety of establishing the ability effectively to manage representative institutions as one of the major criteria in judging the political record and prospects of Southeast Asian countries. … No one should come to the study of Southeast Asian political institutions with the fixed preconception that they should conform to established Western models.”²

These Asian countries will have to find their own balance between the values of sufficient authority and effectiveness of executive leadership on the one hand and adequate, responsible expression of the popular will on the other. It will be a delicate and unstable relationship at best. It seems to me the benefit of the doubt at this stage of the game should be given the need for strong leadership. Our Asian friends should not have too much compunction about copying Western forms intact. Thus Vietnamese proposals sent in your 1468³ look suitable at first glance and probably as good as can be expected. I should think the Vietnamese would need a strong, centralized form of government with suitable outlets for voicing local and public opinion, including a “responsible” opposition. It is not surprising that Ngo Dinh Diem closely followed the Cambodian elections and political developments.⁴ Apparently, he is concerned about parliamentary forms that weaken the executive and overcentralization of authority that discourages opposition. The “institutionalizing” of Diem’s regime adds new and long overdue political elements that have been so sorely needed for well founded diplomatic policies which have been necessarily so personalized by the pro- or anti-Diem problem.

There is even more need for long-range economic planning. I touched on this in my other letter but I just want to mention it again since it seems to me and Len Tyson, who handles economic affairs for Southeast Asia, that this is particularly important. The issues were raised in the points made to Senator Mansfield and in Diem’s speech of September 17, both reported in your 1113 of September 6,⁵ and 1361 of September 21.⁶ We ought to shift the basis of our planning and programming in Viet-Nam to a longer range basis. We have had to meet emergencies and I think on the whole our agencies have done a good job. But should not we now address ourselves to the basic structure and nature of the economy of Viet-Nam? What about the whole land reform question that has been so disappointing so far. This is all a pretty complicated subject. I do not yet visualize how we can get a grasp of it. That is why I have been thinking of some kind of a special mission which could take the time to work with Leland Barrows who is doing a splendid job and with the operational people in ICA in order to come up with some well thought out recommendations. The problem is that many of us are so tied down in Saigon and in Washington that we cannot do this kind of job. But I do feel we should change our approach.

On the military side, I merely mention the new Washington agreement to support your recommendation on the 150,000 force level. We never should have gone down to 90,000 or then 100,000 in such a short time. But we all learned—even generals—and I think corrected our error before completely off course. The growing capabilities and the loyalty of the VNA have been the decisive factor, perhaps this year. General O’Daniel and TRIM have done a wonderful job. At last we may think there is an anchor in Viet-Nam that gives some promise of holding in some winds at least.

To sum up, I would like now to try to gear United States agencies to using more long-range factors in their planning and operations in Viet-Nam. This means the OCB here and the USOM there. I would much appreciate your judgment. Perhaps you could talk to Mr. Hollister, Howard Jones, and Ray Moyer about this.⁷

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA Files: Lot 58 D 207, SEA, Viet-Nam Correspondence—1955. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Ellipsis in the source text. The quotation is from Rupert Emerson, Representative Government in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 16, 192.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 259.
4. In elections held on September 11 for the Cambodian National Assembly, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Socialist People’s Community) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk swept all seats, overwhelming the opposition Democratic Party. The SRN platform called for the abolition of all political parties and the direct election of village representatives. The cabinet was to be responsible to the Crown, which would have veto power over all legislation.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/9–655) The most comprehensive account of the economic proposals handed to Senator Mansfield on August 20 at a meeting with Diem and his Ministers is in despatch 84 from Saigon, September 19, and its enclosures. (Ibid., 851G.00/9–1955)
6. In this telegram the Embassy summarized Diem’s speech. The President had called for enlarging Vietnam’s economic independence through the pursuit of a liberal credit policy which would stimulate domestic investment and through discouragement of additional foreign investment in those sectors essential to national security, such as basic transportation, the marketing of food, and the supply of the army. Diem also stressed industrialization, to be confined at first to products presently imported but for which Vietnam had natural resources, such as rice milling and simple textiles. Lastly, Diem called for the mechanization of agriculture, to be accomplished by the creation of large tillable units in the form of producer cooperatives. (Ibid., 851G.00/9–2155)
7. The reference is to a trip by Hollister and Jones in October to Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Saigon (October 25–27), Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Jakarta, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Hoover began the trip with Hollister but was forced to leave the tour at Manila to return to Washington because of Dulles’ earlier-than-anticipated departure for the Geneva Conference. Information on the Hoover–Hollister trip is ibid., 110.12–HO and Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95, CF 534–541.