Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

250. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, August 25, 1955—1:48 p.m.

664. Joint State–ICA message. For the Ambassador and Director, USOM.

1. We are concerned with lack of progress in agrarian reform in South Vietnam, as reported Embassy Despatch 453² and other reports believing agrarian reform one means strengthening government and administration of South Vietnam. Conversely, lack of progress in agrarian reform hinders development sufficient strength by Government in rural areas to gain real control over South Vietnam.

2. Since current rent reduction and land utilization program appears inadequate, even if adequately implemented, what seems to be needed is full scale agrarian reform, involving broad scale improvement of all economic and social institutions connected with farm life. We note Government has announced 300,000 piasters will be spent in each village for community center, to house communal council, secondary school, clinic, and information center. Also that Government is sending medical and social assistance, and is organizing an education campaign to increase literacy and extend knowledge of modem sanitary and hygienic practices. Is this adequate and sufficiently deep rooted or would further measures be necessary gain support countryside?

3. It is our impression that land ownership and land redistribution program is an essential part of needed agrarian reform program in South Vietnam recognizing that such a program would raise difficult administrative and legal problems and alienate some groups and individuals who at present are supporting Government. Would these disadvantages more than offset gains to be realized from “land for the landless” program sponsored by Government?

4. Admitting agrarian reform could not be carried out in certain insecure areas in South Vietnam could not start be made in areas under Government control? What progress if any has agrarian reform made in areas taken over from Viet Minh administrative control? What role in an agrarian reform program would newly organized General Commissariat for Planning and Reconstruction and Bao An Doan (Security Protection Group) be expected to play? How could an agrarian reform program most effectively assist in refugee resettlement and re-establishment on land of South Vietnamese driven off during long period hostilities?

5. A broad scale agrarian reform program has had some measure success in other Asian countries, e.g., Community Development Program in Philippines, Community Development Program in India, and Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan. Given current conditions in South Vietnam we would envisage that agrarian reform program in South Vietnam should be sole responsibility of Vietnamese Government, with advice and assistance from agencies of United States Government in Vietnam. Please comment.³

6. If your answers to above inquiries indicate your agreement on need for broad scale agrarian reform in South Vietnam, Ambassador may at appropriate time inquire of President Diem his present plans and intentions in this regard, and inform him of importance United States Government attaches this question. Ambassador may inform Diem that we recall that several months ago in connection with reform program discussed with Ambassador Collins, Diem stated that land distribution scheme would be put into effect following rent reduction and land utilization program. If you consider appropriate, an outline of desirable agrarian reform program could be prepared without indication of source which Ambassador could leave with President.

7. Memorandum agrarian reform being pouched.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/6–1555. Confidential. Drafted by Price and cleared in PSA and in draft with both Jones and Raymond T. Moyer, Regional Director, Far East Operations, ICA.
2. Document 210.
3. In telegram 1332 from Saigon, September 20, the Embassy provided the following summary comments: (1) lack of enthusiasm for land reform by Vietnamese officialdom and lack of effective government administration were impeding agrarian reform program; (2) refugee resettlement added pressure for reform; (3) redistribution of ownership of land was not politically possible until after July 1956; and (4) security of tenure, rent reduction, and other assistance to tenant farmers could win rural support for the government, but to date such reforms were not being effectively instituted. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/9–2055)
4. Not found in Department of State files.