There is enclosed, for the Department’s information, a memorandum of
conversation held on June 1, 1955, between Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and USOM consultant, W. I. Ladejinsky.2 Mr. Ladejinsky
has been following closely the agrarian reform program in Vietnam and
had come to see the Prime Minister, at the latter’s invitation, to
discuss recent developments in the program.
In addition to the question of land reform, the conversation touched on
the problem of the resettlement of refugees, the ineffectiveness of the
local civil administration, and recent political developments including
the sect problem. As in earlier conversations, Diem continued to give the impression
of viewing the various economic, social, and administrative programs
discussed as subordinate to the immediate political and military
problems with which he was engaged. The Prime Minister appeared serene
and confident, and expressed his conviction that the Hoa Hao rebellion
would be successfully dealt with. His attitude toward the French
continued to be critical, but he appeared considerably less bitter than
in the past.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum From the Land Reform Adviser in the United States
Operations Mission in Vietnam (Ladejinsky) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt)3
SUBJECT
- Visit with President Ngo Dinh
Diem
. . . . . . .
(4) The nature of my report was three-fold: The sad state of the
agrarian reform; the poor progress of settling refugees on land, and
the problems presented by local administration.
As to the agrarian reform, I told the President that the appointment
of a Minister for Agrarian Reform4 was certainly a step in the right
direction but that, to date, the reform is not off the ground, and
that there are no indications that the situation will undergo a
favorable change in the immediate future. I pointed out why the
tenants show no interest in his program; the potent influence of the
Communists in this connection; the preference for land ownership to
rent reduction; and the political and administrative vacuum in the
countryside which prevents the enforcement of most measures
sponsored by the National Government. I took the liberty of
suggesting to the President that, if his government is to make any
political capital of the agrarian reform, then the time has come to
reexamine the entire problem in the light of the current state of
affairs. More specifically, I suggested (1) that as long as the
program is in being the Chiefs of the Provinces in the non-sect
areas be held responsible for the implementation of the program, and
(2) a national conference of the interested parties with an eye to
determining whether (a) the existing program can be implemented, (b)
whether it should be abandoned altogether and a land ownership and
land distribution program devised in its stead.
The President did not dispute the impasse reached by his program, but
he does not intend to give the land reform question a national
hearing. He has confidence in his new Minister of Agrarian Reform
and is evidently willing to let him try his hand at it for a while
longer. The President’s reluctance to review the issue with all the
care it deserves may be traced also to, what appears to me, a lack
[Page 457]
on his part of a truly
abiding concern with this matter. I am not prepared to say whether
the President’s attitude stems from the fact that he is not a “land
reformer”, or that the more pressing day-to-day issues bordering on
the very survival of his government have primacy in his thinking and
his effort to the exclusion of much else, including agrarian reform.
Whatever the real reason, this much can be said with certainty: on
the occasion of this talk, as during all previous talks, the land
reform problems did not appear to loom large in his scheme of
things.
(5) As to the settlement of refugees on land, the President was
informed that as of the end of May few refugees had been settled on
land; by this is meant settlement in the sense that a refugee
willing to farm has more than shelter and a garden patch, namely,
well-demarcated holdings of their own, with farm tools and animal
power to put the land to use. I pointed out to him that most of the
farming by the refugees in this crop season, commencing with the
rains, will have to be delayed until the crop season of 1956. The
refugee problem being close to the heart of the President, he was
visibly disturbed by the account and prospects. It is my impression
that he had not been fully aware of these developments. I explained
to him that I have not been too close to the problem and that I do
not know all the reasons for the delay; I did point out that perhaps
the basic one, a firm evaluation of the total
acreage available for settlement, its location and quality has not
been made, and that this is the first order of business if the
program is to be successfully implemented. With that in view, I
suggested to the President that he immediately appoint a small
commission with instructions and powers to determine the land
availability, based on the commission’s first hand observations in
the field. I suggested a time limit of one month, and assured him
that the Mission (FOA) will be happy
to render its technical assistance to this urgently needed survey.
The President responded favorably. Whether he will act accordingly,
or, having discussed the matter with appropriate agencies, will act
in favor of another method of moving refugees on land, remains to be
seen. Whatever his future course of action, he is fully cognizant’
that the permanent solution of the refugee problem is yet to take
shape, and that further delays may postpone the solution
indefinitely.
(6) As to local administration, I stated that, with few exceptions,
it is ineffective and that no application of any national
legislation is possible unless the administrators themselves become
conscious of the fact that a free and independent Vietnam demands of
them a zeal and zest of performance over and beyond the customary. I
expressed the view that the real difficulty with the administrators
is not their lack of formal public administration training, but
rather the lassitude, disinterestness and seeming failure to sense
or comprehend the critical
[Page 458]
transitional period Vietnam is passing through. I made the point
that just as the National Army is in need of political training, the
administrators are surely in the same need. The President countered
by saying that this problem has been on his mind, that he ordered
the Delegate for South Vietnam to prepare a secret report on local
administration, and that the findings justified his worst fears.
However, he did not believe he can deal with the problem outside of
the overall issues relating to the country’s pacification and
stabilization. Serious though the administration question is, for
the time being he intended to leave it in the hands of the three
Delegates of Vietnam.
The visitor did not argue the Presidential preference, nor did he
tell him of his most recent experience in one of the most important
provinces of South Vietnam, where a new Chief of Province appointed
by the Delegate is unmistakenly anti-Diem, anti-reform, and pretty much anti-everything
that spells deviating from the current state of inaction.
I did tell the President that the standoffish attitude of the farmers
vis-à-vis the Government is not unrelated to the local
administration; above all, I suggested that it is closely related to
the weak link between the National Government and the farmers. I
elaborated on an earlier statement under somewhat similar
circumstances and suggested that the President himself might devote
some time to help create among the farmers a sense of freedom of
participation, a sense of belonging with the Government in the
business of creating a new State, basing this approach on the
Government’s convincing appreciation of the people’s fundamental
needs. I attempted to impress upon him that he more than any other
Vietnamese is in a position to articulate these ideas, which in the
long run should prove to be the effective weapon against the Viet
Minh and for the stability of Vietnam. But now, as in the past, the
President pleaded extreme pre-occupation with urgent matters.
. . . . . . .
