Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

251. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 25, 1955—8 p.m.

933. This is a country team message. References: (a) Department telegram circular 559;² (b) Embassy despatch 358.³

1. Continuing efforts have been made toward resolution problems of internal security discussed in ref desp. Although some progress achieved, much remains to be accomplished in this critical field. In collaboration with Vietnamese authorities and with assistance Michigan State University team, U.S. agencies Saigon have developed coordinated plan for organizing and training civilian security service. Part of program already underway, and remainder awaits Washington approval. In view of vital importance early establishment effective nationwide civilian security service as key to other civilian and military problems, country team strongly recommends approval of program and granting of funds and specific authorization requested in para 3 (a) and (d) below.

2. Atcs.—Vietnamese plan calls for:

(a) Establishment single security service under Ministry of Interior. Deputy Minister already designated Director Public Safety as over-all coordinator.

(b) National organization to be composed three major subdivisions each with own director: National Police (garde civile)—strength 25,000; semi-autonomous municipal police forces—strength 4,000–6,000; Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (sûreté)—strength 4,000.

(c) Division of responsibilities as follows:

National—Normal law enforcement all areas SVN, excluding four major municipalities, to include counter-intelligence operation and counter subversive activities and nationwide police communications net.

Municipal—Same for four major cities SVN.

VBI—Common police services including counter-intelligence, biographic and fingerprint files and criminal lab; investigation and prosecution major crimes nationwide; enforcement immigration, customs, narcotics, alcohol and income tax laws; coordination counter-espionage operations.

3. In conjunction with this plan, we believe following measures necessary:

(a) Transfer without charge to any appropriation considerable quantities surplus MDAP equipment in Indochina and elsewhere to ICA/FOA for use Vietnamese national security services. (Current deficiencies police equipment highlighted by fact Saigon–Cholon police possess only six radio-equipped vehicles.)

(b) Maximum utilization within secure limits of all outside agencies (UK, Thai, Filipino) to expedite training and lower costs.

(c) Detail (on loan basis from U.S. Government agencies) or employment of 14 additional U.S. advisory personnel to augment 8 advisors currently employed under FOA/Michigan State University contract.

(d) Approval additional funds in following amounts: FY 56—$2,534,465, FY 57—$420,620 to provide for continued possible employment 14 advisors referred to above through FY 57. Breakdown FY 56 funds is: $545,465 to cover all costs additional U.S. personnel; $308,500 to cover specialized training Malaya, Philippines and employment 12–15 Philippine constabulary advisory group in Vietnam; $270,000 to cover purchase additional transportation not available through MDAP surpluses; $704,000 to cover vehicle operation and maintenance costs; $606,500 to purchase riot guns, revolvers, tear gas, ammo, etc., not available through MDAP surpluses; $100,000 to purchase criminal laboratory equipment.

4. To meet these additional expenses USOM/Saigon has reviewed the budget of MSU project and of public administration program and has found the means of providing eight of the additional personnel and $500,000 toward the other additional expenses outlined above. The proposed necessary adjustments which, if approved by ICA/W, will permit these additions are as follows:

(a) Recruitment of two additional police specialists already provided for in the MSU project.

(b) Substitution of police specialists for two public administration staff provided in MSU project but not yet recruited.

(c) Use of savings on transportation and certain local expenses to employ three additional police specialists by increase in personnel ceiling of MSU project without increase in total funds.

(d) Increase of one in personnel ceiling and increase of approximately $60,000 in budget of MSU project to compensate for assignment of Lindholm to special tax advisory project proposed in Toica 199⁴ and use of the additional position to employ a police specialist.

(e) Allotment of $250,000 already earmarked in public administration budget for equipment purchase plus addition of $250,000 from other funds programmed for public administration but not yet committed.

5. This leaves gap of approximately $1,700,000 between program recommended above and funds available from present allotments. Despite urgency of police problem, we believe that present commitments plus additions recommended above represent maximum charge which should be made against existing economic aid funds. Current military expenditures are less than programmed military aid, and increase in police project could be financed from savings in military budget. (It should be noted, however, that if not used for police program these surplus funds would serve to meet part of anticipated short-fall in 1956 military aid funds.) …

6. Pending approval of program and funds, we are proceeding along following lines using present available funds in MSU contract plus presently available personnel from MSU, MAAG and Embassy:

(a) Improvement effectiveness Saigon–Cholon municipal police;

(b) Determination of extent of possible British, Thailand, and Philippine assistance and immediate utilization thereof within limits of available funds;

(c) Maximum possible utilization of MAAG–sponsored FAVN schools for specialist training (use and maintenance of military type communications equipment, vehicles, and weapons) and basic military-refresher training for national police and, where appropriate, weapons instruction for other police elements;

(d) Training of FAVN police personnel to fill (1) instructor requirements for police academy and roving instruction/inspection teams, and (2) key staff or command assignments all echelons security services.

7. Further details of program being forwarded by despatch 54.⁵ In view of great expenditure of time in local review this project, which has resulted in reduction cost estimate from $5 million to $2.5 million for FY 56, we hope approval can be granted without much further delay.⁶ If Dept desires we could send to Washington local country team representative thoroughly conversant entire problem for presentation to State and OCB.

Reinhardt

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/8–2555. Secret.
2. In the reference telegram, March 23, the respective chiefs of mission were instructed “to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés), … prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with communist subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrections,” (Ibid., 700.5/3–2355)
3. This despatch, April 28, in response to circular telegram 559, March 23, is not printed, but see footnote 4, Document 199.
4. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, FOA–ICA Files: Lot W–130, FRC 57 A 248, Box 104)
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 851G.501/8–2955)
6. Approval was granted in telegram 1221 to Saigon, October 10. (Ibid., 751G.5–MSP/10–1055) This Department of State telegram was cleared with ICA and the Department of Defense.