164. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, May 1,
1955—2:10 p.m.
4831. To Collins from Secretary.
- 1.
- Events in past few days have put Vietnamese situation in broader and different perspective than when you were here. It is now no longer simply a question of whether and under what conditions Diem Government should be altered. In the US and the world at large Diem rightly or wrongly is becoming symbol of Vietnamese nationalism struggling against French colonialism and corrupt backward elements. Rightly or wrongly Bao Dai by his recent measures gives the appearance of acting in league with these forces and Diem is emerging as popular hero here.
- 2.
- Since your departure US public and Congressional opinion, in view of Diem’s apparent success in the current military and political battle, is now even less likely than before to support or countenance a removal of Diem forced from without. There is increasing Congressional support for Senator Mansfield’s views with which you are already familiar.
- 3.
- For us at this time to participate in a scheme to remove Diem would not only be domestically impractical but highly detrimental our prestige in Asia. Reported developments, if confirmed and if followed through to a successful conclusion, would appear to overtake some of the principal reasons previously advanced for US to support Diem’s removal.
- 4.
- In this situation we believe that indigenous and nationalist political forces in Saigon and Vietnam should be allowed to work out a solution. It may transpire that a broad-based and acceptable government with or without Diem will evolve out of present crisis. We do not desire to support measures tending to undercut government elements.
- 5.
- Accordingly we believe you should at this juncture:
- (a)
- Indicate that US supporting Diem Government to maintain its authority and to restore law and order.
- (b)
- Counsel Diem continue policy of restraint and moderation toward French.
- (c)
- Urge Ely not take measures which prejudice position Diem Government and national army and caution Ely that US would deplore any military or logistical intervention French forces against Diem Government.
- (d)
- Without French restraint we doubt US counsel to Diem (under (b) above) could be effective.
- 6.
- I recognize that in such a fast-moving situation there may develop factors of which we are unaware here. I will be looking forward to your analyses and continuing recommendations.
- 7.
- Paris and London pass substance to French and British authorities.
Dulles
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–155. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Young and cleared in draft with Bowie, MacArthur, and Dulles. Repeated for information priority to Paris and London.↩