Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

166. Memorandum of a Conversation, Saigon, May 3, 1955¹

Saigon, May 3, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• Malcolm MacDonald, High Commissoner for UK in Southeast Asia
• Ambassador Stephenson, UK
• Ambassador Collins
• Randolph A. Kidder

SUBJECT

• Conversation on Current Political Problems

1. Mr. MacDonald opened the conversation by referring to the Revolutionary Committee of the People of Vietnam which has issued a proclamation stating that it no longer recognizes Bao Dai, advocating that Diem turn over his powers to the Committee and then undertake to form a new government. Cao Dai Generals Trinh Minh The and Phuong are prominent in this group.

2. MacDonald said that the British Embassy has had a study made of the composition and political sentiments of the members of this group. They have feared Viet Minh infiltration. So far they have turned out the name of only one person they believe to be a Viet Minh—Pho. There is another, Thanh, head of the Legal Association, who is questionable, both, I gather, as to membership in the Committee and as to Viet Minh affiliations. Ambassador Collins said we likewise were making a study on the subject and that Americans and British should coordinate their activities. He outlined to MacDonald Ely’s apprehension regarding the Committee and particularly Trinh Minh The.

3. MacDonald said he had talked with Diem and had urged him to attempt to maintain best possible relations with all groups with a view to forming a broader based government of national union. Diem told MacDonald that Bao Dai had been insulting to him in his messages and talked about the National Front. MacDonald got the impression that Diem would like to see Bao Dai deposed but he would not say so directly. Ambassador Collins commented that the Revolutionary Committee represents nobody except its members and that only an elected National Assembly could be in a position to express the national will with regard to Bao Dai. Ambassador Collins said that we must look ahead and ask ourselves whether Diem with all his well-known failings could be expected to be able to run a government any more efficiently than he had in the past. Until there is a National Assembly the removal of Bao Dai has great potential danger.

4. MacDonald, who has always been one of Bao Dai’s most stalwart champions, said Bao Dai has lost much ground even in the last week, that through his recent blunders he has “shot his bolt” for the time being, but we should hope that he will not be overthrown as he may still be useful.

5. Ambassador Collins outlined to MacDonald the present United States position as reflected in Deptel 4831.² He also outlined to MacDonald the attempts he had made prior to his return to Washington to synthesize various Vietnamese proposals starting with that of Thoai for the establishment of an interim government pending compilation [completion?] of a partially-elected assembly.

6. Reference was made to the conciliatory nature of Bao Dai’s last message to Diem,³ copy of which none of us has yet seen. Stephenson said that the radio this morning reported that Bao Dai intended to return to Vietnam when order has been restored.

7. As MacDonald is seeing Ely again this afternoon, the problem of what he should emphasize to Ely was discussed. It was agreed that he should urge Ely to find some method by which the three Binh Xuyen posts in the French Security Zone might be evacuated, and that he might further suggest that if the French consider it still necessary to maintain liaison with Binh Xuyen they should at least explain the nature of this liaison to the Vietnamese and limit the number of men involved.

8. MacDonald said he had seen Quat this morning. Quat, with his group of intellectuals, is preparing a program which they intend to announce after talking with the French, British and ourselves. The program will recommend (1) that Diem return his powers to Bao Dai from whom he received them, and (2) that Bao Dai return to Vietnam to form a new government. After discussion of the Quat program, MacDonald agreed that Ambassador Collins should discourage Quat. MacDonald told Ambassador Collins that the latter could so inform Quat.⁴

1. Source: Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, K. Secret. Drafted by Kidder.
2. Document 164.
3. Not found.
4. No memorandum has been found of a subsequent conversation between Collins and Quat.