Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

241. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina (O’Daniel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Saigon, August 9, 1955—10:30 p.m.

MG 742A, 091330Z. References: DEPTAR (OSD) 292146Z cite Defense 985882,² CINCPAC msg 302231Z³ and US Embassy Saigon msg 186,⁴ CINCPAC msg 302116Z.

This msg answers ur 082027Z and is reply to ur 302116Z.⁵

Req early approval of increase in auth strength of Vietnamese armed forces to 150,000 plus 10,000 sect forces for bal of CY 55, 150,000 incl sect forces by 1 Jul 56 and for bal of CY 56. Proposed forces of 150,000 would incl 4 fld divs (85,000 ea), 6 light divs (5,500 ea) and 13 territorial regts (1,625) plus approximately 4,000 Air, 4,000 Navy and 5,000 civ employees. Justification in order of points contained in referenced DEPTAR msg follows:

A. Fol changes in mil situation have resulted fm reduction of FEC during past year and the probable future phase out of most French Union ground forces: (Note: French strength 1 Aug 55—approx 60,000 fol evacuation of 12,500 in Jul. Planned strength for 1 Oct 55—35,000).

(1) Virtual elimination of the FEC as a force to deter and resist aggression. Three major factors support this:

(a) French lack of incentive is evidenced by repeated statements by French officials to effect that “never again will we fight, on our own, either the Viet Minh or Vietnamese except in self defense.” French can see no future in sacrificing French lives in a country that is outside the French empire. There is a probability that French could and would contribute air and naval spt to combatting Viet Minh over aggression if subj French forces were committed under SEATO auspices.

(b) Increased pressure by Vietnamese govt on French to withdraw all mil forces. It is expecting that for the coming Vietnamese-French negotiations will see the Vietnamese govt requesting a phased French withdrawal of all forces except a tng msn, with all ground forces withdrawn by 1 Apr 56 and air and naval forces by 31 Dec 56.

(c) French need for ground forces elsewhere, primarily N Africa, and the fact that the French govt has given indications of favoring early evacuation of French forces fm IndoChina, limited in time only by mil requirements for properly planned and efficiently implemented mil evacuation. Despite probability French troops would not actively oppose Viet Minh aggression, nevertheless French force constitutes a deterrent to Viet Minh aggression. Elimination of this deterrent would increase possibility of Viet Minh attack unless otherwise offset by compensating deterrent factor associated with Vietnamese forces.

(2) There will soon be no force in Vietnam capable of blocking external aggression sufficiently long to allow arrival of outside aid and the mobilization of additional Vietnamese forces. It is believed a Vietnamese force of 150,000 properly organized and trained and supported by avail French navy and air would have this blocking and delaying capability.

(3) French withdrawal has resulted in only a token French force manning the NE border of Free Vietnam. If Viet Minh are to be denied free access to S Vietnam and the capability to build up Viet Minh subversive strength almost at will, local forces must be employed to guard the extensive borders.

B. The capability of the Viet Minh for subversive and paramilitary activities in Free Vietnam and probability of their exercising those capabilities within next year are as fol:

(1) Viet Minh have capability of

(a) Small unit to bn size guerrilla raiding and harassing operations and

(b) Clandestine terrorist attacks on installations and persons throughout S Vietnam.

These capabilities can be exercised on either sporadic or phased and cumulative basis. Reference capability (a), it is impossible to estimate accurate strength but Viet Minh can put armed forces of light battalion strength (250) into the field in rough terrain. Viet Minh can dominate areas in the foot hills and high ground in central Vietnam, hold trails in plateau area, hold trails along Laotian border for forces invading through back door, maintain bn forces along east bank of southern Mekong River and in the Plain des Joncs area. Viet Minh are in the process of organizing an intricate system of para-military and subversive elements throughout Free Vietnam. They have capability of increasing their underground forces three-fold over a six month period and can block all active support of the govt in all areas except the large cities unless strong counter action is taken by army or police. Ref capability (b), Viet Minh terrorist activities currently directed by psychological, political intimidation, military Viet Minh possess covert orgn and means at any time to step up terrorist activities to point where it could seriously reduce confidence, prestige, Diem govt, both at home and abroad. Above two capabilities can be exercised separately or together or in conjunction with overt mil attack.

(2) The Viet Minh will probably confine their para-military activities to resisting efforts of Vietnamese natl army to destroy them until either hope of diplomatic or electoral victory in Jul 56 is denied them or a decision to attack militarily is made. Whenever conditions indicated that Jul 56 will not see a Viet Minh victory, the para-military forces will probably be heavily augmented in preparation for extensive guerrilla activity, and a clandestine terrorist campaign will be initiated.

C. The size of the Vietnamese national army necessary to maintain internal security is dependent in large measure on the popular spt given Free Vietnamese government. Popular spt is, in turn, largely dependent on size and capability of Vietnamese natl army. Internal security will never be firmly established until the people are willing to take individual and community action against Viet Minh and dissident elements. People will only act when fear of Viet Minh retaliation by either underground agents or external aggression is replaced by confidence that their govt has power to protect them and ensure their ultimate survival. With early withdrawal of French ground forces and in absence of SEATO force commitments, Vietnamese must rely on themselves to produce ground forces necessary to delay external aggression. When considered in this realistic manner, the forces required to establish and maintain internal security must incl force for delaying action. A Vietnamese natl army force of 10 divs (4 fld and 6 light) and 13 territorial regts, with a strength of 142,000 and stationed so that all areas of Free Vietnam are covered by military forces, is required to establish and maintain internal security in the true sense of the words. Force will permit planned integration of sect forces, continuance of operations against rebel elements, containment of remaining sect forces and in conjunction with effective civil security or police forces, the suppression and containment of both the para-military and the clandestine terrorist capability.

