Office of the Historian

239. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

Washington, July 29, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Revised Force Bases for Vietnam

REFERENCES

  • State Cables from Saigon Nos. 183,2 184,3 1864
  • State Cable from Paris No. 2385
  • State Cables to Saigon Nos. 5681,6 497

Chief MAAG, Indochina, with the concurrence of the Ambassador and the Director, USOM, has recommended an increase in the authorized strength of Vietnamese armed forces to 150,000 for the balance of the calendar years 1955 and 1956. Such an increase will require substantial additional direct forces and defense support funds for FY 56. Accordingly, it is requested that you submit your comments [Page 504] on and recommendations concerning the Vietnamese force bases proposed by MAAG Indochina.8

In so doing, it is requested that you consider and present your views upon the following points:

a.
Any changes in the military situation resulting from the reduction of the FEC during the past year and the probable future phase-out of most French Union ground forces.
b.
The capability of the Viet Minh for subversive and paramilitary activities in Free Vietnam and the probability of their exercising those capabilities within the next year.
c.
The VNA strength required to (1) permit politically-necessary integration of some sect forces; (2) continue military operations against Binh Xuyen and dissident Hoa Hao elements; (3) contain the remaining sect forces; and (4) contain Viet Minh underground capability discussed in response to paragraph b above.
d.
The speed with which VNA forces could be demobilized without seriously affecting the efficiency of the army or greatly aggravating the existing internal security problem.
e.
The organization and functions of any VNA forces in excess of the presently planned three field and three territorial divisions.
f.
The effect of any increase in force levels upon the availability of excess stocks of military equipment for trans-shipment from Indochina.

In connection with point e it should be noted that existing U.S. national policy calls for supporting Vietnamese forces needed to maintain internal security, but not those designed to check external aggression. Accordingly, while the desirability of building up forces, such as the three existing field divisions, with a potential capability of deterring aggression and delaying any Viet Minh advance is recognized, such a mission must be thoroughly justified in the light of changed military circumstances if it is to be acceptable to U.S. Government authorities.

In order that no time may be lost in arriving at a decision on the size of the Vietnamese forces to be supported, the Department of Defense has already requested9 CINCPAC to submit as a matter of urgency his views on this matter. Since you may wish to consider these views in arriving at your own recommendations there may be a delay in providing the information requested. However, if it is at all practicable, your recommendations should be submitted not later than 15 August 1955.

A.C. Davis%%10
Vice Admiral, USN
  1. Source: JCS Records, CCS 092 Asia (6–25–48). Top Secret. This memorandum was filed as an enclosure to a note by the Joint Secretaries to the JCS (J.C.S. 1992/470), August 1. (ibid.)↩
  2. In this telegram, July 13, the Embassy reported that Vietnam’s Deputy Defense Minister was leaving Saigon for military discussions in Paris with the French with instructions to call for total withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam by March 1956. The Embassy questioned the wisdom of such an approach and expressed the fear that unless the United States discussed the matter with the French, it could be accused of assisting and encouraging the Vietnamese. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.51G/7–1355) Three footnotes in the source text citing telegram references have been eliminated. The information in those footnotes is in footnotes 3–8 below.↩
  3. Document 226.↩
  4. Document 227.↩
  5. In this telegram, July 15, the Embassy in Paris reported that inquiries with French Foreign Ministry officials confirmed MAAG Vietnam’s reports that the French had decided to withdraw the FEC from Indochina as rapidly as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/7–1555)↩
  6. Document 218.↩
  7. Document 224.↩
  8. See Document 247.↩
  9. In telegram DEF 985882 to CINCPAC, July 29. In this telegram, the second and third paragraphs of the memorandum printed here, including the lettered subparagraphs, are repeated verbatim. (Department of Defense Files)↩
  10. Printed from a typed copy which bears this signature and an indication that the original was signed.↩