Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

167. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 3, 1955—7 p.m.

5030. Ref Paris tel 4767, repeated Saigon 697.²

1. Since my arrival Saigon I have reviewed all messages sent Dept in my absence and have discussed events past week with all US agency chiefs.

2. I am convinced that Kidder has conducted himself extremely well during my absence, not only did he follow American policy, but he showed judgment and restraint in discussions with Ely and Van Laethem. Kidder confirms that he made no such statement as attributed to him by Ely, though he did point out differences in our point of view as to support of Diem. Conversation this morning with Ambassador Stephenson confirms fact that Ely was highly excited and emotional during this period.

3. Ely was completely calm yesterday during our discussion, but did make one slight reference to Kidder, who was present. I immediately stated that Kidder had done no more nor less than I would have done, and that I fully supported his actions. Ely did not press the point, but Van Laethem became so satirical in answering my questions with respect to “proof” of alleged Viet Minh penetration into Diem entourage, that I had to speak rather sharply to him.

4. French have sniped at Lansdale ever since I have been here. I have consistently defended him and will continue to do so. He has performed a highly useful service and has definitely been a restraining influence not only on Diem but on such characters as Trinh Minh The, who has a strong anti-French bias. We must maintain contact with people like The, and Lansdale is our best agent for this purpose.

5. This attitude of Berard’s, which reflects Ely’s irritation with US policy towards Diem, is one of the most disturbing developments which has transpired during the current crisis.³ At my weekly staff meeting this morning I was somewhat shocked at the strong anti-French feeling among the staff officers present as a result of incidents of the past week. I am studying this situation, as well as the widening breach between the Vietnamese and the French, in an attempt to determine what can be done by ourselves and the French to curb these growing frictions, which if permitted to grow could have disastrous results. I will report further on this in my overall evaluation of the situation sometime tomorrow.⁴

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–355. Top Secret; Priority.
2. In this telegram, May 2, the Embassy in Paris reported that Berard had read to Achilles excerpts from a telegram from Ely quoting Kidder as stating that Franco-American cooperation in Saigon was no longer possible. Berard expressed deep concern with Kidder’s attitude and with the activities of Lansdale. Berard charged that Kidder, and particularly Lansdale, had not merely failed to try to restrain Diem, but had encouraged him to take armed action. Achilles doubted, according to the reporting telegram, whether Kidder and Lansdale would have encouraged Diem. (Ibid., 751G.00/5–255)
3. The Department of State, in telegram 3940 to Paris, repeated to Saigon, May 5, rejected Berard’s “insinuations and allegations” and the Embassy in Paris was instructed to inform the French that in view of forthcoming discussions on Vietnam, such personal recriminations were regrettable and ill-timed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–2555)
4. Apparently the reference is to the observations in Document 173.