D. The following factors affect the speed with which Vietnamese natl army forces could reasonably be demobilized:

(1) Vietnamese Natl Army has already undergone a sizeable reduction since the Geneva truce.

(2) The Viet Minh have increased their forces from 341,000 on 20 Jul 54 to 367,000 at present; with the battle corps increasing from 147,000 to 250,000. (Latest reliable intelligence reports.)

(3) Free Vietnam faces a continuing war against the sects and the constant threat of subversive and/or guerrilla activities.

(4) Due to inexperience and lack of necessary machinery for demobilization and need for psychological adjustment of populace, it is considered physically impossible to demobilize below 150,000 and still retain any semblance of an effective force.

(5) Demobilization would add to recruiting potential of Viet Minh and sect elements and aggravate economic and internal security situation. In view of these factors, Vietnamese Natl Army speed of demobilization is considered to be: Reduce fm present strength of 146,000 plus sects to 142,000 including sects by 1 Jul 56. This strength to continue through remainder of FY 56. Impossible to estimate beyond 31 Dec 56, but reduction during that period must be considered in light of then existing situation.

E. The increased strength of Vietnamese Natl Army will add 1 fld and 3 light divs plus 13 territorial regts to presently auth 3 fld and 3 light div force. Functions are as fol:

(1) The 13 regts will assume basic mission of internal security originally planned for the 3 light divs. They will be trained as both a counter-subversive and a combat force and will form nucleus for 4 add combat divs when a civil police and security orgn is ready to relieve them of msn of ferreting out enemy’s clandestine orgn and to assist in suppression of small size enemy para-military activities.

(2) The add 3 light divs and the 3 original light divs (reld of primary msn of internal security by 13 territorial regts) to have function of augmenting internal security forces in establishing and maintaining internal security. The 6 light divs stationed in key areas throughout S Vietnam, will give the Vietnamese a reasonably strong force that can be moved quickly into any trouble area with the ability to take repressive and retaliatory measures against Viet Minh and/or sect activities and through their presence offer a deterrent to Viet Minh disturbances. In case of external aggression the light divs can augment the delaying forces. The presence of these divs forms a base for favorable political action.

(3) The add fld div gives balance to the Vietnamese Natl Army and will have the function of adding its forces to third echelon of defense against internal aggression and first echelon of defense against external aggression as required and allowed by situation.

F. Determination of a finite answer is to the effect the requested increase in force levels would have on the availability of excess stocks of mil equip in S Vietnam is affected by the facts that [sic] (1): Excess property reports to date have been based on a MAAG estimate of a possible Vietnamese troop strength of 150,000 and

(2): There is much salvage or unserviceable property that cannot be applied against requirements of any size force. However it is estimated that the requested force strength increase will raise requirements approximately as fol: Gen purpose vehicles—20%; Weapons (individual)—35%; Ammunition—35%.

In general, requirements for the requested increase can be met with stocks on hand, with sufficient stocks remaining to satisfy needs of Laos and Cambodia and making available to other Vietnam govt agencies the necessary weapons and equip to provide for a civilian security force of not exceeding 25,000; should such a force be decided upon.

It is my seriously considered view that Free Vietnam is at the critical point in its fight for freedom. The foundation has been laid for a strong government and society which offers opportunity for developing the loyalty of its citizens to the point where partisan warfare or resistance against the internal as well as external invader will be accepted as every man’s duty and obligation. The Vietnamese people are ripe for an active change away from the Viet Minh and toward the Free Vietnamese government. A position of military strength is basic to the attitude necessary for popular support of the Diem govt. Present circumstances and attitudes dictate unequivocally that a Free Vietnam armed strength of 150,000 through CY 56 is the minimum for the job to be done.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519 Series. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS.
2. See footnote 9, Document 239.

3. This telegram to the Secretary of Defense, dated July 30, was an interim assessment of ChMAAG’s request for an increase of Vietnamese armed forces from 100,000 to 150,000. In it CINCPAC concurred fully in the proposed increase for three reasons: the virtual elimination of the French as a major force to deter and resist aggression; the reluctance of Vietnam to further reduce forces; and lastly and mostly importantly, the need to contain the “internal threat to security of friendly government.” The last paragraph of the message reads:

   “I consider it most necessary that mission Vietnamese forces include potential capability of deterring aggression and delaying Viet Minh attack for same reasons stated Saigon 186 [Document 227] and because later implications Manila Pact. To fail to do so invites Viet Minh aggression and fails to gain full value of US support to Vietnam. Consider fully justified by changes situation; i.e., probable French withdrawal, present military situation and vastly improved Vietnam posture over recent months.” (JCS Records, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48)(2))

4. Document 227.
5. Neither found.