109. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
4438. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Have this morning discussed situation with highest authority. We are disposed to back whatever your final decision is but before you actually finalize we want to be sure you have weighed all of the factors which concern us here.
We feel that what has happened does not reveal anything new about Diem but rather a basic and dangerous misunderstanding as between France and the U.S.
We have always known the qualities which Diem possesses and those which he lacks. Nevertheless our two countries agreed to support him in default of any one possessing better qualifications. The only alternatives now suggested are the same persons who were regarded as unacceptable substitutes some months ago.
What has happened is that whereas the United States has been proceeding on the assumption that Diem would be backed as against any who might challenge him assuming that he had the capability, apparently the French have given their support only on the assumption that the Binh Xuyen would also be supported as an autonomous authority and that when they challenged Diem he would not be allowed to use force to assert his authority over it.
We can appreciate the reluctance of the French to see force used but if it cannot be used then what is the point of our supporting at great cost the national army which I thought it had been agreed was primarily to be an army for domestic security rather than an army to fight external aggression.
U.S. recognizes that Cao Dai and even the Hoa Hao are genuine sects with cultural religious and political roots which cannot be forcibly torn up without grave consequences which should be avoided but we do not believe that any central government can exist as more [Page 230] than a figurehead if it does not have control over the national police and if this control is farmed out to a gang which exploits its privileges to protect vice on a vastly profitable scale and which exists by virtue of the backing of the self-exiled Bao Dai and the French.
We cannot see that replacement of Diem by any persons you mentioned will of itself correct this situation and indeed we have had the impression that Quat was less acceptable to the sects than is Diem.
There are two other factors to be borne in mind.
One is that it is widely known that Diem has so far existed by reason of U.S. support despite French reluctance. If, however, when the showdown comes the French view prevails then that will gravely weaken our influence for the future both in Vietnam and elsewhere. Removal of Diem under these circumstances may well be interpreted in Vietnam and Asia as example of U.S. paying lip service to nationalist cause and then forsaking true nationalist leader when “colonial interests” put enough pressure on us. The French constantly assert that the U.S. has a primary responsibility in this part of the world but it is difficult to have responsibility without authority. In essence, will not the ouster of Diem on the present conditions mean that from now on we will be merely paying the bill and the French will be calling the tune. Any successor of Diem will clearly know where the real authority lies.
The second factor is that there will be very strong opposition in the Congress to supporting the situation in Indochina generally and Vietnam in particular if Diem is replaced under existing circumstances. We do not say that this opposition may not in the last instance be overcome, particularly if you personally can make a case before the Congressional committees but Mansfield who is looked upon with great respect by his colleagues with reference to this matter, is adamantly opposed to abandonment of Diem under present conditions.2 I wonder whether there is not some intermediate solution between the present extremes now discussed and that Diem can be allowed to regain his damaged prestige by an assertion of authority over the Binh Xuyen and at the same time other elements be brought into the government under conditions which will assure a real delegation of authority.
I feel that as with most orientals Diem must be highly suspicious of what is going on about him and that this suspicion exaggerates his natural disposition to be secretive and untrustful. If he ever really felt that the French and ourselves were solidly behind him might he not really broaden his government? We must I think have some sympathy [Page 231] for his predicament as he is constantly called “the Diem experiment”.
In conclusion I want to reaffirm the very great confidence which we all have in you and in your judgment. You have done and are doing a wonderful job in the face of tremendous difficulties.
Your 44483 has just arrived in Department but is not yet decoded. We will comment on it in subsequent telegram.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–955. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles. Printed also in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 907–909.↩
- See Document 107.↩
- Supra.↩
- See Document 115.↩