Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

110. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 10, 1955—10 p.m.

4452. For Secretary from Collins. Ref Deptels 4438² and 4444,³ just received.

1. Ref paras 2 and 4 Deptel 4438:

a. While there probably is some difference between our outlook with regard to Binh Xuyen and viewpoint of Paris, which does create impression that Paris tends to regard Binh Xuyen and other sects as being on same level as Diem’s govt, this has not really been the case as between Ely and myself. Ely does incline towards dignifying revolt of the “Unified Front” of sects as a “legitimate revolution”. He once compared it to revolutions in Central America, in which we recognized the revolutionary government. I do not believe French have any special solicitude for Binh Xuyen as distinct from other sects. Fact that Binh Xuyen play chief role in most critical problem of present crisis, i.e. control of National Police, and are leaders of sect “Unified Front” has brought them into spotlight. However, in fact, Ely has supported Diem in this conflict, though he has not given the govt a free hand in moving more troops into Saigon during period of current truce. He is completely sincere in feeling that while the govt could drive Binh Xuyen out of Saigon–Cholon, result would not be a solution, even of the current situation but would lead to civil war and definite loss of country to Communism.

b. I have been here too short a time, and our intelligence (and I don’t mean to be critical) is not good enough for me to challenge this evaluation of Ely in which he is supported by men like General Gambiez and Wintrebert, who have been completely friendly to us and our approach, and who know this country and the sects far better than we do.

c. The root of the trouble is not in any divergence of U.S. and French views with regard to sect rebellion. Real reason that I feel it would be best to accede to replacement of Diem is that Diem himself, for reasons outlined in my 4448 and other messages, simply cannot successfully rule this country alone with the advice of his brothers and a handful of other advisors who have no public standing of consequence.

d. If left to his own devices, Diem would attack the Binh Xuyen Sûreté headquarters in the heart of Saigon, as well as Binh Xuyen headquarters on outskirts of Saigon–Cholon and their various posts scattered throughout the two cities. If this is done, there will be considerable bloodshed, destruction of property, wounds will be created which will be impossible to heal, and civil war may well result. A number of senior officers of VN army are dead set against such procedure, and army itself would have no stomach for taking on the sects in a new battle of rice paddies and forests. Population at large would simply not comprehend initiation of warfare between govt and any non-Communist groups such as sects no matter what the issues involved. They know little of these issues and probably understand less.

e. There is no point in going back over the incidents which led up to this current situation. Irrespective of my personal views, responsible VN leaders such as Quat, Do, Minh and their associates are convinced that current tragic situation could have been avoided had Diem shown any flexibility and adeptness in his dealings with Bay Vien and other sect leaders. They may possibly be wrong in this, but that is their conviction.

2. Reference paras 3 and 7:

a. I do not know whether, at the time Diem was selected for the presidency, any consideration was given to either Quat or Do. I voiced my doubts about Diem’s capabilities in estimates of the situation which I sent Dept at end of first week and first month of my stay here. See Embtels 1830, 2108, 2250 and 2303.⁴ During period of these reports I agreed that Diem appeared to be best available man, but did not rule out Quat as an acceptable substitute. I felt then and now that with full support from France and the U.S. Quat could make the grade, since then I have come to know Do and have considerable respect for his ability, though he has less force than Quat. Each of these men has far more flexibility than Diem and has an infinitely more practical approach to the problems of his country, which they know and understand far better than we do. We are not dealing here with fully rational, educated, unbiased Westerners. The Prime Minister of this country must know how to direct and handle men who are highly venal, and who have not yet learned to subordinate their selfish interests for the good of their new and unstable country. Diem cannot make these mental adjustments, and has no knack for the solution of these problems. Do and Quat do.

c. [sic] Reference Quat’s acceptability to the sects, it was Diem who offered this as a reason for not taking Quat into the government after he had promised me to do so. Foreign Minister Do felt then and now that while the sects would not be happy under Quat, their objections could be overcome.

