Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

261. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, October 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Vietnamese National Assembly and other Political Reforms

Ambassador Reinhardt has sent in the Vietnamese plans for two referenda and an election for a national assembly. These plans are contained in his 1468² and 1483³ attached. U.S. officials have been emphasizing to French, British and others the importance of being able to tell the Communists that a national assembly in Free Viet-Nam is a prerequisite to any Vietnamese consideration of consultations and all-Vietnamese elections. I think that line is a sound one in terms of dealing with the Geneva elections problem.

However, I would like to enter a reservation and possibly a minority dissent regarding elections in South Viet-Nam for a national assembly. I have put a mild reservation in the attached outgoing telegram⁴ for your signature commenting on Reinhardt’s 1483. In that telegram he indicates that “it is most important” that elections be held and that we make “unequivocally clear” to Diem the importance we attach to an assembly. I agree with this in theory but I am very worried over how such elections might work out in practice. Democracies in newly independent Asian countries are unpredictable things and first elections like first experiences in anything are utterly unpredictable. I hardly need cite Indonesia as a case in point. As for Viet-Nam, I cannot give you or the Secretary the slightest indication as to what might happen if there were free, secret general elections in South Viet-Nam on December 22 as Diem has now scheduled them. Pro-government forces might win a majority or a jumble of complicated parties might so split representation that there would be no single responsible support for the government, or the Viet Minh and their sympathizers might cleverly get a lot of seats. Unless there is pretty good prior political preparation through vigorous political leadership and a political country-wide party, the national assembly and elections in South Viet-Nam might turn out to be a sour experience. I just don’t know and therefore I am reluctant for the United States and its friends to start pressing the Vietnamese down this path from which there is no return. From all the information I can get from despatches as well as from Americans who have talked with Diem and his advisers, I am satisfied that they are fully aware of the delicate task of finding adequate balance between the establishment of strong, stable, executive leadership and the widest possible extent of representative institutions. A more constitutional process is needed in Viet-Nam to take care of the Bao Dai problem, and increase Diem’s authority. On the other hand, premature or excessive popular representation might submerge the still very frail structure we have been able to help Diem put together despite the almost unsurmountable obstacles during the past twelve months. I naturally hesitate to endanger what has been won so hard.

Recommendations:⁵

1. Therefore, I would recommend that the United States Government not press Diem to hold elections and form an assembly at any particular time during the next three to six months. I think we should let him be the judge of the adequacy and timeliness of his own preparations.

2. That you sign the attached telegram to Saigon.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/10–555. Secret. Also addressed to Sebald who initialed it.
2. See footnote 2, Document 259.
3. Document 259.
4. See Document 264.
5. This heading and recommendation no. 2 are written in the source text in an unidentified hand, presumably done in the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.