3. Reference paragraph 5: When it was agreed that strength of National Army would be determined primarily on basis of requirements for domestic security rather than to fight external aggression, it was considered that it would be used primarily against Viet Minh Communists. I doubt that anyone visualized its employment against the sects which despite their obvious faults, are perhaps currently the most effective organized anti-Communist elements within country other than National Army. It must be remembered also that, because of delays in reaching agreement regarding training responsibility, our MAAG has been unable, thus far, to have much influence on the morale, discipline, and state of readiness of VN armed forces. We have not had opportunity to set this army aside, reorganize it and train it, before it had to be employed in its [garble] pacification operation. In any event, whatever the reasons, fact remains that the leaders of this army would not be fully united, and personnel of the army would be completely unenthusiastic about embarking at this time on a civil war against even Binh Xuyen alone.

4. Re para 6, I agree completely that central government must regain control of National Police if it is to govern effectively. It is for this reason that alternative steps 1a. and 1b. mytel 4448 were predicated on this basic condition. Ely agrees with us in principle on this condition and as I indicated would disagree only as timing and means by which transfer of police control should be brought about.

5. Ref para 8:

a. The charge that U.S. assent to removal of Diem would mean that we were supporting French colonialism could readily be contested. Both Do and Quat are recognized nationalists. Do for example, has never participated in any of the French sponsored govts. He and his brother Chuong (VN Ambassador in Washington) have, in fact, very strong anti-French bias. Furthermore, it was recently pointed out with considerable logic, and it is now generally accepted here that Diem remains in office only because of French and U.S. support. Whether or not we wish it he thus bears the tag of foreign support, which in Asia is closely associated with “colonial interests”. This would be less true of Quat or Do.

b. As pointed out in para 3a., mytel 4448, we should endeavor to have French propose successor, though he must be someone acceptable to us. I feel sure that if Ely’s advice is followed French will not propose Buu Hoi, Tam, Huu, or anyone else closely associated with French colonial interests. We would of course make clear that we would not let French call the tune as to the program of the new govt. My understanding is French have already agreed to both programs Ely and I have developed.

6. Ref para 9:

a. I realize that strong resistance to Diem’s removal may develop in US Senate. I have no way of judging Mansfield’s position under present conditions. These conditions are rather different than those existing when he visited Vietnam in September, 1954 when he feared military dictatorship as only alternative to Diem (see page 14, Mansfield Report⁵). As practical politicians, I would think that Mansfield and his colleagues on Senate committees would give considerable weight to the arguments I have advanced in my recent telegraphic letter to you, and other pertinent messages.

b. With respect to a possible intermediate solution, I can see none other than to have the police powers transferred now by Diem with the full support of Bao Dai and the background support of France and US. The outcome of such action I cannot clearly estimate. I repeat that Ely and his French colleagues are convinced it would lead to civil war; the suggestion that “at same time other elements be brought into the govt under conditions which will assure delegation of authority” is the one that really stumps me. For 5 months I have been trying to get Diem to do just this, without any success whatever. I doubt that Diem could effect such a change even if he knew definitely that the only alternative to his not doing so would be his relief by Bao Dai. As I have already pointed out, no strong man of ability that we know of will now join Diem’s Cabinet under any conditions. This is not just because they fear Diem’s govt may be overthrown by Binh Xuyen and sect coalition, but because they are thoroughly disillusioned as to Diem’s work methods, and unwilling subject themselves to membership in Cabinet where they would be assuming responsibility but in fact have no authority.

7. Ref para 11: I fully appreciate the tremendous difficulties and complexities which Diem has had to face. I have great sympathy for him and deep admiration for his courage, his objectives and his integrity. But I am simply convinced that as a matter of practical politics, he cannot organize and lead a govt which can successfully contest the unity of purpose, skill and efficiency of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh. And since our stake here, from moral, psychological and strategic reasons is so great, I feel we must, however reluctantly, be willing to withdraw our support from even as fine a man as Diem in order to have any real chance of preventing the fall of this country to Communism. I may be wrong, but I do [not] feel that Diem is completely indispensable. I am thinking in terms of our national interest and good of Vietnam, rather than in terms of a single man.

8. I hope this message does not appear to be contentious. It is not intended to be so. I fully appreciate seriousness of problems this situation presents to our govt and difficulty of their solution.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1055. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Supra.
3. In this telegram, April 9, Dulles informed Collins that his telegram 4448 from Saigon, April 9 (Document 108), was being carefully considered and in the meantime he wished to hear Collins’ thoughts on telegram 4438 to Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–955)
4. For texts, dated November 15, December 6, December 13, and December 16, 1954, respectively, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 2250, 2341, 2362, and 2379.
5. The reference is to “Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos,” October 15, 1954, